(Just wanted to say that your story of earning to give has been an inspiration! Your episode with 80k encouraged me to originally enter quant trading.)
Given your clarification, I agree that your observation holds. I too would have loved to hear someone defend the view that âanimals donât count at allâ. I think itâs somewhat common among rationalists, although the only well-known EA-adjacent individuals I know who hold it are Jeff, Yud, and Zvi Mowshowitz. Holden Karnofsky seems to have believed it once, but later changed his mind.[1]
As @JackM pointed out, Jeff didnât really justify his view in his comment thread. Iâve never read Zvi justify that view anywhere either. Iâve heard two main justifications for the view, either of which would be sufficient to prioritize global health:
Overwhelming Hierarchicalism
Solely by virtue of our shared species, helping humans may be lexicographically preferential to helping animals, or perhaps their preferences should be given an enormous multiplier.
I use the term âoverwhelmingâ because depending on which animal welfare BOTEC is used, if we use constant moral weights relative to humans, youâd need a 100x to 1000x multiplier for the math to work out in favor of global health. (This comparison is coherent to me because I accept Michael St. Julesâ argument that we should resolve the two envelopes problem by weighing in the units we know, but I acknowledge that this line of reasoning may not appeal to you if you donât endorse that resolution.)
I personally find overwhelming hierarchicalism (or any form of hierarchicalism) to be deeply dubious. I write more about it here, but I simply see it as a convenient way to avoid confronting ethical problems without having the backing of any sound theoretical justification. I put about as much weight on it as the idea that the interests of the Aryan race should be lexicographically preferred to the interests of non-Aryans. Thereâs just no prior for why that would be the case.
Denial of animal consciousness
Yud and maybe some others seem to believe that animals are most likely not conscious. As before, theyâd have to be really certain that animals arenât conscious to endorse global health here. Even if thereâs a 10% chance that chickens are conscious, given the outsize cost-effectiveness of corporate campaigns if they are, I think theyâd still merit a significant fraction of EA funding. (Probably still more than theyâre currently receiving.)
I think itâs fair to start with a very strong prior that at least chickens and pigs are probably conscious. Pigs have brains with all of the same high-level substructures, which are affected the same way by drugs/âpainkillers/âsocial interaction as humansâ are, and act all of the same ways that humans act would when confronted with situations of suffering and terror. It would be really surprising a priori if what was going on was merely a simulacrum of suffering with no actual consciousness behind it. Indeed, the vast majority of people seem to agree that these animals are conscious and deserve at least some moral concern. I certainly remember being able to feel pain as a child, and I was probably less intelligent than an adult pig during some of that.
Apart from that purely intuitive prior, while Iâm not a consciousness expert at all, the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness says that âthere is strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birdsâ. Rethink Prioritiesâ and Luke Muehlhauserâs work for Open Phil corroborate that. So Yudâs view is also at odds with much of the scientific community and other EAs who have investigated this.
All of this is why I feel like Yudâs Facebook post needed a very high burden of proof to be convincing to me. Instead, it seems like he just kept explaining what his model (a higher-order theory of consciousness) believes without actually justifying his model. He also didnât admit any moral uncertainty about his model. He asserted some deeply unorthodox and unintuitive ideas (like pigs not being conscious), admitted no uncertainty, and didnât make any attempt to justify them. So I didnât find anything about his Facebook post convincing.
Conclusion
To me, the strongest reason to believe that animals donât count at all is because smart and well-meaning people like Jeff, Yud, and Zvi believe it. I havenât read anything remotely convincing that justifies that view on the merits. Thatâs why I didnât even mention these arguments in my follow-up post for Debate Week.
Trying to be charitable, I think the main reasons why nobody defended that view during Debate Week were:
They didnât have the mental bandwidth to be willing to deal with an audience I suspect would be hostile. Overwhelming hierarchicalism is very much against the spirit of radical empathy in EA.
They may have felt like most EAs donât share the basic intuitions underlying their views, so theyâd be talking to a wall. The idea that pigs arenât conscious might seem very intuitive to Eliezer. To me, and I suspect to most people, it seems wild. I could be convinced, but Iâd need to see way more justification than Iâve seen.
in 2017, Holdenâs personal reflections âindicate against the idea that e.g. chickens merit moral concernâ. In 2018, Holden stated that âthere is presently no evidence base that could reasonably justify high confidence [that] nonhuman animals are not âconsciousâ in a morally relevant wayâ.
Strong downvoted because I find this statement repugnant âI put about as much weight on it as the idea that the interests of the Aryan race should be lexicographically preferred to the interests of non-Aryans.â
Why go there? You donât do yourself or animal welfare proponents any favors. Make the argument in a less provocative way.
We know conclusively that human experience is the same. On the animal front there are very many datapoints (mind complexity, brain size, behavior) which are priors that at least push us towards some kind of heirachialism.
I have a lot of respect for most pro-animal arguments, but why go this way?
