âI now believe that less work is being done by these moral claims than by our unusual empirical beliefs, such as the hinge of history hypothesis, or a belief in the efficacy of hits-based giving. â
This is also a view I have moved pretty strongly towards.
[Responding to the quoted sentence, not specifically your comment]
I definitely agree that empirical beliefs like those listed do a substantial amount of work in leading to EAâs unusual set of priorities. I donât have a view on whether that does more of the work than moral claims do.
That said, I think there are two things worth noting in relation to the quoted sentence.
First, I think this sentence could be (mis?)interpreted as implying that the relevant empirical beliefs are ones where EAs tend to disagree with beliefs that are relatively confidently, clearly, and widely held by large numbers of thoughtful non-EAs. If so, we should ask âWhy do EAs disagree with these people? Are we making a mistake, or are they? Do they know of evidence or arguments weâve overlooked?â And those questions would seem especially important given that EAs havenât yet spent huge amounts of time forming, checking, critiquing, etc. those beliefs. (Iâm basically talking about epistemic humility.)
I imagine this is true of some of the relevant âunusualâ empirical beliefs. But I donât think itâs true of most of them, including the hinge of history hypothesis and the efficacy of hits-based giving. My impression is that those topics are ones where there just arenât clear, established, standard views among non-EAs. My impression is that itâs more like:
relatively few people outside of EA have even considered the questions
those who have often frame the questions a bit differently, perhaps evaluate them in ways influenced by differences in moral views (e.g., a focus on consequences vs deontological principles), and often disagree amongst themselves
(I havenât checked those impressions carefully, and I acknowledge that these statements are somewhat vague.)
In other words, our beliefs on these sorts of topics may be unusual primarily because we have any clear views on these precise topics at all, not because weâre disagreeing with a mainstream consensus. I think that that reduces the extent to which we should ask the epistemic-humility-style questions mentioned above (such as âDo they know of evidence or arguments weâve overlooked?â). (Though Iâm still in favour of often asking those sorts of questions.)
Second, I think âour unusual beliefsâ is perhaps a somewhat misleading phrase, as I think thereâs substantial disagreement and debate among EAs on many of the beliefs in question. For example, there has been vigorous debate on the Forum regarding the hinge of history hypothesis, and two key thought leaders in EA (MacAskill and Ord) seem to mostly be on opposing sides of the debate. And Open Phil seems supportive of hits-based giving, but one of the most prominent EA orgs (GiveWell) has historically mostly highlighted âsafer betsâ and has drawn many EAs in that way.
There are of course many empirical questions on which the median/âmajority EA position is not also a median/âmajority position among other groups of people (sometimes simply because most members of other groups have no clear position on the question). But off the top of my head, Iâm not sure if thereâs an empirical belief on which the vast majority of EAs agree, but thatâs unusual outside EA, and that plays a major role in driving differences between EA priorities and mainstream priorities.
(This comment is not necessarily disagreeing with Richard, as I imagine he probably didnât mean to convey the interpretations Iâm pushing back against.)
Joey, are there unusual empirical beliefs you have in mind other than the two mentioned? Hits based giving seems clearly related to Charity Entrepreneurshipâs workâwhat other important but unusual empirical beliefs do you/âCE/âneartermist EAs hold? (Iâm guessing hinge of history hypothesis is irrelevant to your thinking?)
I think the majority of unusual empirical beliefs that came to mind were more in the longtermist space. In some ways these are unusual at even a deeper level than the suggested beliefs e.g. I think EAs generally give more credence epistemically to philosophical/âa priori evidence, Bayesian reasoning, sequence thinking, etc.
If I think about unusual empirical beliefs Charity Entrepreneurship has as well, it would likely be something like the importance of equal rigor, focusing on methodology in general, or the ability to beat the charity market using research.
In both cases these are just a couple that came to mind â I suspect there are a bunch more.
âI now believe that less work is being done by these moral claims than by our unusual empirical beliefs, such as the hinge of history hypothesis, or a belief in the efficacy of hits-based giving. â
This is also a view I have moved pretty strongly towards.
[Responding to the quoted sentence, not specifically your comment]
I definitely agree that empirical beliefs like those listed do a substantial amount of work in leading to EAâs unusual set of priorities. I donât have a view on whether that does more of the work than moral claims do.
That said, I think there are two things worth noting in relation to the quoted sentence.
First, I think this sentence could be (mis?)interpreted as implying that the relevant empirical beliefs are ones where EAs tend to disagree with beliefs that are relatively confidently, clearly, and widely held by large numbers of thoughtful non-EAs. If so, we should ask âWhy do EAs disagree with these people? Are we making a mistake, or are they? Do they know of evidence or arguments weâve overlooked?â And those questions would seem especially important given that EAs havenât yet spent huge amounts of time forming, checking, critiquing, etc. those beliefs. (Iâm basically talking about epistemic humility.)
I imagine this is true of some of the relevant âunusualâ empirical beliefs. But I donât think itâs true of most of them, including the hinge of history hypothesis and the efficacy of hits-based giving. My impression is that those topics are ones where there just arenât clear, established, standard views among non-EAs. My impression is that itâs more like:
relatively few people outside of EA have even considered the questions
those who have often frame the questions a bit differently, perhaps evaluate them in ways influenced by differences in moral views (e.g., a focus on consequences vs deontological principles), and often disagree amongst themselves
(I havenât checked those impressions carefully, and I acknowledge that these statements are somewhat vague.)
In other words, our beliefs on these sorts of topics may be unusual primarily because we have any clear views on these precise topics at all, not because weâre disagreeing with a mainstream consensus. I think that that reduces the extent to which we should ask the epistemic-humility-style questions mentioned above (such as âDo they know of evidence or arguments weâve overlooked?â). (Though Iâm still in favour of often asking those sorts of questions.)
Second, I think âour unusual beliefsâ is perhaps a somewhat misleading phrase, as I think thereâs substantial disagreement and debate among EAs on many of the beliefs in question. For example, there has been vigorous debate on the Forum regarding the hinge of history hypothesis, and two key thought leaders in EA (MacAskill and Ord) seem to mostly be on opposing sides of the debate. And Open Phil seems supportive of hits-based giving, but one of the most prominent EA orgs (GiveWell) has historically mostly highlighted âsafer betsâ and has drawn many EAs in that way.
There are of course many empirical questions on which the median/âmajority EA position is not also a median/âmajority position among other groups of people (sometimes simply because most members of other groups have no clear position on the question). But off the top of my head, Iâm not sure if thereâs an empirical belief on which the vast majority of EAs agree, but thatâs unusual outside EA, and that plays a major role in driving differences between EA priorities and mainstream priorities.
(This comment is not necessarily disagreeing with Richard, as I imagine he probably didnât mean to convey the interpretations Iâm pushing back against.)
Joey, are there unusual empirical beliefs you have in mind other than the two mentioned? Hits based giving seems clearly related to Charity Entrepreneurshipâs workâwhat other important but unusual empirical beliefs do you/âCE/âneartermist EAs hold? (Iâm guessing hinge of history hypothesis is irrelevant to your thinking?)
I think the majority of unusual empirical beliefs that came to mind were more in the longtermist space. In some ways these are unusual at even a deeper level than the suggested beliefs e.g. I think EAs generally give more credence epistemically to philosophical/âa priori evidence, Bayesian reasoning, sequence thinking, etc.
If I think about unusual empirical beliefs Charity Entrepreneurship has as well, it would likely be something like the importance of equal rigor, focusing on methodology in general, or the ability to beat the charity market using research.
In both cases these are just a couple that came to mind â I suspect there are a bunch more.