Then, I think there are ways to interpret Dasgupta’s view as compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”, step by step:
Step 1 rules out options based on pairwise comparisons within the same populations, or same number of people. Because we never compare existence to nonexistence — we only compare the same people or with the same number like in nonidentity — at this step, this step is arguably about affecting persons.
Step 2 is just necessitarianism on the remaining options. Definitely about affecting persons.
These other views also seem compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”:
The view that makes (wide or narrow) necessitarian utilitarian comparisons pairwise while ignoring alternatives, so it gives A<A+, A+<Z, Z<A, a cycle.
Actualism
The procreation asymmetry
Anyway, I feel like we’re nitpicking here about what deserves the label “person-affecting” or “being about affecting persons”.
I wouldn’t agree on the first point, because making Desgupta’s step 1 the “step 1” is, as far as I can tell, not justified by any basic principles. Ruling out Z first seems more plausible, as Z negatively affects the present people, even quite strongly so compared to A and A+. Ruling out A+ is only motivated by an arbitrary-seeming decision to compare just A+ and Z first, merely because they have the same population size (...so what?). The fact that non-existence is not involved here (a comparison to A) is just a result of that decision, not of there really existing just two options.
Alternatively there is the regret argument, that we would “realize”, after choosing A+, that we made a mistake, but that intuition seems not based on some strong principle either. (The intuition could also be misleading because we perhaps don’t tend to imagine A+ as locked in).
I agree though that the classification “person-affecting” alone probably doesn’t capture a lot of potential intricacies of various proposals.
We should separate whether the view is well-motivated from whether it’s compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”. It’s based only on comparisons between counterparts, never between existence and nonexistence. That seems compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”.
We should also separate plausibility from whether it would follow on stricter interpretations of “ethics being about affecting persons”. An even stricter interpretation would also tell us to give less weight to or ignore nonidentity differences using essentially the same arguments you make for A+ over Z, so I think your arguments prove too much. For example,
Alice with welfare level 10 and 1 million people with welfare level 1 each
Alice with welfare level 4 and 1 million different people with welfare level 4 each
You said “Ruling out Z first seems more plausible, as Z negatively affects the present people, even quite strongly so compared to A and A+.” The same argument would support 1 over 2.
Then you said “Ruling out A+ is only motivated by an arbitrary-seeming decision to compare just A+ and Z first, merely because they have the same population size (...so what?).” Similarly, I could say “Picking 2 is only motivated by an arbitrary decision to compare contingent people, merely because there’s a minimum number of contingent people across outcomes (… so what?)”
So, similar arguments support narrow person-affecting views over wide ones.
The fact that non-existence is not involved here (a comparison to A) is just a result of that decision, not of there really existing just two options.
I think ignoring irrelevant alternatives has some independent appeal. Dasgupta’s view does that at step 1, but not at step 2. So, it doesn’t always ignore them, but it ignores them more than necessitarianism does.
I can further motivate Dasgupta’s view, or something similar:
There are some “more objective” facts about axiology or what we should do that don’t depend on who presently, actually or across all outcomes necessarily exists (or even wide versions of this). What we should do is first constrained by these “more objective” facts. Hence something like step 1. But these facts can leave a lot of options incomparable or undominated/permissible. I think all complete, transitive and independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) views are kind of implausible (e.g. the impossibility theorems of Arrhenius). Still, there are some things the most plausible of these views can agree on, including that Z>A+.
Z>A+ follows from anonymous versions of total utilitarianism, average utilitarianism, prioritarianism, egalitarianism, rank-discounted utilitarianism, maximin/leximin, variable value theories and critical-level utilitarianism. Of anonymous, monotonic (Pareto-respecting), transitive, complete and IIA views, it’s only really (partially) ~anti-egalitarian views (e.g. increasing marginal returns to additional welfare, maximax/leximax,geometrism, views with positive lexical thresholds), which sometimes ~prioritize the better off more than ~proportionately, that reject Z>A+, as far as I know. That’s nearly a consensus in favour of Z>A+, and the dissidents have more plausible counterparts that support Z>A+.
On the other hand, there’s more disagreement on A vs A+, and on A vs Z.
