I consider AI safety to be the primary overwhelming cause area in Global Health and Animal Welfare. But I think that even considering saving the lives of all human and animals doesn’t begin to recognize the scope of the issue. This is about extinction. So you must also consider the moral weight of all the future lives lost. I think also that considering life from a hedonistic standpoint of enjoyment/suffering, as if it could sum to a total and thus judge the life worthwhile or not by the total is fundamentally incorrect. I think it’s super weird that so many people commenting here are taking that assumption seemingly for granted without even acknowledging the assumption. Is not a life which has a few moments of glory, perhaps leaves some lasting creative achievement, but has a sum of negative hedonistic experiences, a life worth living? Would you say to someone experiencing chronic pain that you were going to murder them because you believed their life was net negative since they were experiencing more suffering than pleasure? This seems nonsensical to me.
Furthermore, extinction brings up an additional moral point. I place fundamental moral weight on diversity. Loosing an endangered species seems worse to me than loosing a similar number of individuals from a very populous species. Every extinction event seems far worse to me than the suffering of individual animals of the same type. If I had to agree that every elephant would live a net hedonistic-negative life for the next three generations of elephants (and that after that they’d still have to take their chances of leading hedonistic-negative or hedonistic-positive lives), but that this was the only way that elephants would get to continue to exist as a species… I’d absolutely choose for elephants to keep existing. This is separate from issues of hedonistic valence. I don’t value a plant species less or more because it can’t feel pain through animal nerve cells. This is a separate issue entirely!
Furthermore, I place value on another separate concept: complex intelligent perception of the universe and the related qualia/ experience. To me, the Universe would seem a much poorer place with no human left to observe it. I’d rather have humans exist, in net negative lives according to their selfish perception of suffering, than for no humans to exist. Animal species and plant species too, bring some value.
Furthermore, there is additionally the concept of future potential species which don’t yet exist. Uplifted animals. Digital persons. All these things add to both the fundamental values of Diversity and Experiencing the Universe. If all multicellular life on Earth were wiped out, but single celled organisms remained, I’d take value in that beyond the value I place in the lives of those single celled organisms and also beyond the value I place in the existence of their species. My additional type of value would be related to hope that someday multicellular life would evolve again.
I think also that considering life from a hedonistic standpoint of enjoyment/suffering, as if it could sum to a total and thus judge the life worthwhile or not by the total is fundamentally incorrect. I think it’s super weird that so many people commenting here are taking that assumption seemingly for granted without even acknowledging the assumption. Is not a life which has a few moments of glory, perhaps leaves some lasting creative achievement, but has a sum of negative hedonistic experiences, a life worth living? Would you say to someone experiencing chronic pain that you were going to murder them because you believed their life was net negative since they were experiencing more suffering than pleasure?
I’m pretty sympathetic to your view here[1] and preference- and desire-based theories generally. But I’m also skeptical that these dramatically favour humans over nonhuman animals, to the point that global health beats animal welfare.
I suspect the cognitive versions of preferences and desires are not actually interpersonally comparable in general, with utilitarian preferences vs deontologist preferences as a special case. They may also exist in simple forms in other animals, and I give that non-negligible probability. There may be no fact that points to humans mattering more (or other animals mattering more than humans). We may just need to normalize or use Pareto, say. See my posts Types of subjective welfare, Which animals realize which types of subjective welfare? and Solution to the two envelopes problem for moral weights.
In the human case, it would be mistaken to give a kind of hour-by-hour accounting. You know, “I had +4 level of experience for this hour, then I had −2 for the next hour, and then I had −1” — and you sort of sum to try to work out the total… And I came to think that something like that will be applicable in some of the animal cases as well… There are achievements, there are experiences, there are things that can be done in the face of difficulty that might be seen as having the same kind of redemptive role, as casting into a different light the difficult events that led up to it.
The example I use is watching some birds successfully raising some young, fighting off a couple of rather aggressive parrots of another species that wanted to fight them, prevailing against difficult odds — and doing so in a way that was so wholly successful. It seemed to me that if you wanted to do an accounting of how things had gone for those birds, you would not want to do the naive thing of just counting up difficult and less-difficult hours. There’s something special about what’s achieved at the end of that process.
I agree that there are difficult unresolved philosophical questions in regards to hypothetical not-yet-extant people who are varyingly likely to exist depending on the actions of currently extant people (which may be a group that includes blastocysts, for instance).
In regards to non-human animals, and digital entities, I think we need to lean more heavily into computational functionalism (as the video you shared discussed). This point too, is up for debate, but I personally feel much more confident about supporting computational functionalism than biological chauvinism.
