I very much agree the suffering of farmed vertebrates is much more intense than that of soil animals. Here is the welfare per animal-year I got for my preferred exponent of the number of neurons of 0.5:
For broilers in a conventional scenario, −0.115 QALY/animal-year.
For hens in a conventional cage, −0.0857 QALY/animal-year.
For shrimp on an ongrowing farm with air asphyxiation slaughter, −0.00877 QALY/animal-year.
For soil ants, −4.26*10^-4 QALY/animal-year.
For soil termites, −2.70*10^-4 QALY/animal-year.
For soil springtails, −6.60*10^-5 QALY/animal-year.
For soil mites, −4.47*10^-5 QALY/animal-year.
For soil nematodes, −1.31*10^-5 QALY/animal-year.
However, I estimate changes in the expected welfare of soil animals are much larger than changes in the expected welfare of farmed vertebrates because many more soil-animal-years are affected per $. As a classical utilitarian, what matters for me is just the change in the expected welfare, so I believe it makes sense to focus on the effects on soil animals.
In the message I sent you, I said “I am indifferent between i) averting 1 billion animal-years of suffering with intensity 10^-9, and ii) averting 1 animal-year of suffering with intensity 1”, as both avert 1 animal-year of suffering with intensity 1 in expectation. However, for people who care about averting intense suffering on top of what is implied by maximising expected welfare, ii) may be much more valuable than i), in which case neglecting effects on soil animals may well make perfect sense.
On the other hand, it is unclear to me whether prioritising intense suffering implies focussing on farmed vertebrates. I guess the most intense suffering in humans is more intense than the most intense suffering in farmed vertebrates. So prioritising the most intense suffering implies focussing on humans. One can intrinsically value increasing expected welfare, and averting intense suffering. Yet, I feel like there is a significant risk that the weights of these 2 goals would be defined such that the implied priorities align with one’s desired priorities instead of being a reflection of one’s most reflected intuitions. I prefer maximising expected welfare because I see it as the approach making the fewest assumptions (the quantity of happiness/suffering is proportional to duration, intensity, and probability).
It is difficult to know what is the intensity of the pains used in the cumulative pain method. So I like that you present separate results for annoying, hurtful, disabling, and excruciating pain.
I agree one can be much more confident about increasing the welfare of farmed animals than about increasing the welfare of soil animals. Nevertheless, I believe one should consider changes in the expected welfare of all animals. Consider the following interventions:
A. Increases the welfare of chickens by 1 QALY with a probability of 100 %, decreases the welfare of soil animals by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %, and increases the welfare of soil animals by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %. As a result, welfare:
Decreases by 999 QALY (= 1*1 − 0.5*1*10^3) with a probability of 50 %.
Increases by 1,001 QALY (= 1*1 + 0.5*1*10^3) with a probability of 50 %.
Is expected to increase by 1 QALY (= −0.5*999 + 0.5*1,001).
B. Decreases the welfare of soil animals by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %, and increases the welfare of soil animals by 2 kQALY with a probability of 50 %. As a result, welfare:
Decreases by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %.
Increases by 2 kQALY with a probability of 50 %.
Is expected to increase by 500 QALY (= −0.5*1*10^3 + 0.5*2*10^3).
One can be much more confident that A increases the welfare of chicken than that B increases the welfare of soil animals. A increases the welfare of chickens with a probability of 100 %, whereas B increases the welfare of soil animals with a probability of only 50 %. Nonetheless, I would say B is more tractable than A. Both have a probability of increasing welfare of only 50 %, but B is expected to increase welfare much more than A. Analogously, I believe both chicken welfare corporate campaigns, and cheaply saving human lives have a probability of increasing welfare only slighly above 50 %, and that the latter increases welfare much more cost-effectively in expectation than the former.
Thanks, Vasco. I think we’ve clarified where our frameworks diverge—you prioritize maximizing expected welfare, assuming that equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share), whereas I tend to emphasize minimizing the most intense forms of suffering. Both approaches have their merits, but they naturally lead to different prioritizations. Perhaps we can just agree to disagree on this point.
equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share)
How do you compare experiences of different intensity and duration? For example, how would you decide between averting 10 h of annoying pain, or 1 h of hurtful pain. I would assign intensities to experiences based on the time trade-offs I would make (all else equal; experiencing more pain may be worth it for instrumental reasons), and then calculate the total welfare from the product between intensity (positive or negative) and duration.
