Thanks for compiling this! The structure feels very approachable. The bar for engagement is also greatly lowered by your inclusion of the recap, the comparison of theories, and the pointers for discussion and feedback.
Regarding the linked sections, the strongest consensus about the definition of flourishing indeed seems to involve an emphasis on relationships, purpose, and meaning. To me, this emphasis seems to be in tension with the tendency of standard (welfarist) population ethics to only count welfare as a kind of isolated “score” that applies to each life under the (radical) assumption of “all else being equal”.
Specifically, perhaps none of the popular notions of flourishing is even possible to actualize in an “all else equal” life. After all, those notions seem to depend (at least partly, if not fully) on our life making a positive difference for others. For me, the centrality of such a causal link back to others casts doubt on the concept of ‘flourishing lives’ as something that could be mass-produced to independently improve the overall value of the world (contra arguments such as astronomical waste / Bostrom, 2003).
In other words, I think a perfectly valid rejection of the experience machine is to say that entering the machine would sever the essential causal connections of what positive roles we play for how others feel, which seems central to many if not all definitions of flourishing (i.e. the kind of life that we want ours to become).
—
So I’m curious what you, or the reviewed theorists, might say about:
1. Is flourishing even possible “all else being equal”, such as in an experience machine?
2. Relatedly: To what degree does flourishing refer to positive intrinsic vs. extrinsic value?
—
(For my own take, there’s e.g. the brief section on “self-contained versus relational flourishing”. Worth noting is also that a relational i.e. extrinsic notion of flourishing is perfectly compatible with minimalist theories of welfare, such as the Buddhism-inspired views of antifrustrationism by Fehige, 1998 and tranquilism by Gloor, 2017, which work without needing the assumption of intrinsic positive value at all.
They essentially say that, “all else equal”, we are just as well off by satisfying a desire or an unmet need as we would be by letting go of it. Yet a minimalist notion of flourishing would highlight the importance of seeking to satisfy [rather than letting go of] our desires whenever doing so is aligned with making an overall positive difference for others. This we cannot do in an experience machine — nor in population ethics — where such flourishing is impossible, but can do all the time in daily life where other things are never completely unaffected by our actions.)
Thank you for these thoughtful reflections! This is exactly the kind of discussions I was hoping this might generate.
Is flourishing even possible “all else being equal”, such as in an experience machine?
Hmmm, depends on how magical your machine is 😅 and not to be that guy again, but it depends on your definition of flourishing. (I’m choosing to not impose any of my own ideas in this post and even in the comments for now.)
Let’s take the PERMA theory of well-being from Seligman as an example though. He’d probably say:
“If the machine completely stimulates a reality in which I can pursue some or all of these lifestyles of PERMA, then I could flourish in it. So if I could experience and cultivate positive emotions and engagement, and if I could have other simulated beings with me to relate to and build meaning with, then you’ve probably got an experience machine that allows for flourishing.”
To be fair though, I’m not sure Seligman is clear on intricate details within this, such the questions of “what about relationships in particular do humans truly value?” or “what might the machine need to offer to help people forge meaning?” or “what might one do in the machine to experience engagement?”
I feel bad leaving this question largely unanswered for you, but I’ll let you and others discuss!
Relatedly: To what degree does flourishing refer to positive intrinsic vs. extrinsic value?
It seems as though so many of these theories are hinting at intrinsic values, yet it’s strange to not see the term widely used in the literature.
For example, the last 2 theories listed in this document make a claim to say that each element in the model is “universally desired”, “an end in and of itself”, and “pursued by many people for its own sake, not merely to get any of the other elements.”
That kind of phrasing really insinuates “universal intrinsic values”. So I think these psychologists would pretty much all say, “yeah, flourishing directly relates to intrinsic values.”
Ok, I’ll “give in” (AKA step outside my choice to not impose my own thoughts) just for a moment here to give you 2 hot takes:
#1.) Those two theorists, Seligman and VanderWeele, did not use any data when compiling their list of domains. To be frank, it feels like armchair philosophy. They claim their elements of their models to essentially be these exhaustive lists of the most universal intrinsic values, but they didn’t test this at all. They didn’t even run a worldwide survey. (To be fair Harvard did run some surveys years later.) They didn’t have a systematic method to arrive at their models of multidimensional well-being.
I’ll write more about this in another post sometime, but I wanted to leave a fair warning here that: while these theories do refer to intrinsic values, their approach is unfortunately lacking a scientific process.
#2.) I believe any theory of flourishing should begin from a theory of intrinsic values (both in a philosophical sense and even in a “data-driven” sense). So by this I mean to say that any theory that suggests a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of the domains of well-being would need to first clarify and define the intrinsic values that are presumed in the theory. As a basic example, these theories all presume humans, human life, “psychological functioning”, and other concepts are all intrinsically valuable. I would say this principle is doubly applicable to any theory of “needs” as well (and often there’s overlaps where a theory of well-being models a theory of needs). To say that there is any “need” at all in this universe is to assume premises of intrinsic values. To say that a human “needs” to eat nutrients, assumes that we care about that human’s biological systems functioning well (and that we care about that human’s health and life and that human in general). (Haha pardon the ramble, but my personal answer to your question is: “to what degree? In the first degree!” 😅)
Thanks for compiling this! The structure feels very approachable. The bar for engagement is also greatly lowered by your inclusion of the recap, the comparison of theories, and the pointers for discussion and feedback.
