Thanks for sharing! This seems like a really interesting and strong argument, and I think this perspective on deontology has been under-appreciated.
But I think maybe you push the practical implications further than the arguments justify. For example, you say:
>Given how publicly hostile to consequentialism many deontologists are, this result is big news that should change their attitudes and behavior. Even if they are personally constrained against lying for the greater good, they should at least be happy to see sincere consequentialists winning out in the marketplace of ideas. Depending on the details of their view, it may even be wrong for them to interfere by discouraging consequentialist thought (and action) in others.
But I don’t think this implication really follows from your argument (as I understand it), because your argument depends on heavily stylized examples where all the crucial factors are stipulated.
As you say in a footnote:
>on utilitarian grounds, we should generally want people to be disposed to respect rights (and not easily override this disposition since their naive “calculations” are unreliable). But since this reason is merely instrumental, we should of course prefer the better outcome in any situation where it is stipulated that overriding this disposition would actually turn out for the best.
But the quiet deontologist could believe:
1. They have strong reasons to avoid committing rights violations, while finding it preferable that others violate rights when that would lead to better outcomes overall. 2. It makes sense to publicly advocate against consequentialism, because the cases in which violating rights actually leads to better outcomes overall are quite rare and unlikely to be decision-relevant — something the utilitarians often admit!
So this helps make the quiet deontologist’s public advocacy for their view more explicable and sensible. You might think this then puts the quiet deontologist in a bizarre position where the reason they advocate for a view and the reason they hold it sharply diverge. But I think they’d say that advocating for the true view of what individual reasons each person has will actually make things go better overall is consistent and a sufficient justification for advocacy of deontology.
Though it’s possible I’m missing something here — curious what you think!
Yeah, I think that’s broadly right. Most ethical theorists are engaged in “ideal theory”, so that’s the frame I’m working within here. And I find it notable that many deontologists seem to find utilitarianism repugnant, which doesn’t seem warranted if you (should) actually want people to successfully perform the actions it identifies as “right”.
But it’s certainly true that quiet deontologists could—like “government house” consequentialists—predict that, due to widespread agential incompetence, their desired (consequentialist) goals would be better achieved by most people believing deontology instead. They could then coherently advocate their deontology in certain contexts, on “non-ideal theory” grounds.
Care would need to be taken to determine in which contexts one’s goals are better achieved by urging people to aim at something completely different. It seems pretty unlikely to extend to public policy, for example, especially as regards the high-stakes issues discussed in the mainfollow-up post. Insofar as most real-life deontologists don’t seem especially careful about any of this, I think it’s still true that my theoretical arguments should prompt them to rethink their moral advocacy. In particular, they should probably end up much happier with “two-level consequentialism” (the branch of consequentialism that really takes seriously human incompetence and related “non-ideal theory” considerations) than is typical for deontologists.
[Updated to fix reference to post discussing “high stakes” policy issues.]
Yeah that all seems plausible to me! I think your argument here should successfully deflate a lot of the motivation deontologists should have in advocating against consequentialism, especially if they concede (which many seem to) that consequentialists don’t tend to act like naive consequentialists.
Of course, some philosophers may just like talking about which theory they think is true, regardless of whether their theory would imply that they should do that. :)
Thanks for sharing! This seems like a really interesting and strong argument, and I think this perspective on deontology has been under-appreciated.
But I think maybe you push the practical implications further than the arguments justify. For example, you say:
>Given how publicly hostile to consequentialism many deontologists are, this result is big news that should change their attitudes and behavior. Even if they are personally constrained against lying for the greater good, they should at least be happy to see sincere consequentialists winning out in the marketplace of ideas. Depending on the details of their view, it may even be wrong for them to interfere by discouraging consequentialist thought (and action) in others.
But I don’t think this implication really follows from your argument (as I understand it), because your argument depends on heavily stylized examples where all the crucial factors are stipulated.
As you say in a footnote:
>on utilitarian grounds, we should generally want people to be disposed to respect rights (and not easily override this disposition since their naive “calculations” are unreliable). But since this reason is merely instrumental, we should of course prefer the better outcome in any situation where it is stipulated that overriding this disposition would actually turn out for the best.
But the quiet deontologist could believe:
1. They have strong reasons to avoid committing rights violations, while finding it preferable that others violate rights when that would lead to better outcomes overall.
2. It makes sense to publicly advocate against consequentialism, because the cases in which violating rights actually leads to better outcomes overall are quite rare and unlikely to be decision-relevant — something the utilitarians often admit!
So this helps make the quiet deontologist’s public advocacy for their view more explicable and sensible. You might think this then puts the quiet deontologist in a bizarre position where the reason they advocate for a view and the reason they hold it sharply diverge. But I think they’d say that advocating for the true view of what individual reasons each person has will actually make things go better overall is consistent and a sufficient justification for advocacy of deontology.
Though it’s possible I’m missing something here — curious what you think!
Yeah, I think that’s broadly right. Most ethical theorists are engaged in “ideal theory”, so that’s the frame I’m working within here. And I find it notable that many deontologists seem to find utilitarianism repugnant, which doesn’t seem warranted if you (should) actually want people to successfully perform the actions it identifies as “right”.
But it’s certainly true that quiet deontologists could—like “government house” consequentialists—predict that, due to widespread agential incompetence, their desired (consequentialist) goals would be better achieved by most people believing deontology instead. They could then coherently advocate their deontology in certain contexts, on “non-ideal theory” grounds.
Care would need to be taken to determine in which contexts one’s goals are better achieved by urging people to aim at something completely different. It seems pretty unlikely to extend to public policy, for example, especially as regards the high-stakes issues discussed in the
mainfollow-up post. Insofar as most real-life deontologists don’t seem especially careful about any of this, I think it’s still true that my theoretical arguments should prompt them to rethink their moral advocacy. In particular, they should probably end up much happier with “two-level consequentialism” (the branch of consequentialism that really takes seriously human incompetence and related “non-ideal theory” considerations) than is typical for deontologists.[Updated to fix reference to post discussing “high stakes” policy issues.]
Yeah that all seems plausible to me! I think your argument here should successfully deflate a lot of the motivation deontologists should have in advocating against consequentialism, especially if they concede (which many seem to) that consequentialists don’t tend to act like naive consequentialists.
Of course, some philosophers may just like talking about which theory they think is true, regardless of whether their theory would imply that they should do that. :)