Methodologies like Lisak’s—where respondents check a box on a multi-clause question
But that wasn’t Lisak’s methodology. That was the methodology used by other researchers in other studies.
leave room for doubt over whether the respondent read the question carefully and understands the terms in the same way that the researchers do. Any of the terms that you believe are diagnostic of rape, such as “force”, “didn’t want to”, etc… might be interpreted differently from how you would interpret them.
I don’t see how. Those are pretty straightforward terms.
The other way to get a false positive would be if someone agreed with one of those questions, but lacked the element of intention of mens rea. Rape refers to a crime involving mens rea
No, rape is defined by the BJS as “Forced sexual intercourse including both psychological coercion and physical force. Forced sexual intercourse means vaginal, anal, or oral penetration by the offender(s). This category also includes incidents where the penetration is from a foreign object, such as a bottle. Includes attempted rape, male and female victims, and both heterosexual and same sex rape. Attempted rape includes verbal threats of rape.” I have no clue where you got this idea that mens rea is involved.
Feminists often discuss rape as an experience of violation by a victim, but this is a redefinition and case of the non-central fallacy
No it’s not, because the badness of rape doesn’t derive from mens rea. Don’t wield fallacies like weapons if you don’t understand them.
The high stigma of rape is calibrated towards cases where the perpetrator knows what he is doing
I don’t see any reason to believe this.
Cases of reckless or negligent sexual conduct—even if they cause an experience of violation—should be placed in a morally separate category from intentional or purposeful violations
Again, I don’t see any reason to believe this.
These issues are going to lead to a certain rate of false positives for Lisak’s methodology, or Mary Koss’ “Sexual Experiences Survey”, or another methodology based on them. What is that rate of false positives? 1%? 10%? 50%? Who knows
And presumably an equal rate of false negatives, unless you can give some specific reason to the contrary (which you haven’t).
I don’t know why someone might check those boxes as a false positive.
Then it sounds like you don’t know what you are talking about.
Maybe someday someone will do a study and ask them what happened.
That’s exactly what Lisak did.
But what I do know is that sexual practices are highly varied based on culture, class, and ethnicity. I think we should be careful to avoid generalization from our own consent practices and interpretation of terms about consent that other people may not share.
There aren’t any cultures or classes or ethnicities which interpret “force” or “didn’t want to” in some unique way that makes forcing someone who doesn’t want to have sex to have sex something other than rape.
I have it on good authority that sometimes neurotypical humans lightly spank each without getting consent first
That’s not BDSM. It sounds like you don’t know anything about BDSM. It’s also not forcing someone to have sex.
The problem with bourgeois-feminist sensibilities around sex is that they portray people with different norms as constantly assaulting and violating each other, when these people naively think they are fine. This variation in sexual practice and communication styles—such as some populations having a higher baseline level of verbal indirectness, mutual physical forcefulness, or token resistance—makes it harder to design a one-size-fits-all survey to demarcate rape.
Seems pretty easy to me. You take the standard definition of rape, and ask people if they do it.
A criminal conviction
But lots of rapists aren’t convicted.
An explicit admission that uses the word “rape.”
But there are lots of people, such as yourself with your strange invocation of mens rea, who use nonsensical definitions of rape to make it seem like a narrower concept than it actually is.
A qualitative interview, where followup questions can clarify what happened, and establish intention
Your response comes off as very defensive and lacking in substance, so I don’t have much to say other than reiterating my previous views.
Intent is a critical part of moral and legal philosophy, and rape is a general intent crime. The stigma for rape comes from a time when rape was considered to be an unambiguous or obviously intentional violation, such as a stranger jumping out of the bushes. It is both inaccurate and socially harmful to apply this stigma to a wider range of situations that may involve lack of intent or male-female communication problems.
I think the statistical approach to rape is barking up the wrong tree. Lisak’s work, whether quantitative or qualitative is especially untrustworthy, and sheds doubt on the entire field. Using a more conservative, and less-debatable criteria for rape is essential, because the more aggressive definitions have large externalities in terms of distrust between men and women, policies that destroy civil liberties, and tear apart institutions and communities with finger-pointing.
People can interpret terms like “want to” differently. Here is a study by feminists discussing a category of “consensual unwanted sex.”
As for other people’s sexual psychology and consent practices, our perspectives seem very different, so there is little point in discussing it further.
Your response comes off as very defensive and lacking in substance
Is that because I gave a point by point rebuttal to each of your ideas?
Intent is a critical part of moral and legal philosophy
Actually, in consequentialism intent is irrelevant.
