For what itâs worth, I think the basic critique of total utilitarianism of âitâs just obviously more important to save a life than to bring a new one into existenceâ is actually very strong. I think insofar as longtermist folk donât see that, itâs probably a) because itâs so obvious that they are bored with it now and b) Torres tone is so obnoxious and plausibly motivated by personal animosity. But neither of those are good reason to reject the objection!
First, longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism.
Second, population ethics is notoriously difficult, and all views have extremely counterintuitive implications. To assess the plausibility of total utilitarianismâto which longtermism is not committedâ, you need to do the hard work of engaging with the relevant literature and arguments. Epithets like âgenocidalâ and âwhite supremacistâ are not a good substitute for that engagement. [EDIT: I hope it was clear that by âyouâ, I didnât mean âyou, Dr Mathersâ.]
If you think you have valid objections to longtermism, I would be interested in reading about them. But Iâd encourage you to write a separate post or âshortformâ comment, rather than continuing the discussion here, unless they are directly related to the content of the articles to which Avital was responding.
First, longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism.
I think this is not a very good way to dismiss the objection, given the views actual longtermists hold and how longtermism looks in practice today (a point Torres makes). I expect that most longtermists prioritize reducing extinction risks, and the most popular defences Iâm aware of in the community relate to lost potential, the terminal value from those who would otherwise exist, whether or not itâs aggregated linearly as in the total view. If someone prioritizes reducing extinction risk primarily because of the deaths in an extinction event, then they arenât doing it primarily because of a longtermist view; they just happen to share a priority. I think that pretty much leaves the remaining longtermist defences of extinction risk reduction as a) our descendantsâ potential to help others (e.g. cosmic rescue missions), and b) replacing other populations who would be worse off, but then itâs not obvious reducing extinction risks is the best way to accomplish these things, especially without doing more harm than good overall, given the possibility of s-risks, incidental or agential (especially via conflict).
The critique âitâs just obviously more important to save a life than to bring a new one into existenceâ applies to extinction risk-focused longtermism pretty generally, I think, with some exceptions. Of course, the critique doesnât apply to all longtermist views, all extinction risk-focused views, or even necessarily the views of longtermists who happen to focus on reducing extinction risk (or work that happens to reduce extinction risk).
Second, population ethics is notoriously difficult, and all views have extremely counterintuitive implications. To assess the plausibility of total utilitarianismâto which longtermism is not committedâ, you need to do the hard work of engaging with the relevant literature and arguments. Epithets like âgenocidalâ and âwhite supremacistâ are not a good substitute for that engagement. [EDIT: I hope it was clear that by âyouâ, I didnât mean âyou, Dr Mathersâ.]
This is fair, although Torres did also in fact engage with the literature a little, but only to support his criticism of longtermism and total utilitarianism, and he didnât engage with criticisms of other views, so itâs not at all a fair representation of the debate.
If you think you have valid objections to longtermism, I would be interested in reading about them. But Iâd encourage you to write a separate post or âshortformâ comment, rather than continuing the discussion here, unless they are directly related to the content of the articles to which Avital was responding.
I think his comment is directly related to the content of the articles and the OP here, which discuss total utilitarianism, and the critique heâs raising is one of the main critiques in one of Torresâ pieces. I think this is a good place for this kind of discussion, although a separate post might be good, too, to get into the weeds.
I think this is not a very good way to dismiss the objection, given the views actual longtermists hold and how longtermism looks in practice today (a point Torres makes).
I wouldnât characterise my observation that longtermism isnât committed to total utilitarianism as dismissing the objection. I was simply pointing out something that I thought is both true and important, especially in the context of a thread prompted by a series of articles in which the author assumes such a commitment. The remainder of my comment explained why the objection was weak even ignoring this consideration.
Here are two nontrivial ways in which you may end up accepting longtermism even if you reject the total view. First, if you are a âwideâ person-affecting theorist, and you think itâs possible to make a nonrandom difference to the welfare of future sentient beings, whom you expect to exist for a sufficiently long time regardless of your actions. (Note that this is true for suffering-focused views as well as for hedonistic views, which is another reason for being clear about the lack of a necessary connection between longtermism and total utilitarianism, since utilitarianism is hedonistic in its canonical form.) Second, if you subscribe to a theory of normative uncertainty on which the reasons provided by the total view end up dominating your all-things-considered normative requirements, even if you assign significant credence to views other than the total view.
Separately, the sociological fact (if it is a fact) that most people who defend longtermism are total utilitarians seems largely irrelevant for assessing the plausibility of longtermism: this depends on the strength of the arguments for that view.
