The analogy to the âhard problem of physicsâ is interesting, and my stance towards the problem is the same as yours.
However, I donât think the analogy really works.
This is also how I feel about illusionism. Phenomenal experience is the only thing we have direct access to: all arguments, all inferences, all sense data, ultimately cash out in some regularity in the phenomenal content of consciousness. Whatever its ontological status, itâs the epistemic ground of everything else.
Is phenomenality itself necessary/âon the causal path here? Illusionists arenât denying consciousness, that it has contents, that thereâs regularity in its contents or that itâs the only thing we have direct access to. Illusionists are just denying the phenomenal nature of consciousness or phenomenal properties. I would instead say, more neutrally:
Experience (whatever it is) is the only thing we have direct access to: all arguments, all inferences, all sense data, ultimately cash out in some regularity in the content of consciousness (whatever it is). Whatever its ontological status, itâs the epistemic ground of everything else.
Note also that the information in or states of a computer (including robots and AIs) also play a similar role for the computer. And, a computer program canât necessarily explain how it does everything it does. âIneffabilityâ for computers, like us, could just be cognitive impenetrability: some responses and contents are just wired in, and their causes are not accessible to (certain levels of) the program. For âusâ, everything goes through our access consciousness.
So, what exactly do you mean by phenomenality, and whatâs the extra explanatory work phenomenality is doing here? What isnât already explained by the discriminations and responses by our brains, non-phenomenal (quasi-phenomenal) states or just generally physics?
If you define phenomenality just by certain physical states, effects or responses, or functionalist or causal abstractions thereof, say, then I think youâd be defining away phenomenality, i.e. âzero qualiaâ according to Frankish (paper, video).
Is phenomenality itself necessary/âon the causal path here?
I have no idea what the causal path is, or even whether causation is the right conceptual framework here. But it has no bearing on whether phenomenal experiences exist: theyâre particular things out there in the world (so to speak), not causal roles in a model.
Note also that the information in or states of a computer (including robots and AIs) also play a similar role for the computer.
It plays a similar role, for very generous values of âsimilarâ, in the computer qua physical system, sure. And I am perfectly happy to grant that âIâ qua human organism am almost certainly a causally closed physical system like any other. (Or rather, the joint me-environment system is). But thatâs not what Iâm talking about.
For âusâ, everything goes through our access consciousness.
Iâm not talking about access consciousness either! Thatâs just one particular sort of mental state in a vast landscape. The existence of the landscapeâas a really existing thing with really existing contents, not a model - is the heart of the mystery.
whatâs the extra explanatory work phenomenality is doing here?
My whole point is that it doesnât do explanatory work, and expecting it to is a conceptual confusion. The sunâs luminosity does not explain its composition, the fact that looking at it causes retinal damage does not explain its luminosity, the firing of sensory nerves does not explain the damage, and the qualia that constitute âhurting to look atâ do not explain the brain states which cause them.
Phenomenality is raw data: the thing to be explained. Not what I do, not what I say, not the exact microstate of my brain, not even the structural features of my mindâbut the stuff being structured, and the fact there is any.
If you define phenomenality just by certain physical states, effects or responses, or functionalist or causal abstractions thereof
I donât define phenomenality! I point at it. Itâs that thing, right there, all the time. The stuff in virtue of which all my inferential knowledge is inferential knowledge about something, and not just empty formal structure. The relata which introspective thought relates[1]. The stuff at the bottom of the logical positivistsâ glass. You know, the thing.
And again, I am only pointing at particular examples, not defining or characterizing or even trying to offer a conceptual prototype: qualia need not have anything to do with introspection, linguistic thought, inference, or any other sort of higher cognition. In particular, âseeing my computer screenâ and âbeing aware of seeing my computer screenâ are not the same quale.
But it seems to me that phenomenal aspects themselves arenât the raw data by which we know things. If you accept the causal closure of the physical, non-phenomenal aspects of our discriminations and cognitive responses are already enough to explain how we know things, or the phenomenal aspects just are physical aspects (possibly abstracted to functions or dispositions), which would be consistent with illusionism.
Or, do you mean that knowing itself is not entirely physical?
I think the causal closure of the physical is very, very likely, given the evidence. I do not accept it as axiomatic. But if it turns out that it implies illusionism, i.e. that it implies the evidence does not exist, then it is self-defeating and should be rejected.
Or, do you mean that knowing itself is not entirely physical?