The stigma for rape comes from a time when rape was considered to be an unambiguous or obviously intentional violation, such as a stranger jumping out of the bushes. It is both inaccurate and socially harmful to apply this stigma to a wider range of situations
That doesn’t follow. The stigma for rape also comes from a time when the world population was less than 5 billion, but that doesn’t mean that rapes that happened when the world population was more than 5 billion aren’t equally bad.
I think the statistical approach to rape is barking up the wrong tree
Why?
Lisak’s work, whether quantitative or qualitative is especially untrustworthy,
Why? That article doesn’t do much to indicate that he is untrustworthy. Right-wing blogs on the Internet are not very trustworthy either, so I’m not sure why I should take anything at face value here.
and sheds doubt on the entire field.
What field? You do realize that “feminism” is not an academic field, right?
Using a more conservative, and less-debatable criteria for rape is essential
What is debatable or controversial about the statements in the surveys used in Lisak’s study? Can you name a kind of sexual assault which would count as rape in that study, but which we shouldn’t care much about?
because the more aggressive definitions have large externalities in terms of distrust between men and women
Pretty sure that there’s just as much distrust whether rape is accidental or not.
People can interpret terms like “want to” differently
And in none of those ways is it okay to have sex with someone who doesn’t want to.
Here is a study by feminists
What makes you say they are feminists?
discussing a category of “consensual unwanted sex.”
And also discussing a category of “nonconsensual wanted sex,” indicating that Lisak’s figures may well be underestimates.
Actually, in consequentialism intent is irrelevant.
It might be relevant to the evaluation of the rightness of acts (in a certain sense), but it’s not irrelevant (for consequentialists) to what type of act an act is or the evaluation of the actor. (We have other moral concepts aside from the rightness of acts) Consequentialists don’t claim that open heart surgery is a murderous stabbing if it happens to be unsuccessful.
Consequentialism doesn’t care about “what type of act an act is” because it views the rightness of acts purely in terms of their consequences, not in terms of what type of act an act is, or what kind of actor an actor is. Imagine if you said, “Utility is irrelevant for Kantian ethics”, and then I said “no, it is relevant, because even though Kantians don’t make decisions on the basis of utility, the amount of utility caused by a decision affects the Kantian’s belief about the amount of utility caused by an action.” So what? It’s still irrelevant.
Consequentialism doesn’t care about “what type of act an act is” because it views the rightness of acts purely in terms of their consequences
This is definitely false, because consequentialists can and do analyse and evaluate acts in terms other than their rightness. I made this clear in my first sentence, whereas in your reply you are sliding from “consequentialism doesn’t care...” to consequentialism “views the rightness of acts.”
The claim Marcus_N is making above is about what does and what does not count as rape. Consequentialists can say anything they like about their criterion for the rightness of acts and it does not tell us anything about what type of act an act is. Put simply: irrespective of whether intent is relevant to the rightness of an act, consequentialists (the same as anyone) can still say that intent is relevant to whether an act is rape, just as they can say that consent is irrelevant to the rightness of an act, but relevant to whether it counts as rape.
Edit: For example, whether someone is intentionally killed may be irrelevant (to the consequentialist) to whether the act is wrong, but it’s not irrelevant to whether it counts as murder.
This is definitely false, because consequentialists can and do analyse and evaluate acts in terms other than their rightness. I made this clear in my first sentence
If you mean it is normatively relevant to consequentialists what type of act an act is or what kind of actor is doing it, you are incorrect. Consequentialists are only normatively concerned with consequences, hence the name.
The claim MarcusN is making above is about what does and what does not count as rape. Consequentialists can say anything they like about their criterion for the _rightness of acts and it does not tell us anything about what type of act an act is. Put simply: irrespective of whether intent is relevant to the rightness of an act, consequentialists (the same as anyone) can still say that intent is relevant to whether an act is rape
But whether an act is rape or not is irrelevant to the consequentialist, because the consequentialist cares about the consequences of an act, not whether or not it counts as rape. I literally just addressed this in my prior comment and you are repeating yourself. Imagine if you said, “Utility is irrelevant for Kantian ethics”, and then I said “no, it is relevant, because even though Kantians don’t make decisions on the basis of utility, the amount of utility caused by a decision affects the Kantian’s belief about whether actions are utility-maximizing or not.” Yes, in a basic and trivial sense the Kantian’s beliefs depend on the question, but in a normative sense it’s totally irrelevant and a silly thing to bring up.
Never mind the fact that it is blatantly false that the definition of rape involves intent; Marcus gave no definition or support for this claim, even though I gave a substantive source to the contrary.
If you mean it is normatively relevant to consequentialists what type of act an act is or what kind of actor is doing it, you are incorrect.
