Writing from Latvia here. One thing I’ve noticed is the extent to which outside observers underestimate the agency of smaller countries: either Ukraine, or newer NATO members. The interests and the resolve of the newer NATO members to join NATO to defend themselves is still neglected in the opinions of some prominent public intellectuals. The term “NATO expansion” is misleading, “NATO enlargement” is better.
I agree that the agency of newer NATO members (or Ukraine) has been neglected. Still, I don’t think this was a primary driver of underestimating Ukraine’s chances—unless I’m missing what “agency” means here.
I assume predictions were dim about Ukraine’s chances at the beginning of the war primarily because Russia and the West had done an excellent job of convincing us that Russia’s military was highly capable. E.g., I was disconcerted by the awe/dread with which my family members in the US Army spoke about Russian technical capabilities across multiple domains.
That said, I think some of these predictions came from a sense that Ukraine would just “give up”. In which case, missing the agency factor was a mistake.
Yes Russia had convinced others and FSB had convinced Putin that it’s military was much better than it actually was; a key reason why the advances stalled and probably also why Putin launched the war.
But specifically about underestimating Ukraine’s chances, I think the “agency” did impact outcomes a lot. The willingness and ability by society to decide and agree on what’s best for the country and act accordingly is roughly what I mean by “agency” in this context.
Writing from Latvia here. One thing I’ve noticed is the extent to which outside observers underestimate the agency of smaller countries: either Ukraine, or newer NATO members. The interests and the resolve of the newer NATO members to join NATO to defend themselves is still neglected in the opinions of some prominent public intellectuals. The term “NATO expansion” is misleading, “NATO enlargement” is better.
One example how, I suspect, underestimation of agency did lead to wrong predictions: many predicted that the leadership of Ukraine, and the cities of Kyiv and even Lviv would quickly fall. Did not happen. (Admittedly I did not quantify predictions at the time and still feel quite ignorant about the many factors involved.)
https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9743/zelenskyy-remains-president-of-ua-by-2023/
https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9939/kyiv-to-fall-to-russian-forces-by-april-2022/
https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9899/russian-troops-in-lviv-in-2022/
I agree that the agency of newer NATO members (or Ukraine) has been neglected. Still, I don’t think this was a primary driver of underestimating Ukraine’s chances—unless I’m missing what “agency” means here.
I assume predictions were dim about Ukraine’s chances at the beginning of the war primarily because Russia and the West had done an excellent job of convincing us that Russia’s military was highly capable. E.g., I was disconcerted by the awe/dread with which my family members in the US Army spoke about Russian technical capabilities across multiple domains.
That said, I think some of these predictions came from a sense that Ukraine would just “give up”. In which case, missing the agency factor was a mistake.
Yes Russia had convinced others and FSB had convinced Putin that it’s military was much better than it actually was; a key reason why the advances stalled and probably also why Putin launched the war.
But specifically about underestimating Ukraine’s chances, I think the “agency” did impact outcomes a lot. The willingness and ability by society to decide and agree on what’s best for the country and act accordingly is roughly what I mean by “agency” in this context.
Had Zelensky accepted offers to flee and had UA society and military accepted the outside views in the first days of the war, then the RU military could have advanced relatively easily. Even in the poor condition that it was in. But resistance had a huge backing from Ukrainians, that is why Zelensky’s popularity soared from 27% to 80-90% when he declined offers to flee. Seems likely to me that Putin did not expect that, expected a large part of population to welcome his soldiers are liberators from the unpopular government.
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/zelenskys-approval-ratings-soar-amid-war
https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_26-27_fevralya_2022_goda.html