I find your focus on outer game strange. Given the already existing support of the public for going slowly and deliberately, there seems to be a decent case that instead of trying to build public support, we should directly target the policymakers. It’s not clear what extra public support buys us here. In fact, I suspect it might be far more valuable to lobby the industry to try to reduce the amount of opposition such laws might receive.
average time it takes a federal entity to complete an assessment is 3.4 years.
This is a worrying figure to me. If we slow down licensing too much, we almost guarantee that the first super-intelligence is not going to be developed by anyone going through the proper process. Not to mention all of the hours wasted on bureaucratic requirements, rather than actually building an aligned system.
Given the already existing support of the public for going slowly and deliberately, there seems to be a decent case that instead of trying to build public support, we should directly target the policymakers.
I think “public support” is ambiguous, and by some definitions, it isn’t there yet.
One definition is something like “Does the public care about this when they are asked directly?” and this type of support definitely exists, per data like the YouGov poll showing majority support for AI pause.
But there are also polls showing that almost half of U.S. adults “support a ban on factory farming.” I think the correct takeaway from those polls is that there’s a gap between vaguely agreeing with an idea when asked vs. actually supporting specific, meaningful policies in a proactive way.
So I think the definition of “public support” that could help the safety situation, and which is missing right now, is something like “How does this issue rank when the public is asked what causes will inform their voting decisions in the next election cycle?”
But there are also polls showing that almost half of U.S. adults “support a ban on factory farming.” I think the correct takeaway from those polls is that there’s a gap between vaguely agreeing with an idea when asked vs. actually supporting specific, meaningful policies in a proactive way.
I broadly agree with the conclusion as stated. But I think there are at least a couple of important asymmetries between the factory farming question and the AI question, which mean that we shouldn’t expect there to be a gap of a similar magnitude between stated public support and actual public support regarding AI.
Ending factory farming ban is in direct conflict with most respondents’ (perceived) self-interest in a way that a pause on AI is not (since those respondents willingly continue to consume animal products).
Questions about support for factory farming are more likely to elicit socially desirable responding than questions about the AI pause, since most of those respondents believe factory farming is bad and widely viewed as such, so actively supporting factory farming seems bad. I would expect this to be much less the case regarding AI (we looked into this briefly here and found no evidence of socially desirable responding in either direction).
I think both of these factors conduce to a larger gap between stated attitudes and actual support in the animal farming case. That said, I think this is an ameliorable problem: in our replications of the SI animal farming results, we found substantially lower support (close to 15%).
So, I think the conclusion to draw is that polling certain questions can find misleadingly high support for different issues (even if you ask a well known survey panel to run the questions), but not that very high support found in surveys just generally doesn’t mean anything. [Not that you said this, but I wanted to explain why I don’t think it is the case anyway]
Agree, and I want to add that you need to keep up awareness to keep what support we do have from slipping. Even if and when we have legislative victories, there’s going to be opposition from industry for the foreseeable future, so there’s going to be a role for AI Safety advocacy.
Isn’t targeting policymakers still outside game? (If inside game is the big AI companies.)
If we slow down licensing too much, we almost guarantee that the first super-intelligence is not going to be developed by anyone going through the proper process.
The licensing would have to come with sufficient enforcement of compute limits that this isn’t possible (and any sensible licensing would involve this. How many mega-environment-altering infrastructure projects are built without proper licenses? Sure, they may be rubber-stamped via corrupt officials, but that’s another matter..)
My understanding (non-expert) is that the inside game is whatever uses the system as is. Outside is things that try to break the system or put pressure in ways that the system generally does not legibly take as inputs. So, talking to existing officials to use existing ways of regulation is maximum inside game. Throwing a coup and enacting dictatorial powers in order to regulate is maximum outside game. Lobbying is more inside, and protesting is more outside. So when we say “target policymakers”, the question is how? Are you sending polite emails with reasoned arguments, or are you throwing buckets of computer chips at their car as they drive by? (I do not endorse doing this, and I say this for comedic effect :D )
Chloe Cockburn, who used to lead Open Phil’s criminal justice reform work, gives a useful definition here:
‘Mass mobilization and structure organizing make up the “outside game.” Those making change by working within government, or other elite or dominant structures, are part of the inside game.’