I not only explicitly distinguished between criteria for rightness (normative) and other evaluations in the first sentence of first my reply, but I pointed out that I had drawn and repeated that explicit distinction in the first two sentences of my second reply. Consequentialists obviously analyse acts (e.g. whether they are rape / murder / making a bank withdrawal) in terms other than whether whether they are utility maximising and they can and do engage in other (moral and non-moral) evaluations (e.g. character evaluations, like that a person is dishonest or viscious or badly motivated).
Seriously, the fact that you can look at someone saying “consequentialists should care less about these rapes because the criminals didn’t intend to break the law” and not laugh them out of the room for the abject idiocy of the claim they made is worrisome to say the least.
His claim above, that I’m addressing, is about the definition of rape (a question which is totally orthogonal to the normative theory of consequentialists/Kantians), not whether consequentialists should “care less [or more]” depending on intent. I don’t have any particular views on the differing definitions of rape, but the claim that intent matters for whether an act is accidentally killing (by giving you a peanut) or murder (by giving you a peanut) or whether or not you are a consequentialist is uncontroversial.
I not only explicitly distinguished between criteria for rightness (normative) and other evaluations in the first sentence of first my reply
You did not do so clearly, since not all moral theories see normativity as purely a matter of evaluating the rightness of actions.
I pointed out that I had drawn and repeated that explicit distinction in the first two sentences of my second reply.
Yes, and I pointed out twice that your repetition of this distinction is just missing the point, so I don’t know why you think that repeating it for a third time without addressing my counterargument is going to do you any good. You also seem to have overlooked the fact that I was talking about consequentialism the moral theory, not the practices of consequentialists, which is what you are talking about.
Consequentialists obviously analyse acts (e.g. whether they are rape / murder / making a bank withdrawal) in terms other than whether whether they are utility maximising and they can and do engage in other (moral and non-moral) evaluations (e.g. character evaluations, like that a person is dishonest or viscious or badly motivated).
And, for the third fucking time, these evaluations carry no normative relevance for the consequentialist, so to bring them up here is pointless. If this basic point still eludes your grasp, sorry but I just don’t know what to tell you.
Yes, and I pointed out twice that your repetition of this distinction is just missing the point, so I don’t know why you think that repeating it for a third time without addressing my counterargument is going to do you any good.
And, for the third fucking time, these evaluations carry no normative relevance for the consequentialist, so to bring them up here is pointless.
The claim I make quite clearly (based on this distinction) is that even if intent is not relevant, for the consequentialist, as to the _rightness _of the act, it may still relevant, for the consequentialist, to other questions like what kind of act an act is (e.g. a murder, a rape)
You then keep reiterating that it is not normatively relevant, which actually is ignoring my contention, given that I am saying that even if x is not normatively relevant to the consequentialist, it may still be relevant to questions like whether something is a rape.
I don’t know what counter-argument you think I’ve missed, but you need to establish that whether something is part of the consequentialist’s criterion of rightness is relevant here, rather than simply whether something is relevant to whether an act counts as a rape.
You then keep reiterating that it is not normatively relevant, which actually is ignoring my contention, given that I am saying that even if x is not normatively relevant to the consequentialist, it may still be relevant to questions like whether something is a rape.
No I’m not, first of all because I have already pointed out that it is entirely false that whether something is rape has to do with intent. Secondly, I’m not “ignoring” your claim, I’m denying that it carries any weight, since my point was that the definition question of whether something is rape doesn’t factor into the consequentialist’s normative considerations.
If you repeat the same thing three times, and each time I tell you “that’s irrelevant, because you’re totally missing the point of what I said,” then in one sense sure I’m ignoring you, in the same sense that I ignore anyone who makes irrelevant points. Just because I haven’t directly told you that the claim is wrong doesn’t mean that your position hasn’t been addressed. Sometimes people just say things that miss the point of the conversation, and this week it’s you.
I don’t know what counter-argument you think I’ve missed, but you need to establish that whether something is part of the consequentialist’s criterion of rightness is relevant here,
Why? It’s pretty obvious that what is normatively relevant is, quite simply, relevant. I don’t have to explain why having a reason to do something is relevant in any broader sense. It’s trivially true that normativity encompasses all of our reasons for doing things, and we can’t appeal to anything more basic and foundational than reasons, so whatever grander sense of relevancy you have in mind is nonsensical.
rather than simply whether something is relevant to whether an act counts as a rape.
No, I think the burden of argument is on you to tell us why a dispute over definitions, which you’ve already essentially admitted is normatively irrelevant, should concern us.
But that wasn’t Lisak’s methodology. That was the methodology used by other researchers in other studies.
