I’m relatively confident in these views, with the caveat that much of what I just expressed concerns morality, rather than epistemic beliefs about the world. I’m not a moral realist, so I am not quite sure how to parse my “confidence” in moral views.
From an antirealist perspective, at least on the ‘idealizing subjectivism’ form of antirealism, moral uncertainty can be understood as uncertainty about the result of an idealization process. Under this view, there exists some function that takes your current, naive values as input and produces idealized values as output—and your moral uncertainty is uncertainty about the output.
I’m relatively confident in these views, with the caveat that much of what I just expressed concerns morality, rather than epistemic beliefs about the world. I’m not a moral realist, so I am not quite sure how to parse my “confidence” in moral views.
From an antirealist perspective, at least on the ‘idealizing subjectivism’ form of antirealism, moral uncertainty can be understood as uncertainty about the result of an idealization process. Under this view, there exists some function that takes your current, naive values as input and produces idealized values as output—and your moral uncertainty is uncertainty about the output.