Whether or not this step is person-affecting could depend on what kinds of views we use or the facts we’re constrained by, but I’m less worried about that than what I think are plausible (to me) requirements for axiology.
After being constrained by the “more objective” facts in step 1, we should (or are at least allowed to) pick between remaining permissible options in favour of necessary people (or minimizing harm or some other person-affecting principle). Other people wouldn’t have reasonable impartial grounds for complaint with our decisions, because we already addressed the “more objective” impartial facts in 1.
If you were going to defend utilitarian necessitarianism, i.e. maximize the total utility of necessary people, you’d need to justify the utilitarian bit. But the most plausible justifications for the utilitarian bit would end up being justifications for Z>A+, unless you restrict them apparently arbitrarily. So then, you ask: am I a necessitarian first, or a utilitarian first? If you’re utilitarian first, you end up with something like Dasgupta’s view. If you’re a necessitarian first, then you end up with utilitarian necessitarianism.
Similarly if you substitute a different wide, anonymous, monotonic, non-anti-egalitarian view for the utilitarian bit.
You said “Ruling out Z first seems more plausible, as Z negatively affects the present people, even quite strongly so compared to A and A+.” The same argument would support 1 over 2.
Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we can’t infer much from it.
Then you said “Ruling out A+ is only motivated by an arbitrary-seeming decision to compare just A+ and Z first, merely because they have the same population size (...so what?).” Similarly, I could say “Picking 2 is only motivated by an arbitrary decision to compare contingent people, merely because there’s a minimum number of contingent people across outcomes (… so what?)”
Well, there is a necessary number of “contingent people”, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people. Since in both cases not creating anyone is not an option. Unlike in Huemer’s three choice case where A is an option.
I think ignoring irrelevant alternatives has some independent appeal.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. The paradox arises because we seem to have a cycle of binary comparisons: A+ is better than A, Z is better than A+, A is better than Z. The issue here seems to be that this assumes we can just break down a three option comparison into three binary comparisons. Which is arguably false, since it can lead to cycles. And when we want to avoid cycles while keeping binary comparisons, we have to assume we do some of the binary choices “first” and thereby rule out one of the remaining ones, removing the cycle. So we need either a principled way of deciding on the “evaluation order” of the binary comparisons, or reject the assumption that “x compared to y” is necessarily the same as “x compared y, given z”. If the latter removes the cycle, that is.
Another case where IIA leads to an absurd result is preference aggregation. Assume three equally sized groups (1, 2, 3) have these individual preferences:
x≻y≻z
y≻z≻x
z≻x≻y
The obvious and obviously only correct aggregation would be x∼y∼z, i.e. indifference between the three options. Which is different from what would happen if you’d take out either one of three options and make it a binary choice, since each binary choice has a majority. So the “irrelevant” alternatives are not actually irrelevant, since they can determine a choice relevant global property like a cycle. So IIA is false, since it would lead to a cycle. This seems not unlike the cycle we get in the repugnant conclusion paradox, although there the solution is arguably not that all three options are equally good.
There are some “more objective” facts about axiology or what we should do that don’t depend on who presently, actually or across all outcomes necessarily exists (or even wide versions of this). What we should do is first constrained by these “more objective” facts. Hence something like step 1.
I don’t see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first. As I said, this is the strategy of solving three choices with binary comparisons, but in a particular order, so that we end up with two total comparisons instead of three, since we rule out one option early. The question is why doing this or that binary comparison first, rather than another one, would be better. If we insist on comparing A and Z first, we would obviously rule out Z first, so we end up only comparing A and A+, while the comparison A+ and Z is never made.
Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we can’t infer much from it.
I can add any number of other options, as long as they respect the premises of your argument and are “unfair” to the necessary number of contingent people. What specific added complexity matters here and why?
I think you’d want to adjust your argument, replacing “present” with something like “the minimum number of contingent people” (and decide how to match counterparts if there are different numbers of contingent people). But this is moving to a less strict interpretation of “ethics being about affecting persons”. And then I could make your original complaint here against Dasgupta’s approach against the less strict wide interpretation.
Well, there is a necessary number of “contingent people”, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people.