Using that definition, a coup feels very inside game. But I agree with your general characterisation, Dušan.
I also think it’s worth pointing out that the outside game is not just protesting. In the quote, Chloe refers to structure organising and mobilisation.
Here’s a contrast between the two:
Structure Organising:
Long-term Approach: It is a sustained effort that builds power over time through the development of leaders and the cultivation of dedicated members.
Hierarchy and Leadership: There’s a clear hierarchy with defined roles, responsibilities, and lines of accountability.
Defined Membership: Membership is clear and often requires commitment, leading to a strong sense of identity among participants.
Skill Development: Emphasis on training members and leaders to build their skills and capacities.
Relationships: Focus on building deep one-to-one relationships among members, fostering trust and shared commitment.
Clear Goals and Strategies: Goals are specific, and there’s a clear strategy in place, broken down into actionable steps.
Mobilisation:
Short-term Approach: It is often a burst of activity aimed at rallying people around a particular issue or event. Once the event or action concludes, the mobilisation effort may dissipate.
Broad Participation: Mobilisation casts a wide net, seeking to involve as many people as possible, often regardless of their prior involvement or commitment.
Event or Issue-driven: It is typically driven by a particular event, crisis, or issue that demands immediate attention.
Limited Training: There’s less emphasis on long-term skill and capacity building compared to structure organising.
Mass Communication: Use of broad communication strategies, such as mass media or social media, to reach and rally a large audience.
Immediate Goals: The goals are often immediate, such as turning out a large crowd for a protest or getting a specific response from decision-makers.
In essence, while structure organising focuses on building long-term power and capacity, mobilisation is about rallying people for immediate action. Both approaches have their strengths and can be complementary. For example, a well-organised group with a clear structure can mobilise its members more effectively when the need arises.
I’ve written more about the difference between structured organising and mobilisation here.
I find your focus on outer game strange. Given the already existing support of the public for going slowly and deliberately, there seems to be a decent case that instead of trying to build public support, we should directly target the policymakers. It’s not clear what extra public support buys us here. In fact, I suspect it might be far more valuable to lobby the industry to try to reduce the amount of opposition such laws might receive.
These are not exclusive to each other, but complementary. Calling your local senator is only made stronger if the same senator sees protests on the streets calling for the same thing you are calling for.
This is a worrying figure to me. If we slow down licensing too much, we almost guarantee that the first super-intelligence is not going to be developed by anyone going through the proper process. Not to mention all of the hours wasted on bureaucratic requirements, rather than actually building an aligned system.
The regulations on guns/nuclear weapons/bioweapons mean that most public uses are by people not going through the proper process. Still worth regulating them!
I find your focus on outer game strange. Given the already existing support of the public for going slowly and deliberately, there seems to be a decent case that instead of trying to build public support, we should directly target the policymakers. It’s not clear what extra public support buys us here. In fact, I suspect it might be far more valuable to lobby the industry to try to reduce the amount of opposition such laws might receive.
This is a worrying figure to me. If we slow down licensing too much, we almost guarantee that the first super-intelligence is not going to be developed by anyone going through the proper process. Not to mention all of the hours wasted on bureaucratic requirements, rather than actually building an aligned system.
I think “public support” is ambiguous, and by some definitions, it isn’t there yet.
One definition is something like “Does the public care about this when they are asked directly?” and this type of support definitely exists, per data like the YouGov poll showing majority support for AI pause.
But there are also polls showing that almost half of U.S. adults “support a ban on factory farming.” I think the correct takeaway from those polls is that there’s a gap between vaguely agreeing with an idea when asked vs. actually supporting specific, meaningful policies in a proactive way.
So I think the definition of “public support” that could help the safety situation, and which is missing right now, is something like “How does this issue rank when the public is asked what causes will inform their voting decisions in the next election cycle?”
I broadly agree with the conclusion as stated. But I think there are at least a couple of important asymmetries between the factory farming question and the AI question, which mean that we shouldn’t expect there to be a gap of a similar magnitude between stated public support and actual public support regarding AI.
Ending factory farming ban is in direct conflict with most respondents’ (perceived) self-interest in a way that a pause on AI is not (since those respondents willingly continue to consume animal products).
