And yet even a very flawed procedure will, on average across worlds, do better than chance
I respond to the ābetter than chanceā claim in the post I linked to (in my reply to Richard). What do you think Iām missing there? (See also here.)
(The section I linked to from this other post is more of a quick overview of stuff mostly discussed in the sections above. But it might be harder to follow because itās in the context of a post about unawareness specifically, hence the āUEVā term etc. ā sorry about that! You could skip the first paragraph and replace āUEVā with āimprecise EVā.)
I think the arguments you provide only imply the expected change in welfare from pursuing any 2 strategies is closer than one may have thought. However, as long as the information about each strategy is not exactly the same, one will still be better than the other in expectation. If the difference is sufficiently small (e.g. me leaving home 0.001 s later), one could say they have practically the same expected value. I agree there are many more strategies in this situation than people realise. Yet, I am not convinced literally all possible strategies are in that situation.
This particular claim isnāt empirical, itās about what follows from compelling epistemic principles.
(As for empirical evidence that would change my mind about imprecision being so severe that weāre clueless, see our earlier exchange. I guess we hit a crux there.)
I respond to the ābetter than chanceā claim in the post I linked to (in my reply to Richard). What do you think Iām missing there? (See also here.)
Itās a somewhat long post. Want to come on the podcast to discuss?
Sounds great, please DM me! Thanks for the invite. :)
In the meantime, if it helps, for the purposes of this discussion I think the essential sections of the posts I linked are:
āThe structure of indeterminacyā
āAggregating our representor with higher-order credences uses more informationā (and āResponseā)
(The section I linked to from this other post is more of a quick overview of stuff mostly discussed in the sections above. But it might be harder to follow because itās in the context of a post about unawareness specifically, hence the āUEVā term etc. ā sorry about that! You could skip the first paragraph and replace āUEVā with āimprecise EVā.)
Hi Anthony,
I think the arguments you provide only imply the expected change in welfare from pursuing any 2 strategies is closer than one may have thought. However, as long as the information about each strategy is not exactly the same, one will still be better than the other in expectation. If the difference is sufficiently small (e.g. me leaving home 0.001 s later), one could say they have practically the same expected value. I agree there are many more strategies in this situation than people realise. Yet, I am not convinced literally all possible strategies are in that situation.
Hi Vasco ā
My posts argue that this is fundamentally the wrong framework. We donāt have precise āexpectationsā.
Thanks, Anthony. Is there any empirical evidence that would change your mind on that?
This particular claim isnāt empirical, itās about what follows from compelling epistemic principles.
(As for empirical evidence that would change my mind about imprecision being so severe that weāre clueless, see our earlier exchange. I guess we hit a crux there.)