Iām relatively confident in these views, with the caveat that much of what I just expressed concerns morality, rather than epistemic beliefs about the world. Iām not a moral realist, so I am not quite sure how to parse my āconfidenceā in moral views.
From an antirealist perspective, at least on the āidealizing subjectivismā form of antirealism, moral uncertainty can be understood as uncertainty about the result of an idealization process. Under this view, there exists some function that takes your current, naive values as input and produces idealized values as outputāand your moral uncertainty is uncertainty about the output.
How confident are you about these views?
Iām relatively confident in these views, with the caveat that much of what I just expressed concerns morality, rather than epistemic beliefs about the world. Iām not a moral realist, so I am not quite sure how to parse my āconfidenceā in moral views.
From an antirealist perspective, at least on the āidealizing subjectivismā form of antirealism, moral uncertainty can be understood as uncertainty about the result of an idealization process. Under this view, there exists some function that takes your current, naive values as input and produces idealized values as outputāand your moral uncertainty is uncertainty about the output.