But it’s not the same, and we can argue against it on a stricter interpretation. The difference seems significant, too: no specific contingent person is or would be made worse off. They’d have no grounds for complaint. If you can’t tell me for whom the outcome is worse, why should I care? (And then I can just deny each reason you give as not in line with my intuitions, e.g. ”… so what?”)
Stepping back, I’m not saying that wide views are wrong. I’m sympathetic to them. I also have some sympathy for (asymmetric) narrow views for roughly the reasons I just gave. My point is that your argument or the way you argued could prove too much if taken to be a very strong argument. You criticize Dasgupta’s view from a stricter interpretation, but we can also criticize wide views from a stricter interpretation.
I could also criticize presentism, necessitarianism and wide necessitarianism for being insensitive to the differences between A+ and Z for persons affected. The choice between A, A+ and Z is not just a choice between A and A+ or between A and Z. Between A+ and Z, the “extra” persons exist in both and are affected, even if A is available.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. (...)
I think these are okay arguments, but IIA still has independent appeal, and here you need a specific argument for why Z vs A+ depends on the availability of A. If the argument is that we should do what’s best for necessary people (or necessary people + necessary number of contingents and resolving how to match counterparts), where the latter is defined relative to the set of available options, including “irrelevant options”, then you’re close to assuming IIA is false, rather than defending it. Why should we define that relative to the option set?
And there are also other resolutions compatible with IIA. We can revise our intuitions about some of the binary choices, possibly to incomparability, which is what Dasgupta’s view does in the first step.
I don’t see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first.
It is constrained by “more objective” impartial facts. Going straight for necessitarianism first seems too partial, and unfair in other ways (prioritarian, egalitarian, most plausible impartial standards). If you totally ignore the differences in welfare for the extra people between A+ and Z (not just outweighed, but taken to be irrelevant) when A is available, it seems you’re being infinitely partial to the necessary people.[2] Impartiality is somewhat more important to me than my person-affecting intuitions here.
I’m not saying this is a decisive argument or that there is any, but it’s one that appeals to my intuitions. If your person-affecting intuitions are more important or you don’t find necessitarianism or whatever objectionably partial, then you could be more inclined to compare another way.
We’d still have to make choices in practice, though, and a systematic procedure would violate a choice-based version of IIA (whichever we choose in the 3-option case of A, A+, Z would not be chosen in binary choice with one of the available options).
Then, I think there are ways to interpret Dasgupta’s view as compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”, step by step:
Step 1 rules out options based on pairwise comparisons within the same populations, or same number of people. Because we never compare existence to nonexistence — we only compare the same people or with the same number like in nonidentity — at this step, this step is arguably about affecting persons.
Step 2 is just necessitarianism on the remaining options. Definitely about affecting persons.
These other views also seem compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”:
The view that makes (wide or narrow) necessitarian utilitarian comparisons pairwise while ignoring alternatives, so it gives A<A+, A+<Z, Z<A, a cycle.
Actualism
The procreation asymmetry
Anyway, I feel like we’re nitpicking here about what deserves the label “person-affecting” or “being about affecting persons”.
I wouldn’t agree on the first point, because making Desgupta’s step 1 the “step 1” is, as far as I can tell, not justified by any basic principles. Ruling out Z first seems more plausible, as Z negatively affects the present people, even quite strongly so compared to A and A+. Ruling out A+ is only motivated by an arbitrary-seeming decision to compare just A+ and Z first, merely because they have the same population size (...so what?). The fact that non-existence is not involved here (a comparison to A) is just a result of that decision, not of there really existing just two options.
Alternatively there is the regret argument, that we would “realize”, after choosing A+, that we made a mistake, but that intuition seems not based on some strong principle either. (The intuition could also be misleading because we perhaps don’t tend to imagine A+ as locked in).
I agree though that the classification “person-affecting” alone probably doesn’t capture a lot of potential intricacies of various proposals.
We should separate whether the view is well-motivated from whether it’s compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”. It’s based only on comparisons between counterparts, never between existence and nonexistence. That seems compatible with “ethics being about affecting persons”.