Regarding the linked sections, the strongest consensus about the definition of flourishing indeed seems to involve an emphasis on relationships, purpose, and meaning. To me, this emphasis seems to be in tension with the tendency of standard (welfarist) population ethics to only count welfare as a kind of isolated “score” that applies to each life under the (radical) assumption of “all else being equal”.
Specifically, perhaps none of the popular notions of flourishing is even possible to actualize in an “all else equal” life. After all, those notions seem to depend (at least partly, if not fully) on our life making a positive difference for others. For me, the centrality of such a causal link back to others casts doubt on the concept of ‘flourishing lives’ as something that could be mass-produced to independently improve the overall value of the world (contra arguments such as astronomical waste / Bostrom, 2003).
In other words, I think a perfectly valid rejection of the experience machine is to say that entering the machine would sever the essential causal connections of what positive roles we play for how others feel, which seems central to many if not all definitions of flourishing (i.e. the kind of life that we want ours to become).
—
So I’m curious what you, or the reviewed theorists, might say about:
1. Is flourishing even possible “all else being equal”, such as in an experience machine?
2. Relatedly: To what degree does flourishing refer to positive intrinsic vs. extrinsic value?
—
(For my own take, there’s e.g. the brief section on “self-contained versus relational flourishing”. Worth noting is also that a relational i.e. extrinsic notion of flourishing is perfectly compatible with minimalist theories of welfare, such as the Buddhism-inspired views of antifrustrationism by Fehige, 1998 and tranquilism by Gloor, 2017, which work without needing the assumption of intrinsic positive value at all.
They essentially say that, “all else equal”, we are just as well off by satisfying a desire or an unmet need as we would be by letting go of it. Yet a minimalist notion of flourishing would highlight the importance of seeking to satisfy [rather than letting go of] our desires whenever doing so is aligned with making an overall positive difference for others. This we cannot do in an experience machine — nor in population ethics — where such flourishing is impossible, but can do all the time in daily life where other things are never completely unaffected by our actions.)
Thanks Teo!
Thank you for these thoughtful reflections! This is exactly the kind of discussions I was hoping this might generate.
Hmmm, depends on how magical your machine is 😅 and not to be that guy again, but it depends on your definition of flourishing. (I’m choosing to not impose any of my own ideas in this post and even in the comments for now.)
Let’s take the PERMA theory of well-being from Seligman as an example though. He’d probably say:
“If the machine completely stimulates a reality in which I can pursue some or all of these lifestyles of PERMA, then I could flourish in it. So if I could experience and cultivate positive emotions and engagement, and if I could have other simulated beings with me to relate to and build meaning with, then you’ve probably got an experience machine that allows for flourishing.”
To be fair though, I’m not sure Seligman is clear on intricate details within this, such the questions of “what about relationships in particular do humans truly value?” or “what might the machine need to offer to help people forge meaning?” or “what might one do in the machine to experience engagement?”
I feel bad leaving this question largely unanswered for you, but I’ll let you and others discuss!
It seems as though so many of these theories are hinting at intrinsic values, yet it’s strange to not see the term widely used in the literature.
For example, the last 2 theories listed in this document make a claim to say that each element in the model is “universally desired”, “an end in and of itself”, and “pursued by many people for its own sake, not merely to get any of the other elements.”
That kind of phrasing really insinuates “universal intrinsic values”. So I think these psychologists would pretty much all say, “yeah, flourishing directly relates to intrinsic values.”
Ok, I’ll “give in” (AKA step outside my choice to not impose my own thoughts) just for a moment here to give you 2 hot takes:
#1.) Those two theorists, Seligman and VanderWeele, did not use any data when compiling their list of domains. To be frank, it feels like armchair philosophy. They claim their elements of their models to essentially be these exhaustive lists of the most universal intrinsic values, but they didn’t test this at all. They didn’t even run a worldwide survey. (To be fair Harvard did run some surveys years later.) They didn’t have a systematic method to arrive at their models of multidimensional well-being. I’ll write more about this in another post sometime, but I wanted to leave a fair warning here that: while these theories do refer to intrinsic values, their approach is unfortunately lacking a scientific process.
#2.) I believe any theory of flourishing should begin from a theory of intrinsic values (both in a philosophical sense and even in a “data-driven” sense). So by this I mean to say that any theory that suggests a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive list of the domains of well-being would need to first clarify and define the intrinsic values that are presumed in the theory. As a basic example, these theories all presume humans, human life, “psychological functioning”, and other concepts are all intrinsically valuable. I would say this principle is doubly applicable to any theory of “needs” as well (and often there’s overlaps where a theory of well-being models a theory of needs). To say that there is any “need” at all in this universe is to assume premises of intrinsic values. To say that a human “needs” to eat nutrients, assumes that we care about that human’s biological systems functioning well (and that we care about that human’s health and life and that human in general). (Haha pardon the ramble, but my personal answer to your question is: “to what degree? In the first degree!” 😅)