I think a Russian war with a European state has probably increased simply based on Russia’s revealed willingness to go to war
I don’t think this is right- “Russia” doesn’t make actions, Vladimir Putin does; Putin is 70, so he seems unlikely to be in power once Russia has recovered from the current war; there’s some evidence that other Russian elites didn’t actively want the war, so I don’t think it’s right to generalize to “Russia”.
This makes me more confused about whether China committed to a military confrontation with the West. If it has, and China believed it had more military-industrial capacity than the West (which is what I’d believe if I was China), then now is the perfect opportunity to drain Western stocks further and prop up its ally (?) by pumping weapons into Russia (see previous forecasting question).
A US-China war would be fought almost entirely in the air and sea; Ukraine is fighting almost entirely on land. The weapons Ukraine has receive are mostly irrelevant for a potential US-China war; e.g. the Marines have already decided to stop using tanks entirely, and the US being capable of shipping the vast amounts of artillery ammunition being consumed in Ukraine to a combat zone would require the US-China war to already be essentially won.
Weapons being sent to Ukraine are from drawdown stocks, which Taiwan itself hasn’t previously been eligible to receive. Taiwan instead purchases new weapons, but there are many, many other countries purchasing similar types of weapons, and if the US were to become concerned, I’d expect it to prioritize both Ukraine and Taiwan over e.g. Saudi Arabia or Egypt.
(There is some overlap, to be clear, and this might change in the future.)
I don’t think this is right- “Russia” doesn’t make actions, Vladimir Putin does; Putin is 70, so he seems unlikely to be in power once Russia has recovered from the current war; there’s some evidence that other Russian elites didn’t actively want the war, so I don’t think it’s right to generalize to “Russia”.
Even if it was true that many elites were anti-war before the invasion, I think the war has probably accelerated a preexisting process of ideological purification. So even when Putin kicks the can, I think the elites will be just as likely to say “We didn’t go far enough” than “We went too far”. I expect at least some continuity in the willingness to go to war by Putin’s successor.
A US-China war would be fought almost entirely in the air and sea; Ukraine is fighting almost entirely on land. The weapons Ukraine has receive are mostly irrelevant for a potential US-China war; e.g. the Marines have already decided to stop using tanks entirely, and the US being capable of shipping the vast amounts of artillery ammunition being consumed in Ukraine to a combat zone would require the US-China war to already be essentially won.
Why would it be fought almost entirely in the air and sea? That sounds like a best or worst-case scenario, i.e., China isn’t able to actually land or China achieves air and naval superiority around Taiwan. The advanced weapons systems Ukraine has received seem very relevant: Storm shadow, HIMARs, Abrams + Leoopard, Patriot, Javelin, etc. And shipping weapons doesn’t seem to require the war to be essentially won, just that the US can achieve local air and naval superiority over part of Taiwan with a harbour. Complete dominance of the skies in a conflict is rare.
Weapons being sent to Ukraine are from drawdown stocks, which Taiwan itself hasn’t previously been eligible to receive. Taiwan instead purchases new weapons, but there are many, many other countries purchasing similar types of weapons, and if the US were to become concerned, I’d expect it to prioritize both Ukraine and Taiwan over e.g. Saudi Arabia or Egypt.
My concern is that these US stocks seem to be regenerating very, very slowly.
Why would it be fought almost entirely in the air and sea? That sounds like a best or worst-case scenario, i.e., China isn’t able to actually land or China achieves air and naval superiority around Taiwan. The advanced weapons systems Ukraine has received seem very relevant: Storm shadow, HIMARs, Abrams + Leoopard, Patriot, Javelin, etc. And shipping weapons doesn’t seem to require the war to be essentially won, just that the US can achieve local air and naval superiority over part of Taiwan with a harbour. Complete dominance of the skies in a conflict is rare.
It’s unlikely that both the US and China can get mass numbers of supplies to Taiwan. If you can get a (slow/big/vulnerable) freighter to Taiwan you can also almost certainly get an armed military ship, a submarine, or a stealth fighter to Taiwan.
the US can achieve local air and naval superiority over part of Taiwan with a harbour.
I’m not sure what you mean by “local superiority”. Virtually every modern anti-ship missile has enough range to completely cover Taiwan. Taiwan is only 150 miles wide, so the LRASM/JSM/YJ-12 etc all have enough range to go from one side to the other, and most of these have enough range to completely cover the island. It’s questionable (but plausible) whether a carrier a thousand miles out can survive, let alone a (slow and vulnerable) freighter sailing right up to Taiwan.
Complete dominance of the skies in a conflict is rare.
The absence of complete dominance of the skies means that neither side can safely move around, not that both sides can safely move around. e.g. in Ukraine neither side has complete dominance of the skies, but that certainly doesn’t mean that it’s safe for either side to be flying cargo planes to the front lines.
I don’t think this is right- “Russia” doesn’t make actions, Vladimir Putin does; Putin is 70, so he seems unlikely to be in power once Russia has recovered from the current war; there’s some evidence that other Russian elites didn’t actively want the war, so I don’t think it’s right to generalize to “Russia”.
A US-China war would be fought almost entirely in the air and sea; Ukraine is fighting almost entirely on land. The weapons Ukraine has receive are mostly irrelevant for a potential US-China war; e.g. the Marines have already decided to stop using tanks entirely, and the US being capable of shipping the vast amounts of artillery ammunition being consumed in Ukraine to a combat zone would require the US-China war to already be essentially won.
Weapons being sent to Ukraine are from drawdown stocks, which Taiwan itself hasn’t previously been eligible to receive. Taiwan instead purchases new weapons, but there are many, many other countries purchasing similar types of weapons, and if the US were to become concerned, I’d expect it to prioritize both Ukraine and Taiwan over e.g. Saudi Arabia or Egypt.
(There is some overlap, to be clear, and this might change in the future.)
Even if it was true that many elites were anti-war before the invasion, I think the war has probably accelerated a preexisting process of ideological purification. So even when Putin kicks the can, I think the elites will be just as likely to say “We didn’t go far enough” than “We went too far”. I expect at least some continuity in the willingness to go to war by Putin’s successor.
Why would it be fought almost entirely in the air and sea? That sounds like a best or worst-case scenario, i.e., China isn’t able to actually land or China achieves air and naval superiority around Taiwan. The advanced weapons systems Ukraine has received seem very relevant: Storm shadow, HIMARs, Abrams + Leoopard, Patriot, Javelin, etc. And shipping weapons doesn’t seem to require the war to be essentially won, just that the US can achieve local air and naval superiority over part of Taiwan with a harbour. Complete dominance of the skies in a conflict is rare.
My concern is that these US stocks seem to be regenerating very, very slowly.
It’s unlikely that both the US and China can get mass numbers of supplies to Taiwan. If you can get a (slow/big/vulnerable) freighter to Taiwan you can also almost certainly get an armed military ship, a submarine, or a stealth fighter to Taiwan.
I’m not sure what you mean by “local superiority”. Virtually every modern anti-ship missile has enough range to completely cover Taiwan. Taiwan is only 150 miles wide, so the LRASM/JSM/YJ-12 etc all have enough range to go from one side to the other, and most of these have enough range to completely cover the island. It’s questionable (but plausible) whether a carrier a thousand miles out can survive, let alone a (slow and vulnerable) freighter sailing right up to Taiwan.
The absence of complete dominance of the skies means that neither side can safely move around, not that both sides can safely move around. e.g. in Ukraine neither side has complete dominance of the skies, but that certainly doesn’t mean that it’s safe for either side to be flying cargo planes to the front lines.