We should also separate plausibility from whether it would follow on stricter interpretations of “ethics being about affecting persons”. An even stricter interpretation would also tell us to give less weight to or ignore nonidentity differences using essentially the same arguments you make for A+ over Z, so I think your arguments prove too much. For example,
Alice with welfare level 10 and 1 million people with welfare level 1 each
Alice with welfare level 4 and 1 million different people with welfare level 4 each
You said “Ruling out Z first seems more plausible, as Z negatively affects the present people, even quite strongly so compared to A and A+.” The same argument would support 1 over 2.
Then you said “Ruling out A+ is only motivated by an arbitrary-seeming decision to compare just A+ and Z first, merely because they have the same population size (...so what?).” Similarly, I could say “Picking 2 is only motivated by an arbitrary decision to compare contingent people, merely because there’s a minimum number of contingent people across outcomes (… so what?)”
So, similar arguments support narrow person-affecting views over wide ones.
I think ignoring irrelevant alternatives has some independent appeal. Dasgupta’s view does that at step 1, but not at step 2. So, it doesn’t always ignore them, but it ignores them more than necessitarianism does.
I can further motivate Dasgupta’s view, or something similar:
There are some “more objective” facts about axiology or what we should do that don’t depend on who presently, actually or across all outcomes necessarily exists (or even wide versions of this). What we should do is first constrained by these “more objective” facts. Hence something like step 1. But these facts can leave a lot of options incomparable or undominated/permissible. I think all complete, transitive and independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) views are kind of implausible (e.g. the impossibility theorems of Arrhenius). Still, there are some things the most plausible of these views can agree on, including that Z>A+.
Z>A+ follows from Harsanyi’s theorem, extensions to variable population cases and other utilitarian theorems, e.g. McCarthy et al., 2020, Theorem 3.5; Thomas, 2022; sections 4.3 and 5; Gustafsson et al., 2023; Blackorby et al., 2002, Theorem 3.
Z>A+ follows from anonymous versions of total utilitarianism, average utilitarianism, prioritarianism, egalitarianism, rank-discounted utilitarianism, maximin/leximin, variable value theories and critical-level utilitarianism. Of anonymous, monotonic (Pareto-respecting), transitive, complete and IIA views, it’s only really (partially) ~anti-egalitarian views (e.g. increasing marginal returns to additional welfare, maximax/leximax, geometrism, views with positive lexical thresholds), which sometimes ~prioritize the better off more than ~proportionately, that reject Z>A+, as far as I know. That’s nearly a consensus in favour of Z>A+, and the dissidents have more plausible counterparts that support Z>A+.
On the other hand, there’s more disagreement on A vs A+, and on A vs Z.
Whether or not this step is person-affecting could depend on what kinds of views we use or the facts we’re constrained by, but I’m less worried about that than what I think are plausible (to me) requirements for axiology.
After being constrained by the “more objective” facts in step 1, we should (or are at least allowed to) pick between remaining permissible options in favour of necessary people (or minimizing harm or some other person-affecting principle). Other people wouldn’t have reasonable impartial grounds for complaint with our decisions, because we already addressed the “more objective” impartial facts in 1.
If you were going to defend utilitarian necessitarianism, i.e. maximize the total utility of necessary people, you’d need to justify the utilitarian bit. But the most plausible justifications for the utilitarian bit would end up being justifications for Z>A+, unless you restrict them apparently arbitrarily. So then, you ask: am I a necessitarian first, or a utilitarian first? If you’re utilitarian first, you end up with something like Dasgupta’s view. If you’re a necessitarian first, then you end up with utilitarian necessitarianism.
Similarly if you substitute a different wide, anonymous, monotonic, non-anti-egalitarian view for the utilitarian bit.
Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we can’t infer much from it.
Well, there is a necessary number of “contingent people”, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people. Since in both cases not creating anyone is not an option. Unlike in Huemer’s three choice case where A is an option.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. The paradox arises because we seem to have a cycle of binary comparisons: A+ is better than A, Z is better than A+, A is better than Z. The issue here seems to be that this assumes we can just break down a three option comparison into three binary comparisons. Which is arguably false, since it can lead to cycles. And when we want to avoid cycles while keeping binary comparisons, we have to assume we do some of the binary choices “first” and thereby rule out one of the remaining ones, removing the cycle. So we need either a principled way of deciding on the “evaluation order” of the binary comparisons, or reject the assumption that “x compared to y” is necessarily the same as “x compared y, given z”. If the latter removes the cycle, that is.
