Very quickly, what I assume: 1. Pre-FTX-crisis, FTX funded EV for ~$22mil. 2. Post-FTX-bankruptcy, the current FTX bankruptcy lawyers are coming after many groups that FTX gave money to for clawbacks. I assume they threatened EV US with legal action, unless the money was fully returned. 3. The final agreement between the two is for EV US to give back all $22mil to FTX debtors.
Very close. There were also some transfers in 2018 & 2019, totalling about $2.7MM. There was $22.54MM transferred in 2022, for a total of $25.24MM (some numbers rounded). The estate is basically giving up on recovering the 2018/2019 transfers in exchange for getting 100% of the 2022 ones back.
I suspect the defenses on the 2018 transfers in particular were much more viable—they were more than four years prior to bankruptcy filing, which (relying on memory) is a very important threshold in applicable law. In addition, that Alameda was insolvent may be much murkier in 2018 than in 2022. (The 2019 transfers were tiny, so they were probably an afterthought.) I don’t have a firm opinion on whether they were winning, but if you offered me $100 if I correctly guessed whether the estate would win on the 2018 transfers, I’d say “no.”
It’s in Doc. 3745 -- this is for the EV US settlement only, the earmarks for the smaller EV US settlement are not included. TL;DR: Mostly CEA and Longview with 2.5MM for Atlas Fellowship, about 750K each for LTFF and GWWC.
Someone needs to confirm whether ordinary donor funds might be used to cover any charge to LTFF, as that might influence some folks’ end of year decisions. Edit: Zach confirmed they will not.
Very quickly, what I assume:
1. Pre-FTX-crisis, FTX funded EV for ~$22mil.
2. Post-FTX-bankruptcy, the current FTX bankruptcy lawyers are coming after many groups that FTX gave money to for clawbacks. I assume they threatened EV US with legal action, unless the money was fully returned.
3. The final agreement between the two is for EV US to give back all $22mil to FTX debtors.
Very close. There were also some transfers in 2018 & 2019, totalling about $2.7MM. There was $22.54MM transferred in 2022, for a total of $25.24MM (some numbers rounded). The estate is basically giving up on recovering the 2018/2019 transfers in exchange for getting 100% of the 2022 ones back.
I suspect the defenses on the 2018 transfers in particular were much more viable—they were more than four years prior to bankruptcy filing, which (relying on memory) is a very important threshold in applicable law. In addition, that Alameda was insolvent may be much murkier in 2018 than in 2022. (The 2019 transfers were tiny, so they were probably an afterthought.) I don’t have a firm opinion on whether they were winning, but if you offered me $100 if I correctly guessed whether the estate would win on the 2018 transfers, I’d say “no.”
Thanks for the clarity here!
I wonder what EV projects the money was dedicated for. Which project actually ended up with a budget shortfall?
It’s in Doc. 3745 -- this is for the EV US settlement only, the earmarks for the smaller EV US settlement are not included. TL;DR: Mostly CEA and Longview with 2.5MM for Atlas Fellowship, about 750K each for LTFF and GWWC.
Someone needs to confirm whether ordinary donor funds might be used to cover any charge to LTFF, as that might influence some folks’ end of year decisions.Edit: Zach confirmed they will not.(FYI, Atlas won’t be ending up with a budget shortfall as a result of this.)