Questions about support for factory farming are more likely to elicit socially desirable responding than questions about the AI pause, since most of those respondents believe factory farming is bad and widely viewed as such, so actively supporting factory farming seems bad. I would expect this to be much less the case regarding AI (we looked into this briefly here and found no evidence of socially desirable responding in either direction).
I think both of these factors conduce to a larger gap between stated attitudes and actual support in the animal farming case. That said, I think this is an ameliorable problem: in our replications of the SI animal farming results, we found substantially lower support (close to 15%).
So, I think the conclusion to draw is that polling certain questions can find misleadingly high support for different issues (even if you ask a well known survey panel to run the questions), but not that very high support found in surveys just generally doesn’t mean anything. [Not that you said this, but I wanted to explain why I don’t think it is the case anyway]
Agree, and I want to add that you need to keep up awareness to keep what support we do have from slipping. Even if and when we have legislative victories, there’s going to be opposition from industry for the foreseeable future, so there’s going to be a role for AI Safety advocacy.
Isn’t targeting policymakers still outside game? (If inside game is the big AI companies.)
The licensing would have to come with sufficient enforcement of compute limits that this isn’t possible (and any sensible licensing would involve this. How many mega-environment-altering infrastructure projects are built without proper licenses? Sure, they may be rubber-stamped via corrupt officials, but that’s another matter..)
I don’t really know those terms very well. Would love clarification from someone.
My understanding (non-expert) is that the inside game is whatever uses the system as is. Outside is things that try to break the system or put pressure in ways that the system generally does not legibly take as inputs. So, talking to existing officials to use existing ways of regulation is maximum inside game. Throwing a coup and enacting dictatorial powers in order to regulate is maximum outside game. Lobbying is more inside, and protesting is more outside. So when we say “target policymakers”, the question is how? Are you sending polite emails with reasoned arguments, or are you throwing buckets of computer chips at their car as they drive by? (I do not endorse doing this, and I say this for comedic effect :D )
Chloe Cockburn, who used to lead Open Phil’s criminal justice reform work, gives a useful definition here:
‘Mass mobilization and structure organizing make up the “outside game.” Those making change by working within government, or other elite or dominant structures, are part of the inside game.’
Using that definition, a coup feels very inside game. But I agree with your general characterisation, Dušan.
I also think it’s worth pointing out that the outside game is not just protesting. In the quote, Chloe refers to structure organising and mobilisation.
Here’s a contrast between the two:
Structure Organising:
Long-term Approach: It is a sustained effort that builds power over time through the development of leaders and the cultivation of dedicated members.
Hierarchy and Leadership: There’s a clear hierarchy with defined roles, responsibilities, and lines of accountability.
Defined Membership: Membership is clear and often requires commitment, leading to a strong sense of identity among participants.
Skill Development: Emphasis on training members and leaders to build their skills and capacities.
Relationships: Focus on building deep one-to-one relationships among members, fostering trust and shared commitment.
Clear Goals and Strategies: Goals are specific, and there’s a clear strategy in place, broken down into actionable steps.
Mobilisation:
Short-term Approach: It is often a burst of activity aimed at rallying people around a particular issue or event. Once the event or action concludes, the mobilisation effort may dissipate.
Broad Participation: Mobilisation casts a wide net, seeking to involve as many people as possible, often regardless of their prior involvement or commitment.
Event or Issue-driven: It is typically driven by a particular event, crisis, or issue that demands immediate attention.
Limited Training: There’s less emphasis on long-term skill and capacity building compared to structure organising.
Mass Communication: Use of broad communication strategies, such as mass media or social media, to reach and rally a large audience.
Immediate Goals: The goals are often immediate, such as turning out a large crowd for a protest or getting a specific response from decision-makers.
In essence, while structure organising focuses on building long-term power and capacity, mobilisation is about rallying people for immediate action. Both approaches have their strengths and can be complementary. For example, a well-organised group with a clear structure can mobilise its members more effectively when the need arises.
I’ve written more about the difference between structured organising and mobilisation here.
These are not exclusive to each other, but complementary. Calling your local senator is only made stronger if the same senator sees protests on the streets calling for the same thing you are calling for.
The regulations on guns/nuclear weapons/bioweapons mean that most public uses are by people not going through the proper process. Still worth regulating them!