Another quick takeaway: the US planned on making the first nuclear strike on Russia and China throughout the Cold War. Today we have a perception that the US only plans for using a second strike, but almost the entirety of planning material is based on the supposition of the US using nuclear weapons first. Again, thereās little reason to suspect this has changed now.
I do recall Ellsberg claiming that the US plans were based on striking first. But interestingly, in a summary of key points from another book on nuclear war (The Dead Hand), Kit writes:
Through much of the Cold War, USSR leadership believed that the USA might launch a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR. US leadership considered this out of the question, in large part because it seemed implausible that an aggressor could āwinā a nuclear war, though some USSR and US generals did believe in the idea of āwinningā a nuclear war. Further, when NATO spies got hold of documents written by USSR leadership detailing a project to notice signs of the USA preparing a first strike, key US figures thought it was more likely that this was part of a propaganda campaign against the USA or against the intermediate-range Pershing missiles being stationed in Europe than that USSR leadership really thought the USA might launch a first strike.
So now I feel unsure whether to trust Ellsberg or trust The Dead Hand (assuming Kitās summary accurately reflects its claims). (Or maybe thereās some way to reconcile the two sets of claims which Iām not currently seeing?)
Iām not an expert on the topic and donāt have sources on hand that would make the argument in greater detail, but I did take a course on āThe global nuclear regimeā (broadly about institutional developments surrounding nuclear material and weapons control since 1945) and based on my knowledge from that, Iād suggest that there is a way to reconcile the two sets of claims.
First, I think itās important to distinguish between āsurprise attackā and āfirst strikeā. The former is obviously a subset of the latter, but there are also other conceivable kinds of first strike attacks. Surprise attack, to me, sounds like an attack that is launched without an immediate trigger, with the purpose of hitting (and eliminating or severly weakening) an adversary unexpectedly. A nuclear first strike might, instead, be considered in a situation where a conflict is escalading to a point that a nuclear strike by the other party seems to be growing more likely. It might be considered as an instrument to prevent the other party from launching their missiles by hitting them first (e.g. because the costs of waiting for them to launch before counter-striking are considered unacceptable). This comes down to definitions, ultimately, but I think I wouldnāt describe such a first strike as a surprise attack.
Second, there is not necessarily a contradiction between there being plans for first- rather than second-strike attacks and US officials expressing doubts about the USSRās belief in US willingness to actually conduct a first strike. The US figures you mention might have thought that in that moment, the likelihood of a US first-strike was really low and that hence it wouldāve been surprising for the USSR to start the detection project at that moment. These US figures might also have been disingenious or biased when assessing the honesty of the USSR leadership (I would argue that the tendency to attach hidden, often propagandistics, motives to āenemy leadersā - without strong evidence base or even a coherent plausibility argument as supportāis fairly common among US āhawksā). Debending on who the key US figures mentioned in your summary are (unfortunately, I havenāt read The Dead Hand), it might also be that they just werenāt aware of the first strike plans of the US. Lastly (and I donāt consider that one super likely), it might be that the US figures just thought that the Soviet leadership wouldnāt expect a US first strike in spite of the plans for it (either because the Soviets didnāt know about the plans, or because they didnāt think the US was likely to act on them).
I think itās important to distinguish between āsurprise attackā and āfirst strikeā...
Iād guess that this is probably the main thing that explains the contrasts between the two quotes.
The US figures you mention might have thought that in that moment, the likelihood of a US first-strike was really low and that hence it wouldāve been surprising for the USSR to start the detection project at that moment
I doubt that this is can help much in explaining the contrast, since the quote from Kitās summary of The Dead Hand sounds like it applies across a large time period, rather than just at a smaller handful of key points. (Though of course, Kitās summary may be very slightly misleading on certain nuanced points.)
Debending on who the key US figures mentioned in your summary are (unfortunately, I havenāt read The Dead Hand), it might also be that they just werenāt aware of the first strike plans of the US.
I also donāt think this is likely to be a major part of the explanation, as I think it was pretty well known among US military and political leaders that the US had first strike plans. Iām not sure of this, though.
I do recall Ellsberg claiming that the US plans were based on striking first. But interestingly, in a summary of key points from another book on nuclear war (The Dead Hand), Kit writes:
So now I feel unsure whether to trust Ellsberg or trust The Dead Hand (assuming Kitās summary accurately reflects its claims). (Or maybe thereās some way to reconcile the two sets of claims which Iām not currently seeing?)
Iām not an expert on the topic and donāt have sources on hand that would make the argument in greater detail, but I did take a course on āThe global nuclear regimeā (broadly about institutional developments surrounding nuclear material and weapons control since 1945) and based on my knowledge from that, Iād suggest that there is a way to reconcile the two sets of claims.
First, I think itās important to distinguish between āsurprise attackā and āfirst strikeā. The former is obviously a subset of the latter, but there are also other conceivable kinds of first strike attacks. Surprise attack, to me, sounds like an attack that is launched without an immediate trigger, with the purpose of hitting (and eliminating or severly weakening) an adversary unexpectedly. A nuclear first strike might, instead, be considered in a situation where a conflict is escalading to a point that a nuclear strike by the other party seems to be growing more likely. It might be considered as an instrument to prevent the other party from launching their missiles by hitting them first (e.g. because the costs of waiting for them to launch before counter-striking are considered unacceptable). This comes down to definitions, ultimately, but I think I wouldnāt describe such a first strike as a surprise attack.
Second, there is not necessarily a contradiction between there being plans for first- rather than second-strike attacks and US officials expressing doubts about the USSRās belief in US willingness to actually conduct a first strike. The US figures you mention might have thought that in that moment, the likelihood of a US first-strike was really low and that hence it wouldāve been surprising for the USSR to start the detection project at that moment. These US figures might also have been disingenious or biased when assessing the honesty of the USSR leadership (I would argue that the tendency to attach hidden, often propagandistics, motives to āenemy leadersā - without strong evidence base or even a coherent plausibility argument as supportāis fairly common among US āhawksā). Debending on who the key US figures mentioned in your summary are (unfortunately, I havenāt read The Dead Hand), it might also be that they just werenāt aware of the first strike plans of the US. Lastly (and I donāt consider that one super likely), it might be that the US figures just thought that the Soviet leadership wouldnāt expect a US first strike in spite of the plans for it (either because the Soviets didnāt know about the plans, or because they didnāt think the US was likely to act on them).
Good points, thanks!
Iād guess that this is probably the main thing that explains the contrasts between the two quotes.
I doubt that this is can help much in explaining the contrast, since the quote from Kitās summary of The Dead Hand sounds like it applies across a large time period, rather than just at a smaller handful of key points. (Though of course, Kitās summary may be very slightly misleading on certain nuanced points.)
I also donāt think this is likely to be a major part of the explanation, as I think it was pretty well known among US military and political leaders that the US had first strike plans. Iām not sure of this, though.