One way in which the Claire example could differ from other examples is that she owes both a duty of loyalty to EVF and a duty of loyalty to the donors to whom she is making the grant recommendation. If the donor themself is on the board, there is only one duty of loyalty floating about (it doesn’t make sense to say the donor-trustee has a duty of loyalty to themself as a donor).
Private equity employees often sit on the boards of portfolio companies, even though technically it’s not their money—it belongs to the investors in the fund. These PE employees then owe duties to both the other investors in the portfolio company and to the investors in the fund.
Good analogy. This arrangement has been implicitly consented to by the fund investors, so I think it is generally quite fine. I’m more willing to find an implied COI waiver in this context than in most charity contexts for two reasons:
First, private equity fund investors are generally quite sophisticated, and they both understand and desire that someone from the fund sit on the portfolio-company board. I assume that is also true in the Claire example, but there are many charity-related examples where that is not the case.
Second, the aims of the various entities tend to be more necessarily aligned in the for-profit example: everyone wants to make money. Although they might disagree on the best path to get there, money is universally quantifiable in a way that charitable impact is not.
Claire Zabel sits on the board of EVF, and also signs off their grants. Right.
Which of your examples is this more like?
I struggle to really understand the difference, though I guess you’re right that there is one.
One way in which the Claire example could differ from other examples is that she owes both a duty of loyalty to EVF and a duty of loyalty to the donors to whom she is making the grant recommendation. If the donor themself is on the board, there is only one duty of loyalty floating about (it doesn’t make sense to say the donor-trustee has a duty of loyalty to themself as a donor).
Private equity employees often sit on the boards of portfolio companies, even though technically it’s not their money—it belongs to the investors in the fund. These PE employees then owe duties to both the other investors in the portfolio company and to the investors in the fund.
Good analogy. This arrangement has been implicitly consented to by the fund investors, so I think it is generally quite fine. I’m more willing to find an implied COI waiver in this context than in most charity contexts for two reasons:
First, private equity fund investors are generally quite sophisticated, and they both understand and desire that someone from the fund sit on the portfolio-company board. I assume that is also true in the Claire example, but there are many charity-related examples where that is not the case.
Second, the aims of the various entities tend to be more necessarily aligned in the for-profit example: everyone wants to make money. Although they might disagree on the best path to get there, money is universally quantifiable in a way that charitable impact is not.