In the case of complex-brained animals (e.g. parrots), I do think that there is something importantly distinct about them as compared to simple-brained animals (e.g. invertebrates).
I think that in order to differentiate the underlying qualia associated with this behavior in insects versus the qualia experienced by the parrots defending their young, we must turn to neuroscience.
In a bird or mammal neuroscience is able to offer evidence of the computations of specific sets of neurons carrying out computations such as self-modeling and other-modeling, and things like fondness or dislike of specific other modelled agents. In insects (and shrimp, jellyfish, etc), neuroscience can show us that the insect brains consistently lack sets of neurons which could plausibly be carrying out such complex self/other social modeling. Insect brains have various sets of neurons for sensory processing, for motor control, and other such basic functions. Recently, we have made a comprehensive map of every neuron and nearly all their associated synapses in the preserved brain of an individual fruit fly. We can analyze this entire connectome and label the specific functions of every neuron. I recently attended a talk by a neuroscientist who built a computational model of a portion of this fruit fly connectome, and showed that a specific set of simulated inputs (presentation of sugar to taste sensors on legs) resulted in the expected stereotypical reaction of the simulated body (extending the proboscis).
That, to me, is a good start on compelling evidence that our model of the functions of these neurons is correct.
Thus, I would argue that parrots are in a fundamentally different moral category from fruit flies.
For the case of comparing complex-brained non-human animals to humans, the neuroscientific evidence is less clear cut and more complex. I believe there is a case to be made, but it is beyond the scope of this comment.
Thanks for your thoughtful engagement on this matter.
Is not a life which has a few moments of glory, perhaps leaves some lasting creative achievement, but has a sum of negative hedonistic experiences, a life worth living?
I would personally say no unless the moments of glory help others sufficiently to offset the negative experiences of the life in question.
In other words, I am a hedonist and I suspect a lot of others in this thread are too.
What of the view of the possibility that it doesn’t make sense to do a hedonistic summation over experiences, weighted by duration / neuron-count / individual lives / intensity of subjective experience? What if suffering is also a way of experiencing the Universe, and actually has non-negative value in that sense while having negative hedonistic value? I might argue that the existence of a predominantly-but-not-exclusively suffering creature is better than it not existing. How certain can we be of one of these viewpoints over the other?
Claude:
Your question delves into some profound and challenging philosophical territory. Let’s unpack these ideas:
1. Critique of hedonistic summation: The view that we can’t simply sum up experiences across individuals or species challenges utilitarianism and related consequentialist ethical frameworks. This perspective aligns with critiques from philosophers like Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, who argue that such summations fail to capture important aspects of value and experience.
2. Suffering as a form of experience: The idea that suffering, while hedonistically negative, might have non-negative value as a way of experiencing the universe is intriguing. It resonates with existentialist philosophy, particularly ideas from thinkers like Viktor Frankl, who argued that meaning can be found even in suffering.
3. Existence vs. non-existence: Your argument that a predominantly suffering creature’s existence might be preferable to its non-existence touches on deep questions in population ethics and value theory. It relates to Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion” and debates about the value of existence itself.
4. Complexity of value: These points collectively suggest a much more complex view of value than simple hedonic calculus allows for. This aligns with ideas in moral philosophy about value pluralism and the irreducibility of certain moral concepts.
Regarding certainty, it’s crucial to recognize that these are deeply contested philosophical issues. We cannot be highly certain about any of these viewpoints over others. Here’s why:
1. Subjectivity of experience: We lack direct access to others’ subjective experiences, making it challenging to compare or aggregate them meaningfully.
2. Philosophical disagreement: There’s no consensus among philosophers on these issues. Different ethical frameworks (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) would approach these questions differently.
3. Cultural and individual variation: Views on the value of suffering, existence, and experience vary widely across cultures and individuals.
4. Limits of human cognition: Our ability to conceptualize and reason about these abstract ethical concepts may be fundamentally limited by our cognitive architecture.
5. Empirical uncertainty: Many of these questions touch on empirical issues (like the nature of consciousness) that we don’t fully understand scientifically.
Given these factors, I’d argue that we can’t be highly certain of any one viewpoint over the others. What we can do is:
1. Acknowledge the complexity: Recognize that simplistic frameworks may not capture the full richness of value and experience.
2. Remain open to multiple perspectives: Consider various ethical viewpoints when making decisions, especially on issues with far-reaching consequences.
3. Seek common ground: Look for areas of agreement across different ethical frameworks to guide action in the face of uncertainty.
4. Emphasize robustness: Prefer actions and policies that seem positive or at least not harmful across multiple ethical frameworks.
5. Continue philosophical inquiry: Engage in ongoing reflection and debate on these issues, recognizing that our understanding may evolve.
