I agree itās often helpful to make our implicit standards explicit. But I disagree that thatās āwhat weāre actually askingā. At least in my own normative thought, I donāt just wonder about what meets my standards. And I donāt just disagree with others about what does or doesnāt meet their standards or mine. I think the most important disagreement of all is over which standards are really warranted.
On your view, there may not be any normative disagreement, once we all agree about the logical and empirical facts. I think itās key to philosophy that there is more we can wonder about than just that. (There may not be any tractable disagreement once we get down to bedrock clashing standards, but I think there is still a further question over which we really disagree, even if we have no way to persuade the other of our position.)
Itās interesting to consider the meta question of whether one of us is really right about our present metaethical dispute, or whether all you can say is that your position follows from your epistemic standards and mine follows from mine, and there is no further objective question about which we even disagree.
At least in my own normative thought, I donāt just wonder about what meets my standards. [...] I think the most important disagreement of all is over which standards are really warranted.
Really warranted by what? I think Iām an illusionist about this in particular as I donāt even know what we could be reasonably disagreeing over.
For a disagreement about facts (is this blue?), we can argue about actual blueness (measurable) or we can argue about epistemics (which strategies most reliably predict the world?) and meta-epistemics (which strategies most reliably figure out strategies that reliably predict the world?), etc.
For disagreements about morals (is this good?), we can argue about goodness but what is goodness? Is it platonic? Is it grounded in God? Iām not even sure what there is to dispute. Iād argue the best we can do is argue to our shared values (perhaps even universal human values, perhaps idealized by arguing about consistency etc.) and then see what best satisfies those.
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On your view, there may not be any normative disagreement, once we all agree about the logical and empirical facts.
Rightāand this matches our experience! When moral disagreements persist after full empirical and logical agreement, weāre left with clashing bedrock intuitions. You want to insist thereās still a fact about whoās ultimately correct, but canāt explain what would make it true.
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Itās interesting to consider the meta question of whether one of us is really right about our present metaethical dispute, or whether all you can say is that your position follows from your epistemic standards and mine follows from mine, and there is no further objective question about which we even disagree.
I think weāre successfully engaging in a dispute here and that does kind of prove my position. Iām trying to argue that youāre appealing to something that just doesnāt exist and that this is inconsistent with your epistemic values. Whether one can ground a judgement about what is āreally warrantedā is a factual question.
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I want to add that your recent post on meta-metaethical realism also reinforces my point here. You worry that anti-realism about morality commits us to anti-realism about philosophy generally. But thereās a crucial disanalogy: philosophical discourse (including this debate) works precisely because we share epistemic standardsālogical consistency, explanatory power, and various other virtues. When we debate meta-ethics or meta-epistemology, weāre not searching for stance-independent truths but rather working out what follows from our shared epistemic commitments.
The ācompanions in guiltā argument fails because epistemic norms are self-vindicating in a way moral norms arenāt. To even engage in rational discourse about whatās true (including about anti-realism), we must employ epistemic standards. But we can coherently describe worlds with radically different moral standards. Thereās no pragmatic incoherence in moral anti-realism the way there would be in global philosophical anti-realism.
I agree itās often helpful to make our implicit standards explicit. But I disagree that thatās āwhat weāre actually askingā. At least in my own normative thought, I donāt just wonder about what meets my standards. And I donāt just disagree with others about what does or doesnāt meet their standards or mine. I think the most important disagreement of all is over which standards are really warranted.
On your view, there may not be any normative disagreement, once we all agree about the logical and empirical facts. I think itās key to philosophy that there is more we can wonder about than just that. (There may not be any tractable disagreement once we get down to bedrock clashing standards, but I think there is still a further question over which we really disagree, even if we have no way to persuade the other of our position.)
Itās interesting to consider the meta question of whether one of us is really right about our present metaethical dispute, or whether all you can say is that your position follows from your epistemic standards and mine follows from mine, and there is no further objective question about which we even disagree.
Really warranted by what? I think Iām an illusionist about this in particular as I donāt even know what we could be reasonably disagreeing over.
For a disagreement about facts (is this blue?), we can argue about actual blueness (measurable) or we can argue about epistemics (which strategies most reliably predict the world?) and meta-epistemics (which strategies most reliably figure out strategies that reliably predict the world?), etc.
For disagreements about morals (is this good?), we can argue about goodness but what is goodness? Is it platonic? Is it grounded in God? Iām not even sure what there is to dispute. Iād argue the best we can do is argue to our shared values (perhaps even universal human values, perhaps idealized by arguing about consistency etc.) and then see what best satisfies those.
~
Rightāand this matches our experience! When moral disagreements persist after full empirical and logical agreement, weāre left with clashing bedrock intuitions. You want to insist thereās still a fact about whoās ultimately correct, but canāt explain what would make it true.
~
I think weāre successfully engaging in a dispute here and that does kind of prove my position. Iām trying to argue that youāre appealing to something that just doesnāt exist and that this is inconsistent with your epistemic values. Whether one can ground a judgement about what is āreally warrantedā is a factual question.
~
I want to add that your recent post on meta-metaethical realism also reinforces my point here. You worry that anti-realism about morality commits us to anti-realism about philosophy generally. But thereās a crucial disanalogy: philosophical discourse (including this debate) works precisely because we share epistemic standardsālogical consistency, explanatory power, and various other virtues. When we debate meta-ethics or meta-epistemology, weāre not searching for stance-independent truths but rather working out what follows from our shared epistemic commitments.
The ācompanions in guiltā argument fails because epistemic norms are self-vindicating in a way moral norms arenāt. To even engage in rational discourse about whatās true (including about anti-realism), we must employ epistemic standards. But we can coherently describe worlds with radically different moral standards. Thereās no pragmatic incoherence in moral anti-realism the way there would be in global philosophical anti-realism.