I’m not sure how corporate taxes work exactly, but I don’t think the companies benefit overall by giving you the money if you only take advantage of promotions like this and don’t also bet more often than otherwise besides with promotions. Otherwise, companies would donate a lot more and enough to never pay any taxes (or pay only the minimum required after all possible deductions).
So the net effects of taking advantage of this are that the companies earn less in net profits and pay less taxes. But they’d pay less in taxes if they were less profitable, anyway (although they’re probably paying even less, relative to their net profits). Then
If you think it’s good that these companies earn less in net profits after taxes, then that counts in favour of taking and using their promotion money.
If you’re worried about reducing public resources, then this also counts against you using charitable tax credits/deductions in order to donate more to EA charities in general. But EAs don’t typically worry about this, because our charitable dollars do much more good and the rate here is still pretty favourable.
Although more controversial, you might even believe reducing public expenditures overall is good, if you believe the state uses marginal funding in net harmful ways, with harms from wars, enforcing unjust laws or overburdensome regulation.
Thanks for this addition. I think I agree about the likely net effects on the companies’ profits and tax bills, and I mostly mean to be highlighting that some (uncertain) fraction of the money people gain by following this approach would counterfactually have ended up in the hands of the state government, not the sports-betting companies.
That consideration makes the strategy less attractive than it would be if the money came entirely from the companies,[1] and it might be enough to make the proposed strategy net-harmful by some people’s lights, especially if they are less than certain that:
They will stop betting as soon as they exhaust their “free” bets.
They won’t inadvertently promote sports betting to others who might be harmed by exposure to the industry.
They will donate almost all of the proceeds to charitable causes that are more beneficial than marginal public spending.
I think it’s reasonable for people to worry that one or more of these conditions won’t hold in practice.
This point doesn’t hold if you think marginal public spending is worse than marginal corporate profits for sports-betting companies, but my guess is that relatively few people hold that view.
I’m not sure how corporate taxes work exactly, but I don’t think the companies benefit overall by giving you the money if you only take advantage of promotions like this and don’t also bet more often than otherwise besides with promotions. Otherwise, companies would donate a lot more and enough to never pay any taxes (or pay only the minimum required after all possible deductions).
So the net effects of taking advantage of this are that the companies earn less in net profits and pay less taxes. But they’d pay less in taxes if they were less profitable, anyway (although they’re probably paying even less, relative to their net profits). Then
If you think it’s good that these companies earn less in net profits after taxes, then that counts in favour of taking and using their promotion money.
If you’re worried about reducing public resources, then this also counts against you using charitable tax credits/deductions in order to donate more to EA charities in general. But EAs don’t typically worry about this, because our charitable dollars do much more good and the rate here is still pretty favourable.
Although more controversial, you might even believe reducing public expenditures overall is good, if you believe the state uses marginal funding in net harmful ways, with harms from wars, enforcing unjust laws or overburdensome regulation.
Thanks for this addition. I think I agree about the likely net effects on the companies’ profits and tax bills, and I mostly mean to be highlighting that some (uncertain) fraction of the money people gain by following this approach would counterfactually have ended up in the hands of the state government, not the sports-betting companies.
That consideration makes the strategy less attractive than it would be if the money came entirely from the companies,[1] and it might be enough to make the proposed strategy net-harmful by some people’s lights, especially if they are less than certain that:
They will stop betting as soon as they exhaust their “free” bets.
They won’t inadvertently promote sports betting to others who might be harmed by exposure to the industry.
They will donate almost all of the proceeds to charitable causes that are more beneficial than marginal public spending.
I think it’s reasonable for people to worry that one or more of these conditions won’t hold in practice.
This point doesn’t hold if you think marginal public spending is worse than marginal corporate profits for sports-betting companies, but my guess is that relatively few people hold that view.