I wasnât really impressed or persuaded by it to be honest, actually the more I read it the worse it got. I agree with you that heâd make a very interesting 80k podcast guest if he and Rob got the chance to go at it hammer and tongs, but I donât think the current team are up for adversarial conversations (even well-mannered ones) that it would probably turn out to be.
Poverty is No Pond is right to point out the vast complexity of understanding the potential impacts that aid interventions might have, but I think this empirical and moral cluelessness applies to all actions all the time, and he doesnât seem to apply them to his friend Aaron. Thereâs a funny section in the linked piece where he excoriates GiveWell for their hedging languageâyet in Poverty is No Pond he laments that more of those in the aid space arenât more humbly agnostic. Even if we are clueless about how the world works, we must still act in one way or another. He doesnât seem to give any evidence for his suggestions about from epistemic nihilism and personal/âlived experience.
I donât think pointing out that bednets can be used for fishing is a very strong argument against them, and I donât necessarily trust Wenarâs assessment of the evidence here when compared to AMF, GiveWill, and others in the space. Just as he uses the âItâs difficult to get a man to understand something, said Upton Sinclair, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.â line to criticse Ord, I can use it to criticise him here, and much of his view on the value of quantification and empirical research.
A lot of the piece is written in a very hostile, and honestly child-like manner to me. The parts about MacAskill are blazingly hostile, to the point that it comes off as much more hit-piecy than truth-seeking. Like the whole bit about âaltruismâ just seems to underline how little Wenar really understands about EA. I donât think the SBF is insightful or adds much to whatâs been reported on elsewhere.
By the bit it got to longtermism it started to look increasingly ahistorical, pure conjecture, and vitriol, and I lost interest in reading beyond a quick skim. Maybe Iâve been harsh, but I think that it probably deserves to be treated harshly.
My understanding is heâs not at all an advocate for epistemic nihilism (nor just basing decisions on anecdotes like those he shared). (Though the post leaves me a little epistemically depressed.) I think he (like me) thinks we can do better & in the post is arguing that EA is not managing to do better. And, my impression is he is genuinely trying to figure out how we can do better.
Can I ask what your connection to Leif is, are you in contact with him directly/âindirectly in some way?
I did use the term âepistemic nihilismâ as a turn of phrase, but I donât think itâs entirely unwarranted. I think the acid-test that Leifâs applying to GiveWell, if applied to literally any other choice, would lead that way. He certainly doesnât provide any grounding for any of the alternatives.
As much as Iâd also be keen for dialogue and improvement, the level of vitriol combined with flat-out mistakes/âmisrepresentations in the article[1] really doesnât make me see Leif as a good-faith interlocutor here.
Iâm just a student & a few weeks ago I emailed him asking to chat, which he kindly agreed to do. (It was basically a cold email after chatting with a friend about Poverty is No Pond.) We had a good conversation & he came across a very kind & genuine & we agreed to talk again next week (after spring break & this piece was published).
âAs much as Iâd also be keen for dialogue and improvement, the level of vitriol combined with flat-out mistakes/âmisrepresentations in the article really doesnât make me see Leif as a good-faith interlocutor here.â
This is really understandable, though my impression from talking with him is that he is actually thinking about all this in good-faith. I also found the piece unsatisfactory in that it didnât offer solutions, which is what I meant to allude to in saying âBut, really, Iâm interested in the follow-up piece...â
I think itâs really great you reached out to him, and I hope things are going well at Stanford and that youâre enjoying spring break :) And I think if youâre interested in pursuing his ideas, go and talk to him and donât necessarily feel like you have to ârepresent EAâ in any meaningful way.
I think Poverty is No Pond is a thoughtful piece of criticism, even if I disagree with some of the arguments/âconclusions in it. But The Deaths of Effective Altruism is a much worse piece imo, and I donât know how to square its incredible hostility with the picture of a genuine and good-faith person you talked about. Like some of it seems to come from a place of deep anger, and making simple mistakes or asking questions that could have been answered with some easy research or reflection.
I may raise some of these points more specifically in the âQuestions for Leif Postâ, but again I think you should ask your own questions rather than my own!
Reading through it, the vitriolic parts are mostly directed at MacAskill. The author seems to have an intense dislike for MacAskill specifically. He thinks MacAskill is a fraud/âidiot and is angry at him being so popular and influential. Personally, I donât think this hatred is justified, but I have similar feelings about other popular EA figures, so Iâm not sure I can judge that much.
I think if you ignore everything directed at MacAskill, it comes off as harsh but not excessively hostile, and while I disagree with plenty of whatâs in there, it does not come across as bad faith to me.
I cannot really speak to how good or honest Willâs public-facing stuff about practical charity evaluation is, and I find WWOTF a bit shallow outside of the really good chapter on population ethics where Will actually has domain expertise. But the claim that Will is hilariously incompetent as a philosopher is, frankly, garbage. As is the argument for it that Will once defined altruism in a non-standard way. Will regularly publishes in leading academic philosophy journals. He became the UK equivalent of a tenured prof super young at one of the worldâs best universities. Also, frankly, many years ago I actually discussed technical philosophy with Will once or twice, and, like most Oxford graduate students in philosophy, he knows what heâs doing.
I am still somewhat worried that Wenar has genuinely good criticism of GiveWell, but that part of the article was somewhat of a mark against itâs credibility to me even if all the other bad things it says about Will are true. (Note: Iâm not conceding they are true.)
