3. I sympathize strongly with the feeling of urgency but it seems risky to act on it, as long as the longtermist community doesn’t have fully elaborated policy designs on the table that can simply be lobbied into adoption and implementation.
Given that the design of policies or institutional improvements requires a lot of case-specific knowledge, we see this as another reason to privilege high-bandwidth engagement. In such settings, it’s also possible to become policy-entrepreneurs who can create windows of opportunity, instead of needing to wait for them.
Whenever there are large-scale windows of opportunity (e.g. a global pandemic causing significant budget shifts), we’d only be confident in attempting to seize them in a rushed manner if (a) the designs are already on the table and just need to be adopted/implemented or if (b) we were in the position to work in direct collaboration with the policymakers. Of course, SI leverages COVID-19 in its messaging but that’s to make its general case, for now.
If an existential catastrophe is happening very soon, SI is not in a position to do much beyond supporting coordination and networking of key actors (which we’re doing). Being overly alarmist would quickly burn the credibility we have only begun to consolidate. Other actors are in positions with higher leverage and we hope to be able to support them indirectly. Overall, we see most of SI’s impact potential 5-20 years down the line—with one potential milestone being the reassessment of the 2030 UN Agenda.
In such settings, it’s also possible to become policy-entrepreneurs who can create windows of opportunity, instead of needing to wait for them.
This is an interesting point.
It also calls to mind a possible counterpoint to your overall views here (though I think I agree with the views):
Maybe instead of (a) waiting for windows of opportunity (while building capacity) or (b) creating windows of opportunity through insider approaches, it’s sometimes best to (c) create windows of opportunity through outsider approaches like public advocacy?
E.g., I’d guess that public advocacy about climate change has played a substantial role in creating windows for acting on that issue, e.g. because now voters will vote partly based on that issue and politicians are aware of that. And my impression is that public advocacy or similar things like marches and protests have played a key role in creating policy windows in the past, e.g. in the case of the civil rights movement. (I haven’t looked into this stuff closely, though.)
I’d be interested in your thoughts on that. (Though again, I do think I lean in favour of your approach. And in fact I tentatively think some existing longtermism-related public advocacy is sufficiently likely to be counterproductive that it was a mistake for it to be started without further analysis up front, partly because that better preserves option value.)
Yeah, public attention can also be a carrot, not just a stick. But it’s a carrot that grows legs and will run its own way, possibly making it harder when you want to change course upon new learnings.
Our current take here is something like “public advocacy doesn’t create windows of opportunity, it creates windows of implementation”. When public pressure mounts, policymakers want to do something to signal they are trying. And they will often do whatever looks best in that moment. It would only be good to pressure once proposals are worked out and just need to be “pushed through”.
To influence agendas, it seems better, at least mid-term, to pursue insider strategies. However, if all you have is one shot, then you might as well try public advocacy for reprioritization and hope it vaguely goes into the right direction. But if you think there’s time for more targeted and incremental progress, then the best option probably is to become a trusted policy actor in your network of choice.
I think another framing/argument that would also make sense would be something like this: “We (i.e., longtermists) have substantial uncertainty about when relevant windows of opportunity will arise. As such, the longtermist community should have a portfolio which includes efforts targeted at both nearby windows and further away windows (just as it should have a portfolio which includes efforts targeted at a variety of different risks, technologies, countries, etc.). Simon Institute is focused on windows of opportunity other than extremely nearby existential risks.”
Yup, the portfolio approach makes a lot of sense to us. Also, as always, thanks for the summary and links!
A big question is how to define “extremely nearby”. Within the next 5 years, SI should be in a position to directly take meaningful action. Ironically, given SI’s starting point, making short-term action the main goal seems like it could make it less likely to attain the necessary capacity. There’s just no sustainable way in which a new actor can act urgently, as they first have to “stand the test of time” in the eyes of the established ones.