This is fair, although Torres did also in fact engage with the literature a little, but only to support his criticism of longtermism and total utilitarianism, and he didnât engage with criticisms of other views, so itâs not at all a fair representation of the debate.
Yeah, by âengage with the literatureâ I meant doing so in a way that does reasonable justice to it. A climate change skeptic does not âengage with the literatureâ, in the relevant sense, by cherry-picking a few studies in climate science here and there.
I think his comment is directly related to the content of the articles and the OP here, which discuss total utilitarianism, and the critique heâs raising is one of the main critiques in one of Torresâ pieces. I think this is a good place for this kind of discussion, although a separate post might be good, too, to get into the weeds.
I suggested using a separate thread because I expect that any criticism of longtermism posted here would be met with a certain degree of unwarranted hostility, as it may be associated with the articles to which Avital was responding. Although I am myself a longtermist, I would like to see good criticisms of it, discussed in a calm, nonadversarial manner, and I think this is less likely to happen in this thread.
a series of articles in which the author assumes such a commitment.
As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I donât think this is actually true. He never claims so outright. The Current Affairs piece doesnât use the word âutilitarianâ at all, and just refers to totalist arguments made for longtermism, which are some of the most common ones. His wording from the Aeon piece, which Iâve bolded here to emphasize, also suggests otherwise:
To understand the argument, letâs first unpack what longtermists mean by our âlongterm potentialâ, an expression that I have so far used without defining. We can analyse this concept into three main components: transhumanism, space expansionism, and a moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.
I donât think he would have written âclosely associatedâ if he thought longtermism and longtermists were necessarily committed to total utilitarianism.
This leads to the third component: total utilitarianism, which I will refer to as âutilitarianismâ for short. Although some longtermists insist that they arenât utilitarians, we should right away note that this is mostly a smoke-and-mirrors act to deflect criticisms that longtermism â and, more generally, the effective altruism (EA) movement from which it emerged â is nothing more than utilitarianism repackaged. The fact is that the EA movement is deeply utilitarian, at least in practice, and indeed, before it decided upon a name, the movementâs early members, including Ord, seriously considered calling it the âeffective utilitarian communityâ.
The âutilitarianism repackagedâ article explicitly distinguishes EA and utilitarianism, but points out what they share, and argues that criticisms of EA based on criticisms of utilitarianism are therefore fair because of what they share. Similarly, Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism.
Longtermism is also not just the ethical view that some of the primary determinants of what we should do are the consequences on the far future (or similar). Itâs defended in certain ways (often totalist arguments), it has an associated community and practice, and identifying as a longtermist means associating with those, too, and possibly promoting them. The community and practice are shaped largely by totalist (or similar) views. Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they donât generalize to all longtermist views.
As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I donât think this is actually true. He never claims so outright.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be âanalys[ed]â (i.e. logically entails) âa moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.â And in his reply to Avital, he writes that âan integral componentâ of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ. So it looks like the only role the âcloselyâ qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature. But the claim is false: longtermism is not committed to total impersonalist utilitarianism, even if one restricts the scope of âlongtermismâ to the view Torres criticizes in the article, which includes the form of longtermism embraced by MacAskill and Greaves. (I also note that in other writings he drops the qualifier altogether.)
Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism
I agree (and never claimed otherwise).
Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they donât generalize to all longtermist views.
Iâm not sure what exactly you mean by âextendingâ. If you mean something like, âmany longtermist folk accept longtermism because they accept total utilitarianism, so raising objections to total utilitarianism in the context of discussions about longtermism can persuade these people to abandon longtermismâ, then I agree, but only insofar as those who raise the objections are clear that they are directly objecting to total utilitarianism. Otherwise, this is apt to create the false impression that the objections apply to longtermism as such. In my reply to David, I noted that longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism precisely to correct for that potential misimpression.
Ok, I donât find this particularly useful to discuss further, but I think your interpretations of his words are pretty uncharitable here. He could have been clearer/âmore explicit, and this could prevent misinterpretation, including by the wider audience of people reading his essays.
EDIT: Having read more of his post on LW, it does often seem like either he thinks longtermists are committed to assigning positive value to the creation of new people, or that this is just the kind of longtermism he takes issue with, and itâs not always clear which, although I would still lean towards the second interpretation, given everything he wrote.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be âanalys[ed]â (i.e. logically entails) âa moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.â
This seems overly literal, and conflicts with other things he wrote (which Iâve quoted previously, and also in the new post on LW).
âł And in his reply to Avital, he writes that âan integral componentâ of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ.
