But this is still a combination of two questions, the latter of which longtermists have never, to my knowledge, considered probabilistically:[3]
What is the probability that the event kills all living humans?
What effect does the event otherwise have on the probability that we eventually reach an interstellar/existentially secure state, [4] given the possibility of multiple civilisational collapses and ‘reboots’? (where the first reboot is the second civilisation)
3^ The closest thing I know to such an attempt is Luisa Rodriguez’s post What is the likelihood that civilizational collapse would cause technological stagnation? (outdated research), in which she gives some specific probabilities of the chance of a preagricultural civilisation recovering industry based on a grid of extinction rates and scenarios which, after researching the subject, she found reasonably plausible. But this relates only to a single instance of trying to do this (on my reading, specifically the first time, since she imagines the North Antelope Rochelle Coal Mine still having reserves), and only progresses us approximately as far as early 19th century England. Also, per the title’s addendum, she now considers the conclusion too optimistic, but doesn’t feel comfortable giving a quantified update.
I also have not seen analyses of multiple reboots. But in terms of recovery from one loss of civilization, What We Owe the Future touches on it some. Also, my original cost-effectiveness analysis for the long-term future for nuclear war explicitly modeled recovery from collapse. However, then I realized that there were other mechanisms to long-term future impact, such as making global totalitarianism more likely or resulting in worse values in AGI, so I moved to reduction in long-term future value associated with nuclear war or other catastrophes. I like that you are breaking this up into more terms and more reboots, because I think that will result in more accurate modeling.
Thanks for the kind words, David. And apologies—I’d forgotten you’d published those explicit estimates. I’ll edit them in to the OP.
My memory of WWOtF is that Will talks about the process, but other than giving a quick estimate of ’90% chance we recover without coal, 95% chance with’ he doesn’t do as much quantifying as you and Luisa.
Also Lewis Dartnell talked about the process extensively in The Knowledge, but I don’t think he gives any estimate at all about probabilities (the closest I could find was in an essay for Aeon where he opined that ‘an industrial revolution without coal would be, at a minimum, very difficult’).
I think this is a very valuable project.
I also have not seen analyses of multiple reboots. But in terms of recovery from one loss of civilization, What We Owe the Future touches on it some. Also, my original cost-effectiveness analysis for the long-term future for nuclear war explicitly modeled recovery from collapse. However, then I realized that there were other mechanisms to long-term future impact, such as making global totalitarianism more likely or resulting in worse values in AGI, so I moved to reduction in long-term future value associated with nuclear war or other catastrophes. I like that you are breaking this up into more terms and more reboots, because I think that will result in more accurate modeling.
Thanks for the kind words, David. And apologies—I’d forgotten you’d published those explicit estimates. I’ll edit them in to the OP.
My memory of WWOtF is that Will talks about the process, but other than giving a quick estimate of ’90% chance we recover without coal, 95% chance with’ he doesn’t do as much quantifying as you and Luisa.
Also Lewis Dartnell talked about the process extensively in The Knowledge, but I don’t think he gives any estimate at all about probabilities (the closest I could find was in an essay for Aeon where he opined that ‘an industrial revolution without coal would be, at a minimum, very difficult’).