I think the arguments you provide only imply the expected change in welfare from pursuing any 2 strategies is closer than one may have thought. However, as long as the information about each strategy is not exactly the same, one will still be better than the other in expectation. If the difference is sufficiently small (e.g. me leaving home 0.001 s later), one could say they have practically the same expected value. I agree there are many more strategies in this situation than people realise. Yet, I am not convinced literally all possible strategies are in that situation.
This particular claim isn’t empirical, it’s about what follows from compelling epistemic principles.
(As for empirical evidence that would change my mind about imprecision being so severe that we’re clueless, see our earlier exchange. I guess we hit a crux there.)
Hi Anthony,
I think the arguments you provide only imply the expected change in welfare from pursuing any 2 strategies is closer than one may have thought. However, as long as the information about each strategy is not exactly the same, one will still be better than the other in expectation. If the difference is sufficiently small (e.g. me leaving home 0.001 s later), one could say they have practically the same expected value. I agree there are many more strategies in this situation than people realise. Yet, I am not convinced literally all possible strategies are in that situation.
Hi Vasco —
My posts argue that this is fundamentally the wrong framework. We don’t have precise “expectations”.
Thanks, Anthony. Is there any empirical evidence that would change your mind on that?
This particular claim isn’t empirical, it’s about what follows from compelling epistemic principles.
(As for empirical evidence that would change my mind about imprecision being so severe that we’re clueless, see our earlier exchange. I guess we hit a crux there.)