He wrote:
As for the qualifier, I later make the case that an integral component of the sort of longtermism that arises from Bostrom (et al.)âs view is the deeply alienating moral theory of total impersonalist utilitarianism.
That means heâs criticizing a specific sort of longtermism, not the minimal abstract longtermist view, so this does not mean heâs claiming longtermism is committed to total utilitarianism. He also wrote:
Second, it does not matter much whether Bostrom is a consequentialist; I am, once again, criticizing the positions articulated by Bostrom and others, and these positions have important similarities with forms of consequentialism like total impersonalist utilitarianism.
Again, if he thought longtermism was literally committed to consequentialism or total utilitarianism, he would have said so here, rather than speaking about specific positions and merely pointing out similarities.
He also wrote:
Indeed, I would refer to myself as a âlongtermist,â but not the sort that could provide reasons to nuke Germany (as in the excellent example given by Olle HĂ€ggström), reasons based on claims made by, e.g., Bostrom.
Given that he seems to have person-affecting views, this means he does not think longtermism is committed to totalism/âimpersonalism or similar views.
So it looks like the only role the âcloselyâ qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature.
Total utilitarianism is already impersonalist, from my understanding, so to assume by âmoral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismââ, he meant âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ, I think you have to assume he didnât realize (or didnât think) total utilitarianism and total impersonalist utilitarianism are the same view. My guess is that he only added the âimpersonalistâ to emphasize the fact that the theory is impersonalist.
For what itâs worth, I think the basic critique of total utilitarianism of âitâs just obviously more important to save a life than to bring a new one into existenceâ is actually very strong. I think insofar as longtermist folk donât see that, itâs probably a) because itâs so obvious that they are bored with it now and b) Torres tone is so obnoxious and plausibly motivated by personal animosity. But neither of those are good reason to reject the objection!
First, longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism.
Second, population ethics is notoriously difficult, and all views have extremely counterintuitive implications. To assess the plausibility of total utilitarianismâto which longtermism is not committedâ, you need to do the hard work of engaging with the relevant literature and arguments. Epithets like âgenocidalâ and âwhite supremacistâ are not a good substitute for that engagement. [EDIT: I hope it was clear that by âyouâ, I didnât mean âyou, Dr Mathersâ.]
If you think you have valid objections to longtermism, I would be interested in reading about them. But Iâd encourage you to write a separate post or âshortformâ comment, rather than continuing the discussion here, unless they are directly related to the content of the articles to which Avital was responding.
I think this is not a very good way to dismiss the objection, given the views actual longtermists hold and how longtermism looks in practice today (a point Torres makes). I expect that most longtermists prioritize reducing extinction risks, and the most popular defences Iâm aware of in the community relate to lost potential, the terminal value from those who would otherwise exist, whether or not itâs aggregated linearly as in the total view. If someone prioritizes reducing extinction risk primarily because of the deaths in an extinction event, then they arenât doing it primarily because of a longtermist view; they just happen to share a priority. I think that pretty much leaves the remaining longtermist defences of extinction risk reduction as a) our descendantsâ potential to help others (e.g. cosmic rescue missions), and b) replacing other populations who would be worse off, but then itâs not obvious reducing extinction risks is the best way to accomplish these things, especially without doing more harm than good overall, given the possibility of s-risks, incidental or agential (especially via conflict).
The critique âitâs just obviously more important to save a life than to bring a new one into existenceâ applies to extinction risk-focused longtermism pretty generally, I think, with some exceptions. Of course, the critique doesnât apply to all longtermist views, all extinction risk-focused views, or even necessarily the views of longtermists who happen to focus on reducing extinction risk (or work that happens to reduce extinction risk).
This is fair, although Torres did also in fact engage with the literature a little, but only to support his criticism of longtermism and total utilitarianism, and he didnât engage with criticisms of other views, so itâs not at all a fair representation of the debate.
I think his comment is directly related to the content of the articles and the OP here, which discuss total utilitarianism, and the critique heâs raising is one of the main critiques in one of Torresâ pieces. I think this is a good place for this kind of discussion, although a separate post might be good, too, to get into the weeds.
[I made some edits to make my comment clearer.]
I wouldnât characterise my observation that longtermism isnât committed to total utilitarianism as dismissing the objection. I was simply pointing out something that I thought is both true and important, especially in the context of a thread prompted by a series of articles in which the author assumes such a commitment. The remainder of my comment explained why the objection was weak even ignoring this consideration.