One could have the view that welfare reforms are only worth it they decrease the time in each of WFI’s 4 categories of pain. However, these categories could be further broken down into ones with a narrower range of intensity. For consistency, I believe people with that view would only be able to say that a welfare reform is worth it if it decrease the time in pain at any given level of intensity. There is a practically continuous spetrum of possible pain intensities, and I assume it would be extremely difficult to measure them all. In this case, it would be very difficult to determine whether any welfare reform is worth it.
Thanks, Wladimir. Note prioritising decreasing the most intense pain may lead to counterintuitive conclusions. According to WFI, hens in furnished cages experience slighly less excruciating pain than ones in cage-free aviaries. So I do not think there is a strong case for moving from furnished cages to cage-free aviaries if one only prioritises decreasing excruciating pain, which is the most intense category of pain defined by WFI.
I assume you also value decreasing less intense pain, but not proportionally to intensity. I guess decreasing pain which is 50 % as intense is less than 50 % as valuable in your mind, whereas I would say it is 50 % as valuable holding duration, and probability constant.
Thanks Vasco. I’d like to clarify that Disabling Pain is also a severe/intensive level—think of it as the kind of crippling back pain or intense headache that prevents any enjoyment or productivity. And our project study found that moving a hen from a furnished cage to a cage-free aviary prevents, on average, hundreds of hours of Disabling Pain during her laying life. Specifically, transitioning to cage-free systems avoids approximately 275 hours of Disabling pain ( https://welfarefootprint.org/laying-hens).
Additionally, as argued in the book, the estimates for Excruciating Pain were extremely conservative (i.e. Cumulative Pain in both cage systems is likely higher than estimated). We’ll have full estimates soon, once ‘The Welfare Footprint of the Egg’ is released.
Thanks for clarifying, Wladimir. I will also try to clear up my point. In the same way you seem to prioritise decreasing disabling and excruciating pain much more than decreasing annoying and hurtful pain (in particular, much more than justified by pain intensities), I was thinking some may prioritise decreasing excruciating pain much more than decreasing disabling pain. Some people may even go further, and prioritise decreasing the most intense forms of excruciating pain, potentially to an extent cage-free reforms would have very small benefits due to not decreasing the maximum pain intensity. For example, one may only care about the worst 0.1 s of a chicken’s life (arguably during stunning or slaughter), and this be almost exactly as bad for hens in conventional cages and cage-free aviaries.
Thanks for the feedback, Wladimir!
I very much agree the suffering of farmed vertebrates is much more intense than that of soil animals. Here is the welfare per animal-year I got for my preferred exponent of the number of neurons of 0.5:
For broilers in a conventional scenario, −0.115 QALY/animal-year.
For hens in a conventional cage, −0.0857 QALY/animal-year.
For shrimp on an ongrowing farm with air asphyxiation slaughter, −0.00877 QALY/animal-year.
For soil ants, −4.26*10^-4 QALY/animal-year.
For soil termites, −2.70*10^-4 QALY/animal-year.
For soil springtails, −6.60*10^-5 QALY/animal-year.
For soil mites, −4.47*10^-5 QALY/animal-year.
For soil nematodes, −1.31*10^-5 QALY/animal-year.
However, I estimate changes in the expected welfare of soil animals are much larger than changes in the expected welfare of farmed vertebrates because many more soil-animal-years are affected per $. As a classical utilitarian, what matters for me is just the change in the expected welfare, so I believe it makes sense to focus on the effects on soil animals.
In the message I sent you, I said “I am indifferent between i) averting 1 billion animal-years of suffering with intensity 10^-9, and ii) averting 1 animal-year of suffering with intensity 1”, as both avert 1 animal-year of suffering with intensity 1 in expectation. However, for people who care about averting intense suffering on top of what is implied by maximising expected welfare, ii) may be much more valuable than i), in which case neglecting effects on soil animals may well make perfect sense.
On the other hand, it is unclear to me whether prioritising intense suffering implies focussing on farmed vertebrates. I guess the most intense suffering in humans is more intense than the most intense suffering in farmed vertebrates. So prioritising the most intense suffering implies focussing on humans. One can intrinsically value increasing expected welfare, and averting intense suffering. Yet, I feel like there is a significant risk that the weights of these 2 goals would be defined such that the implied priorities align with one’s desired priorities instead of being a reflection of one’s most reflected intuitions. I prefer maximising expected welfare because I see it as the approach making the fewest assumptions (the quantity of happiness/suffering is proportional to duration, intensity, and probability).
It is difficult to know what is the intensity of the pains used in the cumulative pain method. So I like that you present separate results for annoying, hurtful, disabling, and excruciating pain.