Hierarchicalism, as Ariel presents it, is based solely on species membership, where humans are prioritized simply because they are humans. See here (bold emphasis mine):
So, the argument youâre making about mind complexity and behavior goes beyond the species-based hierarchicalism Ariel refers to:
We know conclusively that human experience is the same. On the animal front there are very many datapoints (mind complexity, brain size, behavior) which are priors that at least push us towards some kind of heirachialism.
While I understand the discomfort with the Aryan vs. non-Aryan analogy, striking analogies like this can sometimes help expose problematic reasoning. I feel like itâs a common approach in moral philosophy. But, I recognize that these comparisons are emotionally charged, and itâs important to use them carefully to avoid alienating others.
I feel bad that my comment made you (and a few others, judging by your commentâs agreevotes) feel bad.
As JackM points out, that snarky comment wasnât addressing views which give very low moral weights to animals due to characteristics like mind complexity, brain size, and behavior, which can and should be incorporated into welfare ranges. Instead, it was specifically addressing overwhelming hierarchicalism, which is a view which assigns overwhelmingly lower moral weight based solely on species.
My statement was intended to draw a provocative analogy: Thereâs no theoretical reason why oneâs ethical system should lexicographically prefer one race/âgender/âspecies over another, based solely on that characteristic. In my experience, people who have this view on species say things like âwe have the right to exploit animals because weâre stronger than themâ, or âexploiting animals is the natural orderâ, which could have come straight out of Mein Kampf. Drawing a provocative analogy can (sometimes) force a person to grapple with the cognitive dissonance from holding such a position.
While hierarchicalism is common among the general public, highly engaged EAs generally donât even argue for hierarchicalism because itâs just such a dubious view. I wouldnât write something like this about virtually any other argument for prioritizing global health, including ripple effects, neuron count weighting, denying that animals are conscious, or concerns about optics.
âThereâs no theoretical reason why oneâs ethical system should lexicographically prefer one race/âgender/âspecies over another, based solely on that characteristic. In my experience, people who have this view on species say things like âwe have the right to exploit animals because weâre stronger than themâ, or âexploiting animals is the natural orderâ I completely agree with this (although I think its probably a straw man, I canât see anyone here arguing those things).
I just think its a really bad idea to compare almost most argument (including non-animal related ones) with Nazi Germany and that thought-world. I think its possible to provoke without going this way.
1) Insensitive to the people groups that were involved in that horrific period of time 2) Distracts the argument itself (like it has here, although thatâs kind of on me) 2) Brings potential unnecessary negative PR issues with EA, as it gives unnecessary ammunition for hit pieces.
Its the style not the substance here Iâm strongly against.
(Just wanted to say that your story of earning to give has been an inspiration! Your episode with 80k encouraged me to originally enter quant trading.)
Given your clarification, I agree that your observation holds. I too would have loved to hear someone defend the view that âanimals donât count at allâ. I think itâs somewhat common among rationalists, although the only well-known EA-adjacent individuals I know who hold it are Jeff, Yud, and Zvi Mowshowitz. Holden Karnofsky seems to have believed it once, but later changed his mind.[1]
As @JackM pointed out, Jeff didnât really justify his view in his comment thread. Iâve never read Zvi justify that view anywhere either. Iâve heard two main justifications for the view, either of which would be sufficient to prioritize global health:
Overwhelming Hierarchicalism
Solely by virtue of our shared species, helping humans may be lexicographically preferential to helping animals, or perhaps their preferences should be given an enormous multiplier.
I use the term âoverwhelmingâ because depending on which animal welfare BOTEC is used, if we use constant moral weights relative to humans, youâd need a 100x to 1000x multiplier for the math to work out in favor of global health. (This comparison is coherent to me because I accept Michael St. Julesâ argument that we should resolve the two envelopes problem by weighing in the units we know, but I acknowledge that this line of reasoning may not appeal to you if you donât endorse that resolution.)
I personally find overwhelming hierarchicalism (or any form of hierarchicalism) to be deeply dubious. I write more about it here, but I simply see it as a convenient way to avoid confronting ethical problems without having the backing of any sound theoretical justification. I put about as much weight on it as the idea that the interests of the Aryan race should be lexicographically preferred to the interests of non-Aryans. Thereâs just no prior for why that would be the case.
Denial of animal consciousness
Yud and maybe some others seem to believe that animals are most likely not conscious. As before, theyâd have to be really certain that animals arenât conscious to endorse global health here. Even if thereâs a 10% chance that chickens are conscious, given the outsize cost-effectiveness of corporate campaigns if they are, I think theyâd still merit a significant fraction of EA funding. (Probably still more than theyâre currently receiving.)
I think itâs fair to start with a very strong prior that at least chickens and pigs are probably conscious. Pigs have brains with all of the same high-level substructures, which are affected the same way by drugs/âpainkillers/âsocial interaction as humansâ are, and act all of the same ways that humans act would when confronted with situations of suffering and terror. It would be really surprising a priori if what was going on was merely a simulacrum of suffering with no actual consciousness behind it. Indeed, the vast majority of people seem to agree that these animals are conscious and deserve at least some moral concern. I certainly remember being able to feel pain as a child, and I was probably less intelligent than an adult pig during some of that.
