Thank you for these thoughtful reflections! This is exactly the kind of discussions I was hoping this might generate.
Is flourishing even possible âall else being equalâ, such as in an experience machine?
Hmmm, depends on how magical your machine is đ and not to be that guy again, but it depends on your definition of flourishing. (Iâm choosing to not impose any of my own ideas in this post and even in the comments for now.)
Letâs take the PERMA theory of well-being from Seligman as an example though. Heâd probably say:
âIf the machine completely stimulates a reality in which I can pursue some or all of these lifestyles of PERMA, then I could flourish in it. So if I could experience and cultivate positive emotions and engagement, and if I could have other simulated beings with me to relate to and build meaning with, then youâve probably got an experience machine that allows for flourishing.â
To be fair though, Iâm not sure Seligman is clear on intricate details within this, such the questions of âwhat about relationships in particular do humans truly value?â or âwhat might the machine need to offer to help people forge meaning?â or âwhat might one do in the machine to experience engagement?â
I feel bad leaving this question largely unanswered for you, but Iâll let you and others discuss!
Relatedly: To what degree does flourishing refer to positive intrinsic vs. extrinsic value?
It seems as though so many of these theories are hinting at intrinsic values, yet itâs strange to not see the term widely used in the literature.
For example, the last 2 theories listed in this document make a claim to say that each element in the model is âuniversally desiredâ, âan end in and of itselfâ, and âpursued by many people for its own sake, not merely to get any of the other elements.â
That kind of phrasing really insinuates âuniversal intrinsic valuesâ. So I think these psychologists would pretty much all say, âyeah, flourishing directly relates to intrinsic values.â
Ok, Iâll âgive inâ (AKA step outside my choice to not impose my own thoughts) just for a moment here to give you 2 hot takes:
#1.) Those two theorists, Seligman and VanderWeele, did not use any data when compiling their list of domains. To be frank, it feels like armchair philosophy. They claim their elements of their models to essentially be these exhaustive lists of the most universal intrinsic values, but they didnât test this at all. They didnât even run a worldwide survey. (To be fair Harvard did run some surveys years later.) They didnât have a systematic method to arrive at their models of multidimensional well-being.
Iâll write more about this in another post sometime, but I wanted to leave a fair warning here that: while these theories do refer to intrinsic values, their approach is unfortunately lacking a scientific process.
#2.) I believe any theory of flourishing should begin from a theory of intrinsic values (both in a philosophical sense and even in a âdata-drivenâ sense). So by this I mean to say that any theory that suggests a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of the domains of well-being would need to first clarify and define the intrinsic values that are presumed in the theory. As a basic example, these theories all presume humans, human life, âpsychological functioningâ, and other concepts are all intrinsically valuable. I would say this principle is doubly applicable to any theory of âneedsâ as well (and often thereâs overlaps where a theory of well-being models a theory of needs). To say that there is any âneedâ at all in this universe is to assume premises of intrinsic values. To say that a human âneedsâ to eat nutrients, assumes that we care about that humanâs biological systems functioning well (and that we care about that humanâs health and life and that human in general). (Haha pardon the ramble, but my personal answer to your question is: âto what degree? In the first degree!â đ )
Thanks Teo!
Thank you for these thoughtful reflections! This is exactly the kind of discussions I was hoping this might generate.
Hmmm, depends on how magical your machine is đ and not to be that guy again, but it depends on your definition of flourishing. (Iâm choosing to not impose any of my own ideas in this post and even in the comments for now.)
Letâs take the PERMA theory of well-being from Seligman as an example though. Heâd probably say:
âIf the machine completely stimulates a reality in which I can pursue some or all of these lifestyles of PERMA, then I could flourish in it. So if I could experience and cultivate positive emotions and engagement, and if I could have other simulated beings with me to relate to and build meaning with, then youâve probably got an experience machine that allows for flourishing.â
To be fair though, Iâm not sure Seligman is clear on intricate details within this, such the questions of âwhat about relationships in particular do humans truly value?â or âwhat might the machine need to offer to help people forge meaning?â or âwhat might one do in the machine to experience engagement?â
I feel bad leaving this question largely unanswered for you, but Iâll let you and others discuss!
It seems as though so many of these theories are hinting at intrinsic values, yet itâs strange to not see the term widely used in the literature.
For example, the last 2 theories listed in this document make a claim to say that each element in the model is âuniversally desiredâ, âan end in and of itselfâ, and âpursued by many people for its own sake, not merely to get any of the other elements.â
That kind of phrasing really insinuates âuniversal intrinsic valuesâ. So I think these psychologists would pretty much all say, âyeah, flourishing directly relates to intrinsic values.â
Ok, Iâll âgive inâ (AKA step outside my choice to not impose my own thoughts) just for a moment here to give you 2 hot takes:
#1.) Those two theorists, Seligman and VanderWeele, did not use any data when compiling their list of domains. To be frank, it feels like armchair philosophy. They claim their elements of their models to essentially be these exhaustive lists of the most universal intrinsic values, but they didnât test this at all. They didnât even run a worldwide survey. (To be fair Harvard did run some surveys years later.) They didnât have a systematic method to arrive at their models of multidimensional well-being. Iâll write more about this in another post sometime, but I wanted to leave a fair warning here that: while these theories do refer to intrinsic values, their approach is unfortunately lacking a scientific process.
#2.) I believe any theory of flourishing should begin from a theory of intrinsic values (both in a philosophical sense and even in a âdata-drivenâ sense). So by this I mean to say that any theory that suggests a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of the domains of well-being would need to first clarify and define the intrinsic values that are presumed in the theory. As a basic example, these theories all presume humans, human life, âpsychological functioningâ, and other concepts are all intrinsically valuable. I would say this principle is doubly applicable to any theory of âneedsâ as well (and often thereâs overlaps where a theory of well-being models a theory of needs). To say that there is any âneedâ at all in this universe is to assume premises of intrinsic values. To say that a human âneedsâ to eat nutrients, assumes that we care about that humanâs biological systems functioning well (and that we care about that humanâs health and life and that human in general). (Haha pardon the ramble, but my personal answer to your question is: âto what degree? In the first degree!â đ )