3. I sympathize strongly with the feeling of urgency but it seems risky to act on it, as long as the longtermist community doesn’t have fully elaborated policy designs on the table that can simply be lobbied into adoption and implementation.
Given that the design of policies or institutional improvements requires a lot of case-specific knowledge, we see this as another reason to privilege high-bandwidth engagement. In such settings, it’s also possible to become policy-entrepreneurs who can create windows of opportunity, instead of needing to wait for them.
Whenever there are large-scale windows of opportunity (e.g. a global pandemic causing significant budget shifts), we’d only be confident in attempting to seize them in a rushed manner if (a) the designs are already on the table and just need to be adopted/implemented or if (b) we were in the position to work in direct collaboration with the policymakers. Of course, SI leverages COVID-19 in its messaging but that’s to make its general case, for now.
If an existential catastrophe is happening very soon, SI is not in a position to do much beyond supporting coordination and networking of key actors (which we’re doing). Being overly alarmist would quickly burn the credibility we have only begun to consolidate. Other actors are in positions with higher leverage and we hope to be able to support them indirectly. Overall, we see most of SI’s impact potential 5-20 years down the line—with one potential milestone being the reassessment of the 2030 UN Agenda.
This is an interesting point.
It also calls to mind a possible counterpoint to your overall views here (though I think I agree with the views):
Maybe instead of (a) waiting for windows of opportunity (while building capacity) or (b) creating windows of opportunity through insider approaches, it’s sometimes best to (c) create windows of opportunity through outsider approaches like public advocacy?
E.g., I’d guess that public advocacy about climate change has played a substantial role in creating windows for acting on that issue, e.g. because now voters will vote partly based on that issue and politicians are aware of that. And my impression is that public advocacy or similar things like marches and protests have played a key role in creating policy windows in the past, e.g. in the case of the civil rights movement. (I haven’t looked into this stuff closely, though.)
I’d be interested in your thoughts on that. (Though again, I do think I lean in favour of your approach. And in fact I tentatively think some existing longtermism-related public advocacy is sufficiently likely to be counterproductive that it was a mistake for it to be started without further analysis up front, partly because that better preserves option value.)
Yeah, public attention can also be a carrot, not just a stick. But it’s a carrot that grows legs and will run its own way, possibly making it harder when you want to change course upon new learnings.
Our current take here is something like “public advocacy doesn’t create windows of opportunity, it creates windows of implementation”. When public pressure mounts, policymakers want to do something to signal they are trying. And they will often do whatever looks best in that moment. It would only be good to pressure once proposals are worked out and just need to be “pushed through”.
To influence agendas, it seems better, at least mid-term, to pursue insider strategies. However, if all you have is one shot, then you might as well try public advocacy for reprioritization and hope it vaguely goes into the right direction. But if you think there’s time for more targeted and incremental progress, then the best option probably is to become a trusted policy actor in your network of choice.
This sounds reasonable to me.
I think another framing/argument that would also make sense would be something like this: “We (i.e., longtermists) have substantial uncertainty about when relevant windows of opportunity will arise. As such, the longtermist community should have a portfolio which includes efforts targeted at both nearby windows and further away windows (just as it should have a portfolio which includes efforts targeted at a variety of different risks, technologies, countries, etc.). Simon Institute is focused on windows of opportunity other than extremely nearby existential risks.”
(This would be similar to Owen Cotton-Barratt’s arguments in this talk. There are also some relevant arguments and sources in my post Crucial questions about the optimal timing of work and donations.)
Yup, the portfolio approach makes a lot of sense to us. Also, as always, thanks for the summary and links!
A big question is how to define “extremely nearby”. Within the next 5 years, SI should be in a position to directly take meaningful action. Ironically, given SI’s starting point, making short-term action the main goal seems like it could make it less likely to attain the necessary capacity. There’s just no sustainable way in which a new actor can act urgently, as they first have to “stand the test of time” in the eyes of the established ones.