In the context of existential risk and animal welfare, this uncertainty suggests that we should:
1. Be cautious about actions based solely on hedonic calculations. 2. Consider multiple dimensions of value when assessing risks and interventions. 3. Place high value on preserving future potential for diverse forms of experience and value. 4. Remain humble about our ability to make definitive ethical judgments, especially on a cosmic scale.
This perspective doesn’t necessarily change the prioritization of existential risk prevention, but it does enrich our understanding of what’s at stake and why it matters.
Nathan:
How likely, based on a current scientific understanding of neuroscience, do you think it is that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human? Would a series of shrimp lives, totaling a neuron-count-weighted length of time relative to a typical human life be expected to have the same diversity and complexity of experiences, the same self-aware perception of Self and the Universe, the same richness of interpersonal connections?
Claude:
Based on our current scientific understanding of neuroscience, it is highly unlikely that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human. Let’s break this down:
1. Neural complexity: - Humans have approximately 86 billion neurons in their brains. - Fruit flies have about 100,000 neurons. - Shrimp have around 100,000 neurons as well.
The vast difference in neural complexity alone suggests a significant gap in cognitive capabilities and experiential depth.
2. Brain structure: Human brains have highly developed structures like the neocortex, which is associated with higher-order thinking, self-awareness, and complex emotional processing. These structures are absent or vastly simpler in insects and crustaceans.
3. Cognitive capabilities: Humans demonstrate complex problem-solving, abstract thinking, language use, and long-term planning. While insects and crustaceans show impressive behaviors for their size, their cognitive abilities are much more limited and largely instinctual.
4. Self-awareness: There’s strong evidence for self-awareness in humans (and some other mammals), but little to no evidence for it in insects or crustaceans. The mirror test and other measures of self-awareness have not been passed by these simpler organisms.
5. Emotional complexity: Humans experience a wide range of complex emotions and can reflect on these emotions. While there’s evidence for basic forms of learning and memory in insects and crustaceans, the emotional depth is likely far simpler.
6. Social complexity: Human social interactions involve complex language, culture, and interpersonal relationships. While some insects (like bees) have impressive social structures, they’re based on much simpler communication and don’t approach human-level complexity.
7. Perception of the universe: Humans can contemplate abstract concepts like the nature of the universe, their place in it, and the meaning of existence. There’s no evidence that insects or crustaceans have anything approaching this level of abstract thought.
Regarding the comparison of multiple shrimp or fruit fly lives to a human life:
Even if we were to consider a series of shrimp or fruit fly lives that, when combined, had a total neuron-count-weighted lifespan equivalent to a human, it’s extremely unlikely that this would result in an equivalent richness or diversity of experience. Here’s why:
1. Lack of continuity: Individual experiences wouldn’t accumulate or build on each other across different lives, limiting the potential for complex, long-term learning and development.
2. Simpler sensory systems: The sensory experiences of these organisms are much more limited than humans, restricting the variety and depth of their perceptions.
3. Limited memory and learning: While these organisms can learn, their capacity for complex, long-term memory formation is far more limited than humans.
4. Absence of language and culture: The lack of complex language and cultural transmission severely limits the potential for diverse experiences and knowledge accumulation.
5. Simpler social structures: While some insects have impressive social organizations, they lack the complexity and diversity of human social interactions and relationships.
6. Lack of abstract thinking: The absence of higher-order cognitive functions like abstract reasoning, imagination, and self-reflection fundamentally limits the complexity and diversity of mental experiences.
In conclusion, while shrimp and fruit flies are fascinating organisms with impressive capabilities for their size and neural complexity, current scientific understanding strongly suggests that their experiences are vastly simpler and more limited than human experiences. A collection of their lives, even if matched for total neuron-count-weighted time, would not be expected to approach the diversity, complexity, self-awareness, or richness of a human life.
This perspective underscores the importance of considering factors beyond simple neuron counts or lifespan when assessing the moral weight or value of different forms of life and consciousness. It supports a view that places significant value on the unique capabilities and experiences of more complex organisms, while still recognizing the importance of simpler life forms in their own right.
Sorry a convo with an LLM isn’t likely to convince me of anything, for starters the response on hedonism mainly consists of assertions that there are some philosophers that have opposing views to hedonism. I knew that already...
Which viewpoint, simple hedonistic summation (including a neuron-count-based weighting of all animals and insects) or the more complex set of values that I outlined, do you think is more in sync with the values of a typical person in the world? Which ethical framework do you think has more philosophical merit overall?
