Is this the time to bring up better governance again? Why do we allow CEA to be part of a foundation, controlling community assets without community oversight?
If there was functional community oversight (like e.g. EA Germany has), we would know exactly why SBF was forced out of EVF (then CEA) board.
Can you say more about how this works with organizations like EA Germany? I don’t know anything about SBF leaving the CEA board, but here’s a plausible case:
Some people have concerns about him.
They talk quietly among each other.
Someone respected quietly takes SBF aside and says they think he should resign.
He resigns, looking externally like anyone else who leaves the board including for reasons like “I don’t have time for this now that my company is growing rapidly”.
In this case I think we probably wouldn’t learn about 1-3 or the motivation for 4 even if there was community oversight, unless the people with the concerns or the people they shared them with decided to make them public. And this doesn’t seem like a question of governance?
I do see how governance might affect what the community learned if he didn’t want to step down and was voted out, but even people who don’t want to leave projects often will do it without being officially forced to go if they can see how the official process would turn out and leaving voluntarily lets them save face or get concessions.
EA Germany board members are voted into office by members (aka the community). The board is formally responsible to ordinary community members, and they need to explain their actions. So the remaining board members would at the very least face questions. It’s not a complete fix of course, but I think it could have helped.
Would the board normally face questions if someone left? Especially if they [edit: as in “the person leaving”] clearly had other big things they were working on?
@Jeff Kaufman technically you might be right that even if board members were voted in and were responsible to members, they wouldn’t have to disclose their information of explain their actions.
But if you are voted in and therefore formally accountable to members, you are likely to both feel obligated to explain things like this, and also be motivated to explain important goings on to keep your support to ensure you have a mandate in the community to stay on the board.
Whether we agree or disagree with boards being more democratic (a different question) assuming a board is voted in it’s hard to imagine they wouldn’t be far more likely to publicly explain their actions and face questions.
I’m also often confused by this common argument I see on the EA forums that people might not have time, or might consider other things more important than responding to critical governance issues or decision making—I remember this argument touted on the open phil thread. It seems a convenient excuse for not publicly responding to issues, which seems like a key function of any management body. There may be other good legal or confidentiality reasons not to respond, but I find the “workingother things” or “not enough time” reasoning weak.
Sorry, edited my comment to clarify what I meant by being busy here. The idea isn’t that people might not have time to respond to questions, it’s that the CEO of a fast growing startup deciding they don’t have time to be on the board of a foundation isn’t likely to generate questions.
That sounds like a very sensible set-up (aside from anything else, presumably it significantly lessens the chances of a “surprise! we bought an abbey” moment).
Is this the time to bring up better governance again? Why do we allow CEA to be part of a foundation, controlling community assets without community oversight?
If there was functional community oversight (like e.g. EA Germany has), we would know exactly why SBF was forced out of EVF (then CEA) board.
Can you say more about how this works with organizations like EA Germany? I don’t know anything about SBF leaving the CEA board, but here’s a plausible case:
Some people have concerns about him.
They talk quietly among each other.
Someone respected quietly takes SBF aside and says they think he should resign.
He resigns, looking externally like anyone else who leaves the board including for reasons like “I don’t have time for this now that my company is growing rapidly”.
In this case I think we probably wouldn’t learn about 1-3 or the motivation for 4 even if there was community oversight, unless the people with the concerns or the people they shared them with decided to make them public. And this doesn’t seem like a question of governance?
I do see how governance might affect what the community learned if he didn’t want to step down and was voted out, but even people who don’t want to leave projects often will do it without being officially forced to go if they can see how the official process would turn out and leaving voluntarily lets them save face or get concessions.
EA Germany board members are voted into office by members (aka the community). The board is formally responsible to ordinary community members, and they need to explain their actions. So the remaining board members would at the very least face questions. It’s not a complete fix of course, but I think it could have helped.
Would the board normally face questions if someone left? Especially if they [edit: as in “the person leaving”] clearly had other big things they were working on?
@Jeff Kaufman technically you might be right that even if board members were voted in and were responsible to members, they wouldn’t have to disclose their information of explain their actions.
But if you are voted in and therefore formally accountable to members, you are likely to both feel obligated to explain things like this, and also be motivated to explain important goings on to keep your support to ensure you have a mandate in the community to stay on the board.
Whether we agree or disagree with boards being more democratic (a different question) assuming a board is voted in it’s hard to imagine they wouldn’t be far more likely to publicly explain their actions and face questions.
I’m also often confused by this common argument I see on the EA forums that people might not have time, or might consider other things more important than responding to critical governance issues or decision making—I remember this argument touted on the open phil thread. It seems a convenient excuse for not publicly responding to issues, which seems like a key function of any management body. There may be other good legal or confidentiality reasons not to respond, but I find the “workingother things” or “not enough time” reasoning weak.
Sorry, edited my comment to clarify what I meant by being busy here. The idea isn’t that people might not have time to respond to questions, it’s that the CEO of a fast growing startup deciding they don’t have time to be on the board of a foundation isn’t likely to generate questions.
That sounds like a very sensible set-up (aside from anything else, presumably it significantly lessens the chances of a “surprise! we bought an abbey” moment).