Thanks for this addition. I think I agree about the likely net effects on the companies’ profits and tax bills, and I mostly mean to be highlighting that some (uncertain) fraction of the money people gain by following this approach would counterfactually have ended up in the hands of the state government, not the sports-betting companies.
That consideration makes the strategy less attractive than it would be if the money came entirely from the companies,[1] and it might be enough to make the proposed strategy net-harmful by some people’s lights, especially if they are less than certain that:
They will stop betting as soon as they exhaust their “free” bets.
They won’t inadvertently promote sports betting to others who might be harmed by exposure to the industry.
They will donate almost all of the proceeds to charitable causes that are more beneficial than marginal public spending.
I think it’s reasonable for people to worry that one or more of these conditions won’t hold in practice.
- ^
This point doesn’t hold if you think marginal public spending is worse than marginal corporate profits for sports-betting companies, but my guess is that relatively few people hold that view.
I think there are two differences that might matter to some people, but I don’t mean to claim that they will or should be decisive for everyone:
The relevant marginal tax rates for sports-betting companies are much higher than for companies selling consumer goods like clothes and food; in Massachusetts, I think the relevant tax rate is 20% for app-based sports betting.
Most people aren’t buying clothes on clearance or accepting free samples at the supermarket with a primary goal of maximizing altruistic impact; if they were, I think it would be reasonable for them to account for the tax-revenue consequences in their decision. (I do think it’s permissible to accept those kinds of promotions in everyday life, but I think that’s separate from how we should account for their impact.)