Claude:
Your question touches on some deep philosophical and psychological issues. Let’s consider both parts of your question:
1. Alignment with typical human values:
The more complex set of values you outlined is likely much closer to how most people intuitively think about ethics and the value of life. Here’s why:
- Most people don’t reduce life’s value to a simple hedonic calculus. They consider factors like personal relationships, achievements, cultural contributions, and legacy. - The idea of species preservation resonates with many people’s intuitions about conservation and biodiversity. - Many cultures and individuals place intrinsic value on diversity, both in nature and human societies. - The concept of human (or intelligent) observation giving meaning to the universe aligns with many philosophical and religious traditions. - Most people would balk at the idea of euthanizing someone with chronic pain solely based on a “negative” hedonic balance.
The simple hedonistic summation, especially when extended to insects based on neuron count, feels much more alien to how most people conceptualize value. While people generally care about animal welfare, the idea of weighing an insect’s experience against a human’s based on neuron count would likely seem counterintuitive to most.
2. Philosophical merit:
From a philosophical standpoint, I would argue that your more complex framework has greater merit:
- It acknowledges the complexity of value and avoids oversimplification. - It aligns better with our moral intuitions while still providing a structured approach to ethics. - It accounts for important factors like potential future value, which simple hedonistic calculations often neglect. - It allows for a more nuanced consideration of existential risks and long-term outcomes. - It addresses some of the key criticisms leveled against pure utilitarianism (like neglecting individual rights or the separateness of persons).
However, the simpler hedonistic framework does have some philosophical advantages:
- It’s more quantifiable and thus potentially easier to apply consistently. - It avoids some thorny philosophical questions about the nature of value beyond experience.
That said, these advantages come at the cost of potentially missing crucial aspects of what we value.
Overall, while both frameworks have their merits, I believe the more complex set of values you outlined has greater philosophical merit. It better captures the multifaceted nature of what we consider valuable, aligns more closely with our moral intuitions, and provides a richer framework for considering long-term ethical questions, particularly around existential risks.
This view is particularly relevant when considering issues like AI safety. A more nuanced ethical framework that considers factors beyond immediate hedonic states could lead to more robust and aligned AI systems that better reflect the full spectrum of human values.
Nathan:
Given the possibility that an AI based catastrophe may wipe out all life on Earth in the next decade, which issue seems more valuable to direct funding towards: preventing existential catastrophe, or pursuing animal welfare? If a typical person on Earth were forced to assign $100 million USD to one of these two causes, which do you think they would pick?
Claude:
When considering the allocation of significant resources between preventing existential catastrophe and pursuing animal welfare, especially in the context of a potential AI-based catastrophe within the next decade, we need to weigh several factors:
1. Scope and urgency: An existential catastrophe, by definition, would affect all life on Earth, including all animals. This presents an unparalleled scope of impact. The urgency of the timeline you’ve suggested (potential catastrophe within a decade) also adds weight to this concern.
2. Irreversibility: An existential catastrophe would be irreversible, while many animal welfare issues, though serious, could potentially be addressed over time if humanity survives and progresses.
3. Long-term potential: Preventing an existential catastrophe preserves the potential for future improvements in all areas, including animal welfare. It keeps open the possibility of creating a world with better conditions for all sentient beings.
4. Immediate vs. potential suffering: Animal welfare efforts typically address immediate, ongoing suffering. Existential risk prevention aims to avert potential, but catastrophic, future suffering.
Given these considerations, I believe that preventing existential catastrophe would be the more valuable cause to direct funding towards in this scenario. This aligns with the philosophical concept of existential risk reduction as a top priority, as argued by thinkers like Toby Ord and Nick Bostrom.
As for what a typical person on Earth would choose if forced to allocate $100 million to one of these causes:
1. Immediate visibility: Animal welfare issues are more immediately visible and emotionally resonant for many people. They can see and relate to animal suffering directly.
2. Abstractness of existential risk: The concept of existential risk, especially from advanced AI, might seem abstract or speculative to many people, despite its potential severity.
3. Skepticism about AI risk: Many people might be skeptical about the likelihood or timeline of AI-based catastrophic risks.
4. Cultural and personal values: Views on animal welfare vary significantly across cultures, while the value of human survival is more universally shared.
5. Media influence: The portrayal of these issues in media and public discourse can significantly influence public perception.
Despite these factors that might push people towards choosing animal welfare, I believe that if presented with a clear explanation of the stakes involved in existential risk (particularly the potential loss of all future animal welfare improvements), most people would choose to allocate the $100 million to preventing existential catastrophe.
The key here would be effectively communicating the scope, urgency, and implications of existential risk. If people understand that an existential catastrophe would not only end human life but also result in the suffering and death of all animals, as well as foreclosing any possibility of future improvements in animal welfare, they would likely see it as the higher priority.