I wasnât really impressed or persuaded by it to be honest, actually the more I read it the worse it got. I agree with you that heâd make a very interesting 80k podcast guest if he and Rob got the chance to go at it hammer and tongs, but I donât think the current team are up for adversarial conversations (even well-mannered ones) that it would probably turn out to be.
Poverty is No Pond is right to point out the vast complexity of understanding the potential impacts that aid interventions might have, but I think this empirical and moral cluelessness applies to all actions all the time, and he doesnât seem to apply them to his friend Aaron. Thereâs a funny section in the linked piece where he excoriates GiveWell for their hedging languageâyet in Poverty is No Pond he laments that more of those in the aid space arenât more humbly agnostic. Even if we are clueless about how the world works, we must still act in one way or another. He doesnât seem to give any evidence for his suggestions about from epistemic nihilism and personal/âlived experience.
I donât think pointing out that bednets can be used for fishing is a very strong argument against them, and I donât necessarily trust Wenarâs assessment of the evidence here when compared to AMF, GiveWill, and others in the space. Just as he uses the âItâs difficult to get a man to understand something, said Upton Sinclair, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.â line to criticse Ord, I can use it to criticise him here, and much of his view on the value of quantification and empirical research.
A lot of the piece is written in a very hostile, and honestly child-like manner to me. The parts about MacAskill are blazingly hostile, to the point that it comes off as much more hit-piecy than truth-seeking. Like the whole bit about âaltruismâ just seems to underline how little Wenar really understands about EA. I donât think the SBF is insightful or adds much to whatâs been reported on elsewhere.
By the bit it got to longtermism it started to look increasingly ahistorical, pure conjecture, and vitriol, and I lost interest in reading beyond a quick skim. Maybe Iâve been harsh, but I think that it probably deserves to be treated harshly.
My understanding is heâs not at all an advocate for epistemic nihilism (nor just basing decisions on anecdotes like those he shared). (Though the post leaves me a little epistemically depressed.) I think he (like me) thinks we can do better & in the post is arguing that EA is not managing to do better. And, my impression is he is genuinely trying to figure out how we can do better.
Can I ask what your connection to Leif is, are you in contact with him directly/âindirectly in some way?
I did use the term âepistemic nihilismâ as a turn of phrase, but I donât think itâs entirely unwarranted. I think the acid-test that Leifâs applying to GiveWell, if applied to literally any other choice, would lead that way. He certainly doesnât provide any grounding for any of the alternatives.
As much as Iâd also be keen for dialogue and improvement, the level of vitriol combined with flat-out mistakes/âmisrepresentations in the article[1] really doesnât make me see Leif as a good-faith interlocutor here.
At least from my point-of-view. Theyâre either caused by his anger or even wilful misrepresentation.
Iâm just a student & a few weeks ago I emailed him asking to chat, which he kindly agreed to do. (It was basically a cold email after chatting with a friend about Poverty is No Pond.) We had a good conversation & he came across a very kind & genuine & we agreed to talk again next week (after spring break & this piece was published).
âAs much as Iâd also be keen for dialogue and improvement, the level of vitriol combined with flat-out mistakes/âmisrepresentations in the article really doesnât make me see Leif as a good-faith interlocutor here.â
This is really understandable, though my impression from talking with him is that he is actually thinking about all this in good-faith. I also found the piece unsatisfactory in that it didnât offer solutions, which is what I meant to allude to in saying âBut, really, Iâm interested in the follow-up piece...â
Thanks for sharing your thoughts, btw :)
I think itâs really great you reached out to him, and I hope things are going well at Stanford and that youâre enjoying spring break :) And I think if youâre interested in pursuing his ideas, go and talk to him and donât necessarily feel like you have to ârepresent EAâ in any meaningful way.
I think Poverty is No Pond is a thoughtful piece of criticism, even if I disagree with some of the arguments/âconclusions in it. But The Deaths of Effective Altruism is a much worse piece imo, and I donât know how to square its incredible hostility with the picture of a genuine and good-faith person you talked about. Like some of it seems to come from a place of deep anger, and making simple mistakes or asking questions that could have been answered with some easy research or reflection.
I may raise some of these points more specifically in the âQuestions for Leif Postâ, but again I think you should ask your own questions rather than my own!
Reading through it, the vitriolic parts are mostly directed at MacAskill. The author seems to have an intense dislike for MacAskill specifically. He thinks MacAskill is a fraud/âidiot and is angry at him being so popular and influential. Personally, I donât think this hatred is justified, but I have similar feelings about other popular EA figures, so Iâm not sure I can judge that much.
I think if you ignore everything directed at MacAskill, it comes off as harsh but not excessively hostile, and while I disagree with plenty of whatâs in there, it does not come across as bad faith to me.
I cannot really speak to how good or honest Willâs public-facing stuff about practical charity evaluation is, and I find WWOTF a bit shallow outside of the really good chapter on population ethics where Will actually has domain expertise. But the claim that Will is hilariously incompetent as a philosopher is, frankly, garbage. As is the argument for it that Will once defined altruism in a non-standard way. Will regularly publishes in leading academic philosophy journals. He became the UK equivalent of a tenured prof super young at one of the worldâs best universities. Also, frankly, many years ago I actually discussed technical philosophy with Will once or twice, and, like most Oxford graduate students in philosophy, he knows what heâs doing.
I am still somewhat worried that Wenar has genuinely good criticism of GiveWell, but that part of the article was somewhat of a mark against itâs credibility to me even if all the other bad things it says about Will are true. (Note: Iâm not conceding they are true.)