I don’t see how. Those are pretty straightforward terms.
No, rape is defined by the BJS as “Forced sexual intercourse including both psychological coercion and physical force. Forced sexual intercourse means vaginal, anal, or oral penetration by the offender(s). This category also includes incidents where the penetration is from a foreign object, such as a bottle. Includes attempted rape, male and female victims, and both heterosexual and same sex rape. Attempted rape includes verbal threats of rape.” I have no clue where you got this idea that mens rea is involved.
No it’s not, because the badness of rape doesn’t derive from mens rea. Don’t wield fallacies like weapons if you don’t understand them.
I don’t see any reason to believe this.
Again, I don’t see any reason to believe this.
And presumably an equal rate of false negatives, unless you can give some specific reason to the contrary (which you haven’t).
Then it sounds like you don’t know what you are talking about.
That’s exactly what Lisak did.
There aren’t any cultures or classes or ethnicities which interpret “force” or “didn’t want to” in some unique way that makes forcing someone who doesn’t want to have sex to have sex something other than rape.
That’s not BDSM. It sounds like you don’t know anything about BDSM. It’s also not forcing someone to have sex.
Seems pretty easy to me. You take the standard definition of rape, and ask people if they do it.
But lots of rapists aren’t convicted.
But there are lots of people, such as yourself with your strange invocation of mens rea, who use nonsensical definitions of rape to make it seem like a narrower concept than it actually is.
Well that’s what Lisak did.
Which is nonsense, as I have pointed out.
Your response comes off as very defensive and lacking in substance, so I don’t have much to say other than reiterating my previous views.
Intent is a critical part of moral and legal philosophy, and rape is a general intent crime. The stigma for rape comes from a time when rape was considered to be an unambiguous or obviously intentional violation, such as a stranger jumping out of the bushes. It is both inaccurate and socially harmful to apply this stigma to a wider range of situations that may involve lack of intent or male-female communication problems.
I think the statistical approach to rape is barking up the wrong tree. Lisak’s work, whether quantitative or qualitative is especially untrustworthy, and sheds doubt on the entire field. Using a more conservative, and less-debatable criteria for rape is essential, because the more aggressive definitions have large externalities in terms of distrust between men and women, policies that destroy civil liberties, and tear apart institutions and communities with finger-pointing.
People can interpret terms like “want to” differently. Here is a study by feminists discussing a category of “consensual unwanted sex.”
As for other people’s sexual psychology and consent practices, our perspectives seem very different, so there is little point in discussing it further.
Is that because I gave a point by point rebuttal to each of your ideas?
Actually, in consequentialism intent is irrelevant.
That doesn’t follow. The stigma for rape also comes from a time when the world population was less than 5 billion, but that doesn’t mean that rapes that happened when the world population was more than 5 billion aren’t equally bad.
Why?
Why? That article doesn’t do much to indicate that he is untrustworthy. Right-wing blogs on the Internet are not very trustworthy either, so I’m not sure why I should take anything at face value here.
What field? You do realize that “feminism” is not an academic field, right?
What is debatable or controversial about the statements in the surveys used in Lisak’s study? Can you name a kind of sexual assault which would count as rape in that study, but which we shouldn’t care much about?
Pretty sure that there’s just as much distrust whether rape is accidental or not.
And in none of those ways is it okay to have sex with someone who doesn’t want to.
What makes you say they are feminists?
And also discussing a category of “nonconsensual wanted sex,” indicating that Lisak’s figures may well be underestimates.
It might be relevant to the evaluation of the rightness of acts (in a certain sense), but it’s not irrelevant (for consequentialists) to what type of act an act is or the evaluation of the actor. (We have other moral concepts aside from the rightness of acts) Consequentialists don’t claim that open heart surgery is a murderous stabbing if it happens to be unsuccessful.
Consequentialism doesn’t care about “what type of act an act is” because it views the rightness of acts purely in terms of their consequences, not in terms of what type of act an act is, or what kind of actor an actor is. Imagine if you said, “Utility is irrelevant for Kantian ethics”, and then I said “no, it is relevant, because even though Kantians don’t make decisions on the basis of utility, the amount of utility caused by a decision affects the Kantian’s belief about the amount of utility caused by an action.” So what? It’s still irrelevant.
This is definitely false, because consequentialists can and do analyse and evaluate acts in terms other than their rightness. I made this clear in my first sentence, whereas in your reply you are sliding from “consequentialism doesn’t care...” to consequentialism “views the rightness of acts.”