This assessment assumes that people are making this decision based on a rational evaluation of impact rather than purely emotional responses. In reality, individual choices might vary based on personal experiences, cultural background, and exposure to information about these issues.
In conclusion, while both causes are important, the potential for an AI-based existential catastrophe in the near future presents a uniquely urgent and high-stakes scenario that, in my analysis, warrants prioritization in this hypothetical funding allocation scenario.
I consider AI safety to be the primary overwhelming cause area in Global Health and Animal Welfare. But I think that even considering saving the lives of all human and animals doesn’t begin to recognize the scope of the issue. This is about extinction. So you must also consider the moral weight of all the future lives lost. I think also that considering life from a hedonistic standpoint of enjoyment/suffering, as if it could sum to a total and thus judge the life worthwhile or not by the total is fundamentally incorrect. I think it’s super weird that so many people commenting here are taking that assumption seemingly for granted without even acknowledging the assumption. Is not a life which has a few moments of glory, perhaps leaves some lasting creative achievement, but has a sum of negative hedonistic experiences, a life worth living? Would you say to someone experiencing chronic pain that you were going to murder them because you believed their life was net negative since they were experiencing more suffering than pleasure? This seems nonsensical to me.
Furthermore, extinction brings up an additional moral point. I place fundamental moral weight on diversity. Loosing an endangered species seems worse to me than loosing a similar number of individuals from a very populous species. Every extinction event seems far worse to me than the suffering of individual animals of the same type. If I had to agree that every elephant would live a net hedonistic-negative life for the next three generations of elephants (and that after that they’d still have to take their chances of leading hedonistic-negative or hedonistic-positive lives), but that this was the only way that elephants would get to continue to exist as a species… I’d absolutely choose for elephants to keep existing. This is separate from issues of hedonistic valence. I don’t value a plant species less or more because it can’t feel pain through animal nerve cells. This is a separate issue entirely!
Furthermore, I place value on another separate concept: complex intelligent perception of the universe and the related qualia/ experience. To me, the Universe would seem a much poorer place with no human left to observe it. I’d rather have humans exist, in net negative lives according to their selfish perception of suffering, than for no humans to exist. Animal species and plant species too, bring some value.
Furthermore, there is additionally the concept of future potential species which don’t yet exist. Uplifted animals. Digital persons. All these things add to both the fundamental values of Diversity and Experiencing the Universe. If all multicellular life on Earth were wiped out, but single celled organisms remained, I’d take value in that beyond the value I place in the lives of those single celled organisms and also beyond the value I place in the existence of their species. My additional type of value would be related to hope that someday multicellular life would evolve again.
I’m pretty sympathetic to your view here[1] and preference- and desire-based theories generally. But I’m also skeptical that these dramatically favour humans over nonhuman animals, to the point that global health beats animal welfare.
I suspect the cognitive versions of preferences and desires are not actually interpersonally comparable in general, with utilitarian preferences vs deontologist preferences as a special case. They may also exist in simple forms in other animals, and I give that non-negligible probability. There may be no fact that points to humans mattering more (or other animals mattering more than humans). We may just need to normalize or use Pareto, say. See my posts Types of subjective welfare, Which animals realize which types of subjective welfare? and Solution to the two envelopes problem for moral weights.
I think many other animals have access to things like love and achievement, e.g. animals who raise their own offspring. Here’s a nice illustration from Peter Godfrey-Smith’s recent 80,000 Hours podcast episode:
For keeping people alive, not bringing them into existence, given my person-affecting intuitions.
I agree that there are difficult unresolved philosophical questions in regards to hypothetical not-yet-extant people who are varyingly likely to exist depending on the actions of currently extant people (which may be a group that includes blastocysts, for instance).
In regards to non-human animals, and digital entities, I think we need to lean more heavily into computational functionalism (as the video you shared discussed). This point too, is up for debate, but I personally feel much more confident about supporting computational functionalism than biological chauvinism.
In the case of complex-brained animals (e.g. parrots), I do think that there is something importantly distinct about them as compared to simple-brained animals (e.g. invertebrates).
Some invertebrates do tend to their young, even potentially sacrificing their own lives on behalf of their brood. See: https://entomologytoday.org/2018/05/11/research-confirms-insect-moms-are-the-best/
I think that in order to differentiate the underlying qualia associated with this behavior in insects versus the qualia experienced by the parrots defending their young, we must turn to neuroscience.