I agree one can be much more confident about increasing the welfare of farmed animals than about increasing the welfare of soil animals. Nevertheless, I believe one should consider changes in the expected welfare of all animals. Consider the following interventions:
A. Increases the welfare of chickens by 1 QALY with a probability of 100 %, decreases the welfare of soil animals by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %, and increases the welfare of soil animals by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %. As a result, welfare:
Decreases by 999 QALY (= 1*1 − 0.5*1*10^3) with a probability of 50 %.
Increases by 1,001 QALY (= 1*1 + 0.5*1*10^3) with a probability of 50 %.
Is expected to increase by 1 QALY (= −0.5*999 + 0.5*1,001).
B. Decreases the welfare of soil animals by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %, and increases the welfare of soil animals by 2 kQALY with a probability of 50 %. As a result, welfare:
Decreases by 1 kQALY with a probability of 50 %.
Increases by 2 kQALY with a probability of 50 %.
Is expected to increase by 500 QALY (= −0.5*1*10^3 + 0.5*2*10^3).
One can be much more confident that A increases the welfare of chicken than that B increases the welfare of soil animals. A increases the welfare of chickens with a probability of 100 %, whereas B increases the welfare of soil animals with a probability of only 50 %. Nonetheless, I would say B is more tractable than A. Both have a probability of increasing welfare of only 50 %, but B is expected to increase welfare much more than A. Analogously, I believe both chicken welfare corporate campaigns, and cheaply saving human lives have a probability of increasing welfare only slighly above 50 %, and that the latter increases welfare much more cost-effectively in expectation than the former.
Thanks, Vasco. I think we’ve clarified where our frameworks diverge—you prioritize maximizing expected welfare, assuming that equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share), whereas I tend to emphasize minimizing the most intense forms of suffering. Both approaches have their merits, but they naturally lead to different prioritizations. Perhaps we can just agree to disagree on this point.
Hi Wladimir.
How do you compare experiences of different intensity and duration? For example, how would you decide between averting 10 h of annoying pain, or 1 h of hurtful pain. I would assign intensities to experiences based on the time trade-offs I would make (all else equal; experiencing more pain may be worth it for instrumental reasons), and then calculate the total welfare from the product between intensity (positive or negative) and duration.
One could have the view that welfare reforms are only worth it they decrease the time in each of WFI’s 4 categories of pain. However, these categories could be further broken down into ones with a narrower range of intensity. For consistency, I believe people with that view would only be able to say that a welfare reform is worth it if it decrease the time in pain at any given level of intensity. There is a practically continuous spetrum of possible pain intensities, and I assume it would be extremely difficult to measure them all. In this case, it would be very difficult to determine whether any welfare reform is worth it.
Thanks, Wladimir. Note prioritising decreasing the most intense pain may lead to counterintuitive conclusions. According to WFI, hens in furnished cages experience slighly less excruciating pain than ones in cage-free aviaries. So I do not think there is a strong case for moving from furnished cages to cage-free aviaries if one only prioritises decreasing excruciating pain, which is the most intense category of pain defined by WFI.
I assume you also value decreasing less intense pain, but not proportionally to intensity. I guess decreasing pain which is 50 % as intense is less than 50 % as valuable in your mind, whereas I would say it is 50 % as valuable holding duration, and probability constant.
Thanks Vasco. I’d like to clarify that Disabling Pain is also a severe/intensive level—think of it as the kind of crippling back pain or intense headache that prevents any enjoyment or productivity. And our project study found that moving a hen from a furnished cage to a cage-free aviary prevents, on average, hundreds of hours of Disabling Pain during her laying life. Specifically, transitioning to cage-free systems avoids approximately 275 hours of Disabling pain ( https://welfarefootprint.org/laying-hens).
Additionally, as argued in the book, the estimates for Excruciating Pain were extremely conservative (i.e. Cumulative Pain in both cage systems is likely higher than estimated). We’ll have full estimates soon, once ‘The Welfare Footprint of the Egg’ is released.
Thanks for clarifying, Wladimir. I will also try to clear up my point. In the same way you seem to prioritise decreasing disabling and excruciating pain much more than decreasing annoying and hurtful pain (in particular, much more than justified by pain intensities), I was thinking some may prioritise decreasing excruciating pain much more than decreasing disabling pain. Some people may even go further, and prioritise decreasing the most intense forms of excruciating pain, potentially to an extent cage-free reforms would have very small benefits due to not decreasing the maximum pain intensity. For example, one may only care about the worst 0.1 s of a chicken’s life (arguably during stunning or slaughter), and this be almost exactly as bad for hens in conventional cages and cage-free aviaries.