The claim Marcus_N is making above is about what does and what does not count as rape. Consequentialists can say anything they like about their criterion for the rightness of acts and it does not tell us anything about what type of act an act is. Put simply: irrespective of whether intent is relevant to the rightness of an act, consequentialists (the same as anyone) can still say that intent is relevant to whether an act is rape, just as they can say that consent is irrelevant to the rightness of an act, but relevant to whether it counts as rape.
Edit: For example, whether someone is intentionally killed may be irrelevant (to the consequentialist) to whether the act is wrong, but it’s not irrelevant to whether it counts as murder.
If you mean it is normatively relevant to consequentialists what type of act an act is or what kind of actor is doing it, you are incorrect. Consequentialists are only normatively concerned with consequences, hence the name.
But whether an act is rape or not is irrelevant to the consequentialist, because the consequentialist cares about the consequences of an act, not whether or not it counts as rape. I literally just addressed this in my prior comment and you are repeating yourself. Imagine if you said, “Utility is irrelevant for Kantian ethics”, and then I said “no, it is relevant, because even though Kantians don’t make decisions on the basis of utility, the amount of utility caused by a decision affects the Kantian’s belief about whether actions are utility-maximizing or not.” Yes, in a basic and trivial sense the Kantian’s beliefs depend on the question, but in a normative sense it’s totally irrelevant and a silly thing to bring up.
Never mind the fact that it is blatantly false that the definition of rape involves intent; Marcus gave no definition or support for this claim, even though I gave a substantive source to the contrary.
I not only explicitly distinguished between criteria for rightness (normative) and other evaluations in the first sentence of first my reply, but I pointed out that I had drawn and repeated that explicit distinction in the first two sentences of my second reply. Consequentialists obviously analyse acts (e.g. whether they are rape / murder / making a bank withdrawal) in terms other than whether whether they are utility maximising and they can and do engage in other (moral and non-moral) evaluations (e.g. character evaluations, like that a person is dishonest or viscious or badly motivated).
His claim above, that I’m addressing, is about the definition of rape (a question which is totally orthogonal to the normative theory of consequentialists/Kantians), not whether consequentialists should “care less [or more]” depending on intent. I don’t have any particular views on the differing definitions of rape, but the claim that intent matters for whether an act is accidentally killing (by giving you a peanut) or murder (by giving you a peanut) or whether or not you are a consequentialist is uncontroversial.
You did not do so clearly, since not all moral theories see normativity as purely a matter of evaluating the rightness of actions.
Yes, and I pointed out twice that your repetition of this distinction is just missing the point, so I don’t know why you think that repeating it for a third time without addressing my counterargument is going to do you any good. You also seem to have overlooked the fact that I was talking about consequentialism the moral theory, not the practices of consequentialists, which is what you are talking about.
And, for the third fucking time, these evaluations carry no normative relevance for the consequentialist, so to bring them up here is pointless. If this basic point still eludes your grasp, sorry but I just don’t know what to tell you.
The claim I make quite clearly (based on this distinction) is that even if intent is not relevant, for the consequentialist, as to the _rightness _of the act, it may still relevant, for the consequentialist, to other questions like what kind of act an act is (e.g. a murder, a rape)
You then keep reiterating that it is not normatively relevant, which actually is ignoring my contention, given that I am saying that even if x is not normatively relevant to the consequentialist, it may still be relevant to questions like whether something is a rape.
I don’t know what counter-argument you think I’ve missed, but you need to establish that whether something is part of the consequentialist’s criterion of rightness is relevant here, rather than simply whether something is relevant to whether an act counts as a rape.
No I’m not, first of all because I have already pointed out that it is entirely false that whether something is rape has to do with intent. Secondly, I’m not “ignoring” your claim, I’m denying that it carries any weight, since my point was that the definition question of whether something is rape doesn’t factor into the consequentialist’s normative considerations.
If you repeat the same thing three times, and each time I tell you “that’s irrelevant, because you’re totally missing the point of what I said,” then in one sense sure I’m ignoring you, in the same sense that I ignore anyone who makes irrelevant points. Just because I haven’t directly told you that the claim is wrong doesn’t mean that your position hasn’t been addressed. Sometimes people just say things that miss the point of the conversation, and this week it’s you.
Why? It’s pretty obvious that what is normatively relevant is, quite simply, relevant. I don’t have to explain why having a reason to do something is relevant in any broader sense. It’s trivially true that normativity encompasses all of our reasons for doing things, and we can’t appeal to anything more basic and foundational than reasons, so whatever grander sense of relevancy you have in mind is nonsensical.
No, I think the burden of argument is on you to tell us why a dispute over definitions, which you’ve already essentially admitted is normatively irrelevant, should concern us.