In a bird or mammal neuroscience is able to offer evidence of the computations of specific sets of neurons carrying out computations such as self-modeling and other-modeling, and things like fondness or dislike of specific other modelled agents. In insects (and shrimp, jellyfish, etc), neuroscience can show us that the insect brains consistently lack sets of neurons which could plausibly be carrying out such complex self/other social modeling. Insect brains have various sets of neurons for sensory processing, for motor control, and other such basic functions. Recently, we have made a comprehensive map of every neuron and nearly all their associated synapses in the preserved brain of an individual fruit fly. We can analyze this entire connectome and label the specific functions of every neuron. I recently attended a talk by a neuroscientist who built a computational model of a portion of this fruit fly connectome, and showed that a specific set of simulated inputs (presentation of sugar to taste sensors on legs) resulted in the expected stereotypical reaction of the simulated body (extending the proboscis).
That, to me, is a good start on compelling evidence that our model of the functions of these neurons is correct.
Thus, I would argue that parrots are in a fundamentally different moral category from fruit flies.
For the case of comparing complex-brained non-human animals to humans, the neuroscientific evidence is less clear cut and more complex. I believe there is a case to be made, but it is beyond the scope of this comment.
Thanks for your thoughtful engagement on this matter.
I would personally say no unless the moments of glory help others sufficiently to offset the negative experiences of the life in question.
In other words, I am a hedonist and I suspect a lot of others in this thread are too.
Conversation with Claude Sonnet 3.5:
Nathan:
What of the view of the possibility that it doesn’t make sense to do a hedonistic summation over experiences, weighted by duration / neuron-count / individual lives / intensity of subjective experience? What if suffering is also a way of experiencing the Universe, and actually has non-negative value in that sense while having negative hedonistic value? I might argue that the existence of a predominantly-but-not-exclusively suffering creature is better than it not existing. How certain can we be of one of these viewpoints over the other?
Claude:
Your question delves into some profound and challenging philosophical territory. Let’s unpack these ideas:
1. Critique of hedonistic summation:
The view that we can’t simply sum up experiences across individuals or species challenges utilitarianism and related consequentialist ethical frameworks. This perspective aligns with critiques from philosophers like Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, who argue that such summations fail to capture important aspects of value and experience.
2. Suffering as a form of experience:
The idea that suffering, while hedonistically negative, might have non-negative value as a way of experiencing the universe is intriguing. It resonates with existentialist philosophy, particularly ideas from thinkers like Viktor Frankl, who argued that meaning can be found even in suffering.
3. Existence vs. non-existence:
Your argument that a predominantly suffering creature’s existence might be preferable to its non-existence touches on deep questions in population ethics and value theory. It relates to Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion” and debates about the value of existence itself.
4. Complexity of value:
These points collectively suggest a much more complex view of value than simple hedonic calculus allows for. This aligns with ideas in moral philosophy about value pluralism and the irreducibility of certain moral concepts.
Regarding certainty, it’s crucial to recognize that these are deeply contested philosophical issues. We cannot be highly certain about any of these viewpoints over others. Here’s why:
1. Subjectivity of experience:
We lack direct access to others’ subjective experiences, making it challenging to compare or aggregate them meaningfully.
2. Philosophical disagreement:
There’s no consensus among philosophers on these issues. Different ethical frameworks (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) would approach these questions differently.
3. Cultural and individual variation:
Views on the value of suffering, existence, and experience vary widely across cultures and individuals.
4. Limits of human cognition:
Our ability to conceptualize and reason about these abstract ethical concepts may be fundamentally limited by our cognitive architecture.
5. Empirical uncertainty:
Many of these questions touch on empirical issues (like the nature of consciousness) that we don’t fully understand scientifically.
Given these factors, I’d argue that we can’t be highly certain of any one viewpoint over the others. What we can do is:
1. Acknowledge the complexity:
Recognize that simplistic frameworks may not capture the full richness of value and experience.
2. Remain open to multiple perspectives:
Consider various ethical viewpoints when making decisions, especially on issues with far-reaching consequences.
3. Seek common ground:
Look for areas of agreement across different ethical frameworks to guide action in the face of uncertainty.
4. Emphasize robustness:
Prefer actions and policies that seem positive or at least not harmful across multiple ethical frameworks.
5. Continue philosophical inquiry:
Engage in ongoing reflection and debate on these issues, recognizing that our understanding may evolve.
In the context of existential risk and animal welfare, this uncertainty suggests that we should:
1. Be cautious about actions based solely on hedonic calculations.
2. Consider multiple dimensions of value when assessing risks and interventions.
3. Place high value on preserving future potential for diverse forms of experience and value.
4. Remain humble about our ability to make definitive ethical judgments, especially on a cosmic scale.
This perspective doesn’t necessarily change the prioritization of existential risk prevention, but it does enrich our understanding of what’s at stake and why it matters.