I am referring to my phenomenology, not (what I believe to be) the corresponding behavioral dispositions. E.g. so far as I know my visual field can be simultaneously all blue and all dark, but never all blue and all red. We have a clear path towards explaining why that would be true, and vague hints that it might be possible to explain why, given that itâs true, I can think the corresponding thoughts and say the corresponding words. But explaining how I can make that judgement is not an explanation of why I have visual qualia to begin with.
Whether these are also physical in some broader sense of the word, I canât say.
The analogy to the âhard problem of physicsâ is interesting, and my stance towards the problem is the same as yours.
However, I donât think the analogy really works.
Is phenomenality itself necessary/âon the causal path here? Illusionists arenât denying consciousness, that it has contents, that thereâs regularity in its contents or that itâs the only thing we have direct access to. Illusionists are just denying the phenomenal nature of consciousness or phenomenal properties. I would instead say, more neutrally:
Note also that the information in or states of a computer (including robots and AIs) also play a similar role for the computer. And, a computer program canât necessarily explain how it does everything it does. âIneffabilityâ for computers, like us, could just be cognitive impenetrability: some responses and contents are just wired in, and their causes are not accessible to (certain levels of) the program. For âusâ, everything goes through our access consciousness.
So, what exactly do you mean by phenomenality, and whatâs the extra explanatory work phenomenality is doing here? What isnât already explained by the discriminations and responses by our brains, non-phenomenal (quasi-phenomenal) states or just generally physics?
If you define phenomenality just by certain physical states, effects or responses, or functionalist or causal abstractions thereof, say, then I think youâd be defining away phenomenality, i.e. âzero qualiaâ according to Frankish (paper, video).
I have no idea what the causal path is, or even whether causation is the right conceptual framework here. But it has no bearing on whether phenomenal experiences exist: theyâre particular things out there in the world (so to speak), not causal roles in a model.
It plays a similar role, for very generous values of âsimilarâ, in the computer qua physical system, sure. And I am perfectly happy to grant that âIâ qua human organism am almost certainly a causally closed physical system like any other. (Or rather, the joint me-environment system is). But thatâs not what Iâm talking about.
Iâm not talking about access consciousness either! Thatâs just one particular sort of mental state in a vast landscape. The existence of the landscapeâas a really existing thing with really existing contents, not a model - is the heart of the mystery.
My whole point is that it doesnât do explanatory work, and expecting it to is a conceptual confusion. The sunâs luminosity does not explain its composition, the fact that looking at it causes retinal damage does not explain its luminosity, the firing of sensory nerves does not explain the damage, and the qualia that constitute âhurting to look atâ do not explain the brain states which cause them.
Phenomenality is raw data: the thing to be explained. Not what I do, not what I say, not the exact microstate of my brain, not even the structural features of my mindâbut the stuff being structured, and the fact there is any.
I donât define phenomenality! I point at it. Itâs that thing, right there, all the time. The stuff in virtue of which all my inferential knowledge is inferential knowledge about something, and not just empty formal structure. The relata which introspective thought relates[1]. The stuff at the bottom of the logical positivistsâ glass. You know, the thing.
And again, I am only pointing at particular examples, not defining or characterizing or even trying to offer a conceptual prototype: qualia need not have anything to do with introspection, linguistic thought, inference, or any other sort of higher cognition. In particular, âseeing my computer screenâ and âbeing aware of seeing my computer screenâ are not the same quale.
But it seems to me that phenomenal aspects themselves arenât the raw data by which we know things. If you accept the causal closure of the physical, non-phenomenal aspects of our discriminations and cognitive responses are already enough to explain how we know things, or the phenomenal aspects just are physical aspects (possibly abstracted to functions or dispositions), which would be consistent with illusionism.
Or, do you mean that knowing itself is not entirely physical?
I think the causal closure of the physical is very, very likely, given the evidence. I do not accept it as axiomatic. But if it turns out that it implies illusionism, i.e. that it implies the evidence does not exist, then it is self-defeating and should be rejected.
I am referring to my phenomenology, not (what I believe to be) the corresponding behavioral dispositions. E.g. so far as I know my visual field can be simultaneously all blue and all dark, but never all blue and all red. We have a clear path towards explaining why that would be true, and vague hints that it might be possible to explain why, given that itâs true, I can think the corresponding thoughts and say the corresponding words. But explaining how I can make that judgement is not an explanation of why I have visual qualia to begin with.
Whether these are also physical in some broader sense of the word, I canât say.