Another case where IIA leads to an absurd result is preference aggregation. Assume three equally sized groups (1, 2, 3) have these individual preferences:
x≻y≻z
y≻z≻x
z≻x≻y
The obvious and obviously only correct aggregation would be x∼y∼z, i.e. indifference between the three options. Which is different from what would happen if you’d take out either one of three options and make it a binary choice, since each binary choice has a majority. So the “irrelevant” alternatives are not actually irrelevant, since they can determine a choice relevant global property like a cycle. So IIA is false, since it would lead to a cycle. This seems not unlike the cycle we get in the repugnant conclusion paradox, although there the solution is arguably not that all three options are equally good.
I don’t see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first. As I said, this is the strategy of solving three choices with binary comparisons, but in a particular order, so that we end up with two total comparisons instead of three, since we rule out one option early. The question is why doing this or that binary comparison first, rather than another one, would be better. If we insist on comparing A and Z first, we would obviously rule out Z first, so we end up only comparing A and A+, while the comparison A+ and Z is never made.
I can add any number of other options, as long as they respect the premises of your argument and are “unfair” to the necessary number of contingent people. What specific added complexity matters here and why?
I think you’d want to adjust your argument, replacing “present” with something like “the minimum number of contingent people” (and decide how to match counterparts if there are different numbers of contingent people). But this is moving to a less strict interpretation of “ethics being about affecting persons”. And then I could make your original complaint here against Dasgupta’s approach against the less strict wide interpretation.
But it’s not the same, and we can argue against it on a stricter interpretation. The difference seems significant, too: no specific contingent person is or would be made worse off. They’d have no grounds for complaint. If you can’t tell me for whom the outcome is worse, why should I care? (And then I can just deny each reason you give as not in line with my intuitions, e.g. ”… so what?”)
Stepping back, I’m not saying that wide views are wrong. I’m sympathetic to them. I also have some sympathy for (asymmetric) narrow views for roughly the reasons I just gave. My point is that your argument or the way you argued could prove too much if taken to be a very strong argument. You criticize Dasgupta’s view from a stricter interpretation, but we can also criticize wide views from a stricter interpretation.
I could also criticize presentism, necessitarianism and wide necessitarianism for being insensitive to the differences between A+ and Z for persons affected. The choice between A, A+ and Z is not just a choice between A and A+ or between A and Z. Between A+ and Z, the “extra” persons exist in both and are affected, even if A is available.
I think these are okay arguments, but IIA still has independent appeal, and here you need a specific argument for why Z vs A+ depends on the availability of A. If the argument is that we should do what’s best for necessary people (or necessary people + necessary number of contingents and resolving how to match counterparts), where the latter is defined relative to the set of available options, including “irrelevant options”, then you’re close to assuming IIA is false, rather than defending it. Why should we define that relative to the option set?
And there are also other resolutions compatible with IIA. We can revise our intuitions about some of the binary choices, possibly to incomparability, which is what Dasgupta’s view does in the first step.
Or we can just accept cycles.[1]
It is constrained by “more objective” impartial facts. Going straight for necessitarianism first seems too partial, and unfair in other ways (prioritarian, egalitarian, most plausible impartial standards). If you totally ignore the differences in welfare for the extra people between A+ and Z (not just outweighed, but taken to be irrelevant) when A is available, it seems you’re being infinitely partial to the necessary people.[2] Impartiality is somewhat more important to me than my person-affecting intuitions here.
I’m not saying this is a decisive argument or that there is any, but it’s one that appeals to my intuitions. If your person-affecting intuitions are more important or you don’t find necessitarianism or whatever objectionably partial, then you could be more inclined to compare another way.
We’d still have to make choices in practice, though, and a systematic procedure would violate a choice-based version of IIA (whichever we choose in the 3-option case of A, A+, Z would not be chosen in binary choice with one of the available options).
Or rejecting full aggregation, or aggregating in different ways, but we can consider other thought experiments for those possibilities.