Apart from that purely intuitive prior, while Iâm not a consciousness expert at all, the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness says that âthere is strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birdsâ. Rethink Prioritiesâ and Luke Muehlhauserâs work for Open Phil corroborate that. So Yudâs view is also at odds with much of the scientific community and other EAs who have investigated this.
All of this is why I feel like Yudâs Facebook post needed a very high burden of proof to be convincing to me. Instead, it seems like he just kept explaining what his model (a higher-order theory of consciousness) believes without actually justifying his model. He also didnât admit any moral uncertainty about his model. He asserted some deeply unorthodox and unintuitive ideas (like pigs not being conscious), admitted no uncertainty, and didnât make any attempt to justify them. So I didnât find anything about his Facebook post convincing.
Conclusion
To me, the strongest reason to believe that animals donât count at all is because smart and well-meaning people like Jeff, Yud, and Zvi believe it. I havenât read anything remotely convincing that justifies that view on the merits. Thatâs why I didnât even mention these arguments in my follow-up post for Debate Week.
Trying to be charitable, I think the main reasons why nobody defended that view during Debate Week were:
They didnât have the mental bandwidth to be willing to deal with an audience I suspect would be hostile. Overwhelming hierarchicalism is very much against the spirit of radical empathy in EA.
They may have felt like most EAs donât share the basic intuitions underlying their views, so theyâd be talking to a wall. The idea that pigs arenât conscious might seem very intuitive to Eliezer. To me, and I suspect to most people, it seems wild. I could be convinced, but Iâd need to see way more justification than Iâve seen.
in 2017, Holdenâs personal reflections âindicate against the idea that e.g. chickens merit moral concernâ. In 2018, Holden stated that âthere is presently no evidence base that could reasonably justify high confidence [that] nonhuman animals are not âconsciousâ in a morally relevant wayâ.
Strong downvoted because I find this statement repugnant âI put about as much weight on it as the idea that the interests of the Aryan race should be lexicographically preferred to the interests of non-Aryans.â
Why go there? You donât do yourself or animal welfare proponents any favors. Make the argument in a less provocative way.
We know conclusively that human experience is the same. On the animal front there are very many datapoints (mind complexity, brain size, behavior) which are priors that at least push us towards some kind of heirachialism.
I have a lot of respect for most pro-animal arguments, but why go this way?
Hierarchicalism, as Ariel presents it, is based solely on species membership, where humans are prioritized simply because they are humans. See here (bold emphasis mine):
So, the argument youâre making about mind complexity and behavior goes beyond the species-based hierarchicalism Ariel refers to:
While I understand the discomfort with the Aryan vs. non-Aryan analogy, striking analogies like this can sometimes help expose problematic reasoning. I feel like itâs a common approach in moral philosophy. But, I recognize that these comparisons are emotionally charged, and itâs important to use them carefully to avoid alienating others.
(I didnât downvote your comment, by the way.)
I feel bad that my comment made you (and a few others, judging by your commentâs agreevotes) feel bad.
As JackM points out, that snarky comment wasnât addressing views which give very low moral weights to animals due to characteristics like mind complexity, brain size, and behavior, which can and should be incorporated into welfare ranges. Instead, it was specifically addressing overwhelming hierarchicalism, which is a view which assigns overwhelmingly lower moral weight based solely on species.
My statement was intended to draw a provocative analogy: Thereâs no theoretical reason why oneâs ethical system should lexicographically prefer one race/âgender/âspecies over another, based solely on that characteristic. In my experience, people who have this view on species say things like âwe have the right to exploit animals because weâre stronger than themâ, or âexploiting animals is the natural orderâ, which could have come straight out of Mein Kampf. Drawing a provocative analogy can (sometimes) force a person to grapple with the cognitive dissonance from holding such a position.
While hierarchicalism is common among the general public, highly engaged EAs generally donât even argue for hierarchicalism because itâs just such a dubious view. I wouldnât write something like this about virtually any other argument for prioritizing global health, including ripple effects, neuron count weighting, denying that animals are conscious, or concerns about optics.
âThereâs no theoretical reason why oneâs ethical system should lexicographically prefer one race/âgender/âspecies over another, based solely on that characteristic. In my experience, people who have this view on species say things like âwe have the right to exploit animals because weâre stronger than themâ, or âexploiting animals is the natural orderâ I completely agree with this (although I think its probably a straw man, I canât see anyone here arguing those things).
I just think its a really bad idea to compare almost most argument (including non-animal related ones) with Nazi Germany and that thought-world. I think its possible to provoke without going this way.
1) Insensitive to the people groups that were involved in that horrific period of time
2) Distracts the argument itself (like it has here, although thatâs kind of on me)
2) Brings potential unnecessary negative PR issues with EA, as it gives unnecessary ammunition for hit pieces.
Its the style not the substance here Iâm strongly against.