Thanks, Vasco. I think we’ve clarified where our frameworks diverge—you prioritize maximizing expected welfare, assuming that equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share), whereas I tend to emphasize minimizing the most intense forms of suffering. Both approaches have their merits, but they naturally lead to different prioritizations. Perhaps we can just agree to disagree on this point.
equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share)
How do you compare experiences of different intensity and duration? For example, how would you decide between averting 10 h of annoying pain, or 1 h of hurtful pain. I would assign intensities to experiences based on the time trade-offs I would make (all else equal; experiencing more pain may be worth it for instrumental reasons), and then calculate the total welfare from the product between intensity (positive or negative) and duration.
One could have the view that welfare reforms are only worth it they decrease the time in each of WFI’s 4 categories of pain. However, these categories could be further broken down into ones with a narrower range of intensity. For consistency, I believe people with that view would only be able to say that a welfare reform is worth it if it decrease the time in pain at any given level of intensity. There is a practically continuous spetrum of possible pain intensities, and I assume it would be extremely difficult to measure them all. In this case, it would be very difficult to determine whether any welfare reform is worth it.
Thanks, Wladimir. Note prioritising decreasing the most intense pain may lead to counterintuitive conclusions. According to WFI, hens in furnished cages experience slighly less excruciating pain than ones in cage-free aviaries. So I do not think there is a strong case for moving from furnished cages to cage-free aviaries if one only prioritises decreasing excruciating pain, which is the most intense category of pain defined by WFI.
I assume you also value decreasing less intense pain, but not proportionally to intensity. I guess decreasing pain which is 50 % as intense is less than 50 % as valuable in your mind, whereas I would say it is 50 % as valuable holding duration, and probability constant.
Thanks Vasco. I’d like to clarify that Disabling Pain is also a severe/intensive level—think of it as the kind of crippling back pain or intense headache that prevents any enjoyment or productivity. And our project study found that moving a hen from a furnished cage to a cage-free aviary prevents, on average, hundreds of hours of Disabling Pain during her laying life. Specifically, transitioning to cage-free systems avoids approximately 275 hours of Disabling pain ( https://welfarefootprint.org/laying-hens).
Additionally, as argued in the book, the estimates for Excruciating Pain were extremely conservative (i.e. Cumulative Pain in both cage systems is likely higher than estimated). We’ll have full estimates soon, once ‘The Welfare Footprint of the Egg’ is released.
Thanks for clarifying, Wladimir. I will also try to clear up my point. In the same way you seem to prioritise decreasing disabling and excruciating pain much more than decreasing annoying and hurtful pain (in particular, much more than justified by pain intensities), I was thinking some may prioritise decreasing excruciating pain much more than decreasing disabling pain. Some people may even go further, and prioritise decreasing the most intense forms of excruciating pain, potentially to an extent cage-free reforms would have very small benefits due to not decreasing the maximum pain intensity. For example, one may only care about the worst 0.1 s of a chicken’s life (arguably during stunning or slaughter), and this be almost exactly as bad for hens in conventional cages and cage-free aviaries.
Thanks, Vasco. I think we’ve clarified where our frameworks diverge—you prioritize maximizing expected welfare, assuming that equivalences across intensities are possible once the time component is introduced (an assumption I don’t share), whereas I tend to emphasize minimizing the most intense forms of suffering. Both approaches have their merits, but they naturally lead to different prioritizations. Perhaps we can just agree to disagree on this point.
Hi Wladimir.
How do you compare experiences of different intensity and duration? For example, how would you decide between averting 10 h of annoying pain, or 1 h of hurtful pain. I would assign intensities to experiences based on the time trade-offs I would make (all else equal; experiencing more pain may be worth it for instrumental reasons), and then calculate the total welfare from the product between intensity (positive or negative) and duration.
One could have the view that welfare reforms are only worth it they decrease the time in each of WFI’s 4 categories of pain. However, these categories could be further broken down into ones with a narrower range of intensity. For consistency, I believe people with that view would only be able to say that a welfare reform is worth it if it decrease the time in pain at any given level of intensity. There is a practically continuous spetrum of possible pain intensities, and I assume it would be extremely difficult to measure them all. In this case, it would be very difficult to determine whether any welfare reform is worth it.
Thanks, Wladimir. Note prioritising decreasing the most intense pain may lead to counterintuitive conclusions. According to WFI, hens in furnished cages experience slighly less excruciating pain than ones in cage-free aviaries. So I do not think there is a strong case for moving from furnished cages to cage-free aviaries if one only prioritises decreasing excruciating pain, which is the most intense category of pain defined by WFI.
I assume you also value decreasing less intense pain, but not proportionally to intensity. I guess decreasing pain which is 50 % as intense is less than 50 % as valuable in your mind, whereas I would say it is 50 % as valuable holding duration, and probability constant.
Thanks Vasco. I’d like to clarify that Disabling Pain is also a severe/intensive level—think of it as the kind of crippling back pain or intense headache that prevents any enjoyment or productivity. And our project study found that moving a hen from a furnished cage to a cage-free aviary prevents, on average, hundreds of hours of Disabling Pain during her laying life. Specifically, transitioning to cage-free systems avoids approximately 275 hours of Disabling pain ( https://welfarefootprint.org/laying-hens).
Additionally, as argued in the book, the estimates for Excruciating Pain were extremely conservative (i.e. Cumulative Pain in both cage systems is likely higher than estimated). We’ll have full estimates soon, once ‘The Welfare Footprint of the Egg’ is released.
Thanks for clarifying, Wladimir. I will also try to clear up my point. In the same way you seem to prioritise decreasing disabling and excruciating pain much more than decreasing annoying and hurtful pain (in particular, much more than justified by pain intensities), I was thinking some may prioritise decreasing excruciating pain much more than decreasing disabling pain. Some people may even go further, and prioritise decreasing the most intense forms of excruciating pain, potentially to an extent cage-free reforms would have very small benefits due to not decreasing the maximum pain intensity. For example, one may only care about the worst 0.1 s of a chicken’s life (arguably during stunning or slaughter), and this be almost exactly as bad for hens in conventional cages and cage-free aviaries.