“...the historical record suggests that permanent collapse is unlikely. (Complex civilizations were independently developed multiple times; major collapses, like the Bronze Age Collapse or fall of the Roman Empire, were reversed after a couple thousand years; it didn’t take that long to go from the Neolithic Revolution to the Industrial Revolution; etc.).”
Yeah, I think those are useful analogies/data points to draw on, and that sort of thing plays a role in my views as well. Though I feel like, to be confident that recovery was likely, I’d want to be much more specific about what type, speed, and severity of collapse we’re talking about, and what type of recovery we’re talking about (e.g., does it include recovering our current moral norms, or just current GDP?). And I’d also want to flesh out the analogies more. (I’ve sketched out a research project vaguely along those lines, and might hopefully pursue it some day.)
A small example of why: I think the fall of the Roman Empire can validly be called a large-scale collapse, but as far as I’m aware it was quite gradual, and many parts of the world were unaffected, and those that were affected still retained many elements of “civilization”. I think GCR researchers are often talking about quite a different type of collapse scenario. (But one could also perhaps argue that the type of scenario they’re talking about is less likely.)
With this in mind, I think the last sentence of the Garfinkel quote is also probably worth including: “But I haven’t thought enough about civilizational recovery or, for example, future biological weapons to feel firm in my higher level of optimism.”
Ben Garfinkel made an interesting comment here:
Yeah, I think those are useful analogies/data points to draw on, and that sort of thing plays a role in my views as well. Though I feel like, to be confident that recovery was likely, I’d want to be much more specific about what type, speed, and severity of collapse we’re talking about, and what type of recovery we’re talking about (e.g., does it include recovering our current moral norms, or just current GDP?). And I’d also want to flesh out the analogies more. (I’ve sketched out a research project vaguely along those lines, and might hopefully pursue it some day.)
A small example of why: I think the fall of the Roman Empire can validly be called a large-scale collapse, but as far as I’m aware it was quite gradual, and many parts of the world were unaffected, and those that were affected still retained many elements of “civilization”. I think GCR researchers are often talking about quite a different type of collapse scenario. (But one could also perhaps argue that the type of scenario they’re talking about is less likely.)
With this in mind, I think the last sentence of the Garfinkel quote is also probably worth including: “But I haven’t thought enough about civilizational recovery or, for example, future biological weapons to feel firm in my higher level of optimism.”