Nathan:
How likely, based on a current scientific understanding of neuroscience, do you think it is that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human? Would a series of shrimp lives, totaling a neuron-count-weighted length of time relative to a typical human life be expected to have the same diversity and complexity of experiences, the same self-aware perception of Self and the Universe, the same richness of interpersonal connections?
Claude:
Based on our current scientific understanding of neuroscience, it is highly unlikely that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human. Let’s break this down:
1. Neural complexity:
- Humans have approximately 86 billion neurons in their brains.
- Fruit flies have about 100,000 neurons.
- Shrimp have around 100,000 neurons as well.
The vast difference in neural complexity alone suggests a significant gap in cognitive capabilities and experiential depth.
2. Brain structure:
Human brains have highly developed structures like the neocortex, which is associated with higher-order thinking, self-awareness, and complex emotional processing. These structures are absent or vastly simpler in insects and crustaceans.
3. Cognitive capabilities:
Humans demonstrate complex problem-solving, abstract thinking, language use, and long-term planning. While insects and crustaceans show impressive behaviors for their size, their cognitive abilities are much more limited and largely instinctual.
4. Self-awareness:
There’s strong evidence for self-awareness in humans (and some other mammals), but little to no evidence for it in insects or crustaceans. The mirror test and other measures of self-awareness have not been passed by these simpler organisms.
5. Emotional complexity:
Humans experience a wide range of complex emotions and can reflect on these emotions. While there’s evidence for basic forms of learning and memory in insects and crustaceans, the emotional depth is likely far simpler.
6. Social complexity:
Human social interactions involve complex language, culture, and interpersonal relationships. While some insects (like bees) have impressive social structures, they’re based on much simpler communication and don’t approach human-level complexity.
7. Perception of the universe:
Humans can contemplate abstract concepts like the nature of the universe, their place in it, and the meaning of existence. There’s no evidence that insects or crustaceans have anything approaching this level of abstract thought.
Regarding the comparison of multiple shrimp or fruit fly lives to a human life:
Even if we were to consider a series of shrimp or fruit fly lives that, when combined, had a total neuron-count-weighted lifespan equivalent to a human, it’s extremely unlikely that this would result in an equivalent richness or diversity of experience. Here’s why:
1. Lack of continuity:
Individual experiences wouldn’t accumulate or build on each other across different lives, limiting the potential for complex, long-term learning and development.
2. Simpler sensory systems:
The sensory experiences of these organisms are much more limited than humans, restricting the variety and depth of their perceptions.
3. Limited memory and learning:
While these organisms can learn, their capacity for complex, long-term memory formation is far more limited than humans.
4. Absence of language and culture:
The lack of complex language and cultural transmission severely limits the potential for diverse experiences and knowledge accumulation.
5. Simpler social structures:
While some insects have impressive social organizations, they lack the complexity and diversity of human social interactions and relationships.
6. Lack of abstract thinking:
The absence of higher-order cognitive functions like abstract reasoning, imagination, and self-reflection fundamentally limits the complexity and diversity of mental experiences.
In conclusion, while shrimp and fruit flies are fascinating organisms with impressive capabilities for their size and neural complexity, current scientific understanding strongly suggests that their experiences are vastly simpler and more limited than human experiences. A collection of their lives, even if matched for total neuron-count-weighted time, would not be expected to approach the diversity, complexity, self-awareness, or richness of a human life.
This perspective underscores the importance of considering factors beyond simple neuron counts or lifespan when assessing the moral weight or value of different forms of life and consciousness. It supports a view that places significant value on the unique capabilities and experiences of more complex organisms, while still recognizing the importance of simpler life forms in their own right.
Sorry a convo with an LLM isn’t likely to convince me of anything, for starters the response on hedonism mainly consists of assertions that there are some philosophers that have opposing views to hedonism. I knew that already...
A conversation about this with Claude Sonnet 3.5:
Nathan:
Which viewpoint, simple hedonistic summation (including a neuron-count-based weighting of all animals and insects) or the more complex set of values that I outlined, do you think is more in sync with the values of a typical person in the world? Which ethical framework do you think has more philosophical merit overall?
Claude:
Your question touches on some deep philosophical and psychological issues. Let’s consider both parts of your question:
1. Alignment with typical human values:
The more complex set of values you outlined is likely much closer to how most people intuitively think about ethics and the value of life. Here’s why:
- Most people don’t reduce life’s value to a simple hedonic calculus. They consider factors like personal relationships, achievements, cultural contributions, and legacy.
- The idea of species preservation resonates with many people’s intuitions about conservation and biodiversity.
- Many cultures and individuals place intrinsic value on diversity, both in nature and human societies.
