I agree that the model I proposed is imprecise; I think this counts against its usefulness but not its validity.
I’m not suggesting this as a thing to advocate for; merely as a descriptive pattern of what the category of war crimes is doing. I think the things which make ending war harder are an important class of really destructive thing, but it seems clarity-obscuring to me to claim that this is definitionally what war crimes are? Rather than giving your thing a new label and then getting to discuss what fraction of war crimes are in that category, and whether there are things in that category which aren’t war crimes (e.g. if torturing POWs counts under your categorization, then why doesn’t conscription count—after all, it damages the “one side runs out of soldiers” mechanism for ending war).
merely as a descriptive pattern of what the category of war crimes is doing. I think the things which make ending war harder are an important class of really destructive thing, but it seems clarity-obscuring to me to claim that this is definitionally what war crimes are? Rather than giving your thing a new label
Fair, I guess the thing I’m interested in is something like “widely shared and independently recurring norms of war.” Though I’d want to be narrow enough to exclude stuff like “norms of war include paying your soldiers and have okay logistics planning” or “norms of war descriptively include being total morons sometimes in XYZ ways”
e.g. if torturing POWs counts under your categorization, then why doesn’t conscription count—after all, it damages the “one side runs out of soldiers” mechanism for ending war
right sorry I do think the costs/benefits ratio matter significantly here.
Ok, so one place the predictions of these theories might come apart is that my theory suggests a norm against impersonating medics, whereas I think yours doesn’t (although maybe I’m just not seeing it; I don’t think I would have said that avoiding torture of prisoners was part of protecting the mechanisms of ending war, although I do kind of see what you mean). I haven’t looked into it at all, but if that norm has emerged independently multiple times that would be suggestive in favour of the broader theory; whereas if it has just emerged once it looks perhaps more potentially-idiosyncratic, which would be suggestive in favour of the narrower theory.
I agree that the model I proposed is imprecise; I think this counts against its usefulness but not its validity.
I’m not suggesting this as a thing to advocate for; merely as a descriptive pattern of what the category of war crimes is doing. I think the things which make ending war harder are an important class of really destructive thing, but it seems clarity-obscuring to me to claim that this is definitionally what war crimes are? Rather than giving your thing a new label and then getting to discuss what fraction of war crimes are in that category, and whether there are things in that category which aren’t war crimes (e.g. if torturing POWs counts under your categorization, then why doesn’t conscription count—after all, it damages the “one side runs out of soldiers” mechanism for ending war).
Poor choice of words on my part!
Fair, I guess the thing I’m interested in is something like “widely shared and independently recurring norms of war.” Though I’d want to be narrow enough to exclude stuff like “norms of war include paying your soldiers and have okay logistics planning” or “norms of war descriptively include being total morons sometimes in XYZ ways”
right sorry I do think the costs/benefits ratio matter significantly here.
Ok, so one place the predictions of these theories might come apart is that my theory suggests a norm against impersonating medics, whereas I think yours doesn’t (although maybe I’m just not seeing it; I don’t think I would have said that avoiding torture of prisoners was part of protecting the mechanisms of ending war, although I do kind of see what you mean). I haven’t looked into it at all, but if that norm has emerged independently multiple times that would be suggestive in favour of the broader theory; whereas if it has just emerged once it looks perhaps more potentially-idiosyncratic, which would be suggestive in favour of the narrower theory.
Thanks, I like this crux/operationalization!