Yeah, I think thatâs broadly right. Most ethical theorists are engaged in âideal theoryâ, so thatâs the frame Iâm working within here. And I find it notable that many deontologists seem to find utilitarianism repugnant, which doesnât seem warranted if you (should) actually want people to successfully perform the actions it identifies as ârightâ.
But itâs certainly true that quiet deontologists couldâlike âgovernment houseâ consequentialistsâpredict that, due to widespread agential incompetence, their desired (consequentialist) goals would be better achieved by most people believing deontology instead. They could then coherently advocate their deontology in certain contexts, on ânon-ideal theoryâ grounds.
Care would need to be taken to determine in which contexts oneâs goals are better achieved by urging people to aim at something completely different. It seems pretty unlikely to extend to public policy, for example, especially as regards the high-stakes issues discussed in the mainfollow-up post. Insofar as most real-life deontologists donât seem especially careful about any of this, I think itâs still true that my theoretical arguments should prompt them to rethink their moral advocacy. In particular, they should probably end up much happier with âtwo-level consequentialismâ (the branch of consequentialism that really takes seriously human incompetence and related ânon-ideal theoryâ considerations) than is typical for deontologists.
[Updated to fix reference to post discussing âhigh stakesâ policy issues.]
Yeah that all seems plausible to me! I think your argument here should successfully deflate a lot of the motivation deontologists should have in advocating against consequentialism, especially if they concede (which many seem to) that consequentialists donât tend to act like naive consequentialists.
Of course, some philosophers may just like talking about which theory they think is true, regardless of whether their theory would imply that they should do that. :)
Yeah, I think thatâs broadly right. Most ethical theorists are engaged in âideal theoryâ, so thatâs the frame Iâm working within here. And I find it notable that many deontologists seem to find utilitarianism repugnant, which doesnât seem warranted if you (should) actually want people to successfully perform the actions it identifies as ârightâ.
But itâs certainly true that quiet deontologists couldâlike âgovernment houseâ consequentialistsâpredict that, due to widespread agential incompetence, their desired (consequentialist) goals would be better achieved by most people believing deontology instead. They could then coherently advocate their deontology in certain contexts, on ânon-ideal theoryâ grounds.
Care would need to be taken to determine in which contexts oneâs goals are better achieved by urging people to aim at something completely different. It seems pretty unlikely to extend to public policy, for example, especially as regards the high-stakes issues discussed in the
mainfollow-up post. Insofar as most real-life deontologists donât seem especially careful about any of this, I think itâs still true that my theoretical arguments should prompt them to rethink their moral advocacy. In particular, they should probably end up much happier with âtwo-level consequentialismâ (the branch of consequentialism that really takes seriously human incompetence and related ânon-ideal theoryâ considerations) than is typical for deontologists.[Updated to fix reference to post discussing âhigh stakesâ policy issues.]
Yeah that all seems plausible to me! I think your argument here should successfully deflate a lot of the motivation deontologists should have in advocating against consequentialism, especially if they concede (which many seem to) that consequentialists donât tend to act like naive consequentialists.
Of course, some philosophers may just like talking about which theory they think is true, regardless of whether their theory would imply that they should do that. :)