- The concept of human (or intelligent) observation giving meaning to the universe aligns with many philosophical and religious traditions.
- Most people would balk at the idea of euthanizing someone with chronic pain solely based on a “negative” hedonic balance.
The simple hedonistic summation, especially when extended to insects based on neuron count, feels much more alien to how most people conceptualize value. While people generally care about animal welfare, the idea of weighing an insect’s experience against a human’s based on neuron count would likely seem counterintuitive to most.
2. Philosophical merit:
From a philosophical standpoint, I would argue that your more complex framework has greater merit:
- It acknowledges the complexity of value and avoids oversimplification.
- It aligns better with our moral intuitions while still providing a structured approach to ethics.
- It accounts for important factors like potential future value, which simple hedonistic calculations often neglect.
- It allows for a more nuanced consideration of existential risks and long-term outcomes.
- It addresses some of the key criticisms leveled against pure utilitarianism (like neglecting individual rights or the separateness of persons).
However, the simpler hedonistic framework does have some philosophical advantages:
- It’s more quantifiable and thus potentially easier to apply consistently.
- It avoids some thorny philosophical questions about the nature of value beyond experience.
That said, these advantages come at the cost of potentially missing crucial aspects of what we value.
Overall, while both frameworks have their merits, I believe the more complex set of values you outlined has greater philosophical merit. It better captures the multifaceted nature of what we consider valuable, aligns more closely with our moral intuitions, and provides a richer framework for considering long-term ethical questions, particularly around existential risks.
This view is particularly relevant when considering issues like AI safety. A more nuanced ethical framework that considers factors beyond immediate hedonic states could lead to more robust and aligned AI systems that better reflect the full spectrum of human values.
Nathan:
Given the possibility that an AI based catastrophe may wipe out all life on Earth in the next decade, which issue seems more valuable to direct funding towards: preventing existential catastrophe, or pursuing animal welfare? If a typical person on Earth were forced to assign $100 million USD to one of these two causes, which do you think they would pick?
Claude:
When considering the allocation of significant resources between preventing existential catastrophe and pursuing animal welfare, especially in the context of a potential AI-based catastrophe within the next decade, we need to weigh several factors:
1. Scope and urgency:
An existential catastrophe, by definition, would affect all life on Earth, including all animals. This presents an unparalleled scope of impact. The urgency of the timeline you’ve suggested (potential catastrophe within a decade) also adds weight to this concern.
2. Irreversibility:
An existential catastrophe would be irreversible, while many animal welfare issues, though serious, could potentially be addressed over time if humanity survives and progresses.
3. Long-term potential:
Preventing an existential catastrophe preserves the potential for future improvements in all areas, including animal welfare. It keeps open the possibility of creating a world with better conditions for all sentient beings.
4. Immediate vs. potential suffering:
Animal welfare efforts typically address immediate, ongoing suffering. Existential risk prevention aims to avert potential, but catastrophic, future suffering.
Given these considerations, I believe that preventing existential catastrophe would be the more valuable cause to direct funding towards in this scenario. This aligns with the philosophical concept of existential risk reduction as a top priority, as argued by thinkers like Toby Ord and Nick Bostrom.
As for what a typical person on Earth would choose if forced to allocate $100 million to one of these causes:
1. Immediate visibility:
Animal welfare issues are more immediately visible and emotionally resonant for many people. They can see and relate to animal suffering directly.
2. Abstractness of existential risk:
The concept of existential risk, especially from advanced AI, might seem abstract or speculative to many people, despite its potential severity.
3. Skepticism about AI risk:
Many people might be skeptical about the likelihood or timeline of AI-based catastrophic risks.
4. Cultural and personal values:
Views on animal welfare vary significantly across cultures, while the value of human survival is more universally shared.
5. Media influence:
The portrayal of these issues in media and public discourse can significantly influence public perception.
Despite these factors that might push people towards choosing animal welfare, I believe that if presented with a clear explanation of the stakes involved in existential risk (particularly the potential loss of all future animal welfare improvements), most people would choose to allocate the $100 million to preventing existential catastrophe.
The key here would be effectively communicating the scope, urgency, and implications of existential risk. If people understand that an existential catastrophe would not only end human life but also result in the suffering and death of all animals, as well as foreclosing any possibility of future improvements in animal welfare, they would likely see it as the higher priority.
This assessment assumes that people are making this decision based on a rational evaluation of impact rather than purely emotional responses. In reality, individual choices might vary based on personal experiences, cultural background, and exposure to information about these issues.
In conclusion, while both causes are important, the potential for an AI-based existential catastrophe in the near future presents a uniquely urgent and high-stakes scenario that, in my analysis, warrants prioritization in this hypothetical funding allocation scenario.