It’s maybe worth clarifying that I’m most concerned about people who a combination of high-confidence in utilitarianism and a lack of qualms about putting it into practice.
Thank you, that makes more sense + I largely agree.
However, I also wonder if all this could be better gauged by watching out for key psychological traits/features instead of probing someone’s ethical view. For instance, a person low in openness showing high-risk behavior who happens to be a deontologist could cause as much trouble as a naive utilitarian optimizer. In either case, it would be the high-risk behavior that would potentially cause problems rather than how they ethically make decisions.
I was trying to do that :) That’s why I opened with naive optimizing as the problem. The point about gung-ho utilitarians was supposed to be an example of a potential implication.
Yeah, I think “proudly self-identified utilitarians” is not the same as “naively optimizing utilitarians”, so would encourage you to still be welcoming to those in the former group who are not in the latter :-)
ETA: I did appreciate your emphasizing that “it’s quite possible to have radical inside views while being cautious in your actions.”
I had you in mind as a good utilitarian when writing :)
Good point that just saying ‘naively optimizing’ utilitarians is probably clearest most of the time. I was looking for other words that would denote high-confidence and willingness to act without qualms.
minor nitpick—this doesn’t seem to capture naive utilitarianism as I understand it. I always thought naive utilitarianism was about going against common sense norms on the basis of your own personal fragile calculations. eg lying is prone to being rumbled and one’s reputation is very fragile, so it makes sense to follow the norm of not lying even if your own calculations seem to suggest that it is good because the calculations will tend to miss longer term indirect and subtle effects. But this is neither about (1) high confidence nor (2) acting without qualms. Indeed one might decide not to lie with high confidence and without qualms. Equally, one might choose to ‘lie for the greater good’ with low confidence and with lots of qualms. This would still be naive utilitarian behaviour
That’s useful—my ‘naive optimizing’ thing isn’t supposed to be the same thing as naive utilitarianism, but I do find it hard to pin down the exact trait that’s the issue here, and those are interesting points about confidence maybe not being the key thing.
Thank you, that makes more sense + I largely agree.
However, I also wonder if all this could be better gauged by watching out for key psychological traits/features instead of probing someone’s ethical view. For instance, a person low in openness showing high-risk behavior who happens to be a deontologist could cause as much trouble as a naive utilitarian optimizer. In either case, it would be the high-risk behavior that would potentially cause problems rather than how they ethically make decisions.
I was trying to do that :) That’s why I opened with naive optimizing as the problem. The point about gung-ho utilitarians was supposed to be an example of a potential implication.
Yeah, I think “proudly self-identified utilitarians” is not the same as “naively optimizing utilitarians”, so would encourage you to still be welcoming to those in the former group who are not in the latter :-)
ETA: I did appreciate your emphasizing that “it’s quite possible to have radical inside views while being cautious in your actions.”
I had you in mind as a good utilitarian when writing :)
Good point that just saying ‘naively optimizing’ utilitarians is probably clearest most of the time. I was looking for other words that would denote high-confidence and willingness to act without qualms.
minor nitpick—this doesn’t seem to capture naive utilitarianism as I understand it. I always thought naive utilitarianism was about going against common sense norms on the basis of your own personal fragile calculations. eg lying is prone to being rumbled and one’s reputation is very fragile, so it makes sense to follow the norm of not lying even if your own calculations seem to suggest that it is good because the calculations will tend to miss longer term indirect and subtle effects. But this is neither about (1) high confidence nor (2) acting without qualms. Indeed one might decide not to lie with high confidence and without qualms. Equally, one might choose to ‘lie for the greater good’ with low confidence and with lots of qualms. This would still be naive utilitarian behaviour
That’s useful—my ‘naive optimizing’ thing isn’t supposed to be the same thing as naive utilitarianism, but I do find it hard to pin down the exact trait that’s the issue here, and those are interesting points about confidence maybe not being the key thing.