Iâm not sure how corporate taxes work exactly, but I donât think the companies benefit overall by giving you the money if you only take advantage of promotions like this and donât also bet more often than otherwise besides with promotions. Otherwise, companies would donate a lot more and enough to never pay any taxes (or pay only the minimum required after all possible deductions).
So the net effects of taking advantage of this are that the companies earn less in net profits and pay less taxes. But theyâd pay less in taxes if they were less profitable, anyway (although theyâre probably paying even less, relative to their net profits). Then
If you think itâs good that these companies earn less in net profits after taxes, then that counts in favour of taking and using their promotion money.
If youâre worried about reducing public resources, then this also counts against you using charitable tax credits/âdeductions in order to donate more to EA charities in general. But EAs donât typically worry about this, because our charitable dollars do much more good and the rate here is still pretty favourable.
Although more controversial, you might even believe reducing public expenditures overall is good, if you believe the state uses marginal funding in net harmful ways, with harms from wars, enforcing unjust laws or overburdensome regulation.
Thanks for this addition. I think I agree about the likely net effects on the companiesâ profits and tax bills, and I mostly mean to be highlighting that some (uncertain) fraction of the money people gain by following this approach would counterfactually have ended up in the hands of the state government, not the sports-betting companies.
That consideration makes the strategy less attractive than it would be if the money came entirely from the companies,[1] and it might be enough to make the proposed strategy net-harmful by some peopleâs lights, especially if they are less than certain that:
They will stop betting as soon as they exhaust their âfreeâ bets.
They wonât inadvertently promote sports betting to others who might be harmed by exposure to the industry.
They will donate almost all of the proceeds to charitable causes that are more beneficial than marginal public spending.
I think itâs reasonable for people to worry that one or more of these conditions wonât hold in practice.
This point doesnât hold if you think marginal public spending is worse than marginal corporate profits for sports-betting companies, but my guess is that relatively few people hold that view.
Iâm not sure how corporate taxes work exactly, but I donât think the companies benefit overall by giving you the money if you only take advantage of promotions like this and donât also bet more often than otherwise besides with promotions. Otherwise, companies would donate a lot more and enough to never pay any taxes (or pay only the minimum required after all possible deductions).
So the net effects of taking advantage of this are that the companies earn less in net profits and pay less taxes. But theyâd pay less in taxes if they were less profitable, anyway (although theyâre probably paying even less, relative to their net profits). Then
If you think itâs good that these companies earn less in net profits after taxes, then that counts in favour of taking and using their promotion money.
If youâre worried about reducing public resources, then this also counts against you using charitable tax credits/âdeductions in order to donate more to EA charities in general. But EAs donât typically worry about this, because our charitable dollars do much more good and the rate here is still pretty favourable.
Although more controversial, you might even believe reducing public expenditures overall is good, if you believe the state uses marginal funding in net harmful ways, with harms from wars, enforcing unjust laws or overburdensome regulation.
Thanks for this addition. I think I agree about the likely net effects on the companiesâ profits and tax bills, and I mostly mean to be highlighting that some (uncertain) fraction of the money people gain by following this approach would counterfactually have ended up in the hands of the state government, not the sports-betting companies.
That consideration makes the strategy less attractive than it would be if the money came entirely from the companies,[1] and it might be enough to make the proposed strategy net-harmful by some peopleâs lights, especially if they are less than certain that:
They will stop betting as soon as they exhaust their âfreeâ bets.
They wonât inadvertently promote sports betting to others who might be harmed by exposure to the industry.
They will donate almost all of the proceeds to charitable causes that are more beneficial than marginal public spending.
I think itâs reasonable for people to worry that one or more of these conditions wonât hold in practice.
This point doesnât hold if you think marginal public spending is worse than marginal corporate profits for sports-betting companies, but my guess is that relatively few people hold that view.