Here are two nontrivial ways in which you may end up accepting longtermism even if you reject the total view. First, if you are a âwideâ person-affecting theorist, and you think itâs possible to make a nonrandom difference to the welfare of future sentient beings, whom you expect to exist for a sufficiently long time regardless of your actions. (Note that this is true for suffering-focused views as well as for hedonistic views, which is another reason for being clear about the lack of a necessary connection between longtermism and total utilitarianism, since utilitarianism is hedonistic in its canonical form.) Second, if you subscribe to a theory of normative uncertainty on which the reasons provided by the total view end up dominating your all-things-considered normative requirements, even if you assign significant credence to views other than the total view.
Separately, the sociological fact (if it is a fact) that most people who defend longtermism are total utilitarians seems largely irrelevant for assessing the plausibility of longtermism: this depends on the strength of the arguments for that view.
Yeah, by âengage with the literatureâ I meant doing so in a way that does reasonable justice to it. A climate change skeptic does not âengage with the literatureâ, in the relevant sense, by cherry-picking a few studies in climate science here and there.
I suggested using a separate thread because I expect that any criticism of longtermism posted here would be met with a certain degree of unwarranted hostility, as it may be associated with the articles to which Avital was responding. Although I am myself a longtermist, I would like to see good criticisms of it, discussed in a calm, nonadversarial manner, and I think this is less likely to happen in this thread.
As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I donât think this is actually true. He never claims so outright. The Current Affairs piece doesnât use the word âutilitarianâ at all, and just refers to totalist arguments made for longtermism, which are some of the most common ones. His wording from the Aeon piece, which Iâve bolded here to emphasize, also suggests otherwise:
I donât think he would have written âclosely associatedâ if he thought longtermism and longtermists were necessarily committed to total utilitarianism.
The âutilitarianism repackagedâ article explicitly distinguishes EA and utilitarianism, but points out what they share, and argues that criticisms of EA based on criticisms of utilitarianism are therefore fair because of what they share. Similarly, Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism.
Longtermism is also not just the ethical view that some of the primary determinants of what we should do are the consequences on the far future (or similar). Itâs defended in certain ways (often totalist arguments), it has an associated community and practice, and identifying as a longtermist means associating with those, too, and possibly promoting them. The community and practice are shaped largely by totalist (or similar) views. Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they donât generalize to all longtermist views.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be âanalys[ed]â (i.e. logically entails) âa moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.â And in his reply to Avital, he writes that âan integral componentâ of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ. So it looks like the only role the âcloselyâ qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature. But the claim is false: longtermism is not committed to total impersonalist utilitarianism, even if one restricts the scope of âlongtermismâ to the view Torres criticizes in the article, which includes the form of longtermism embraced by MacAskill and Greaves. (I also note that in other writings he drops the qualifier altogether.)
I agree (and never claimed otherwise).
Iâm not sure what exactly you mean by âextendingâ. If you mean something like, âmany longtermist folk accept longtermism because they accept total utilitarianism, so raising objections to total utilitarianism in the context of discussions about longtermism can persuade these people to abandon longtermismâ, then I agree, but only insofar as those who raise the objections are clear that they are directly objecting to total utilitarianism. Otherwise, this is apt to create the false impression that the objections apply to longtermism as such. In my reply to David, I noted that longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism precisely to correct for that potential misimpression.
Ok, I donât find this particularly useful to discuss further, but I think your interpretations of his words are pretty uncharitable here. He could have been clearer/âmore explicit, and this could prevent misinterpretation, including by the wider audience of people reading his essays.
EDIT: Having read more of his post on LW, it does often seem like either he thinks longtermists are committed to assigning positive value to the creation of new people, or that this is just the kind of longtermism he takes issue with, and itâs not always clear which, although I would still lean towards the second interpretation, given everything he wrote.
This seems overly literal, and conflicts with other things he wrote (which Iâve quoted previously, and also in the new post on LW).
He wrote:
That means heâs criticizing a specific sort of longtermism, not the minimal abstract longtermist view, so this does not mean heâs claiming longtermism is committed to total utilitarianism. He also wrote:
Again, if he thought longtermism was literally committed to consequentialism or total utilitarianism, he would have said so here, rather than speaking about specific positions and merely pointing out similarities.
He also wrote:
Given that he seems to have person-affecting views, this means he does not think longtermism is committed to totalism/âimpersonalism or similar views.
Total utilitarianism is already impersonalist, from my understanding, so to assume by âmoral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismââ, he meant âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ, I think you have to assume he didnât realize (or didnât think) total utilitarianism and total impersonalist utilitarianism are the same view. My guess is that he only added the âimpersonalistâ to emphasize the fact that the theory is impersonalist.