Is not a life which has a few moments of glory, perhaps leaves some lasting creative achievement, but has a sum of negative hedonistic experiences, a life worth living?
I would personally say no unless the moments of glory help others sufficiently to offset the negative experiences of the life in question.
In other words, I am a hedonist and I suspect a lot of others in this thread are too.
What of the view of the possibility that it doesn’t make sense to do a hedonistic summation over experiences, weighted by duration / neuron-count / individual lives / intensity of subjective experience? What if suffering is also a way of experiencing the Universe, and actually has non-negative value in that sense while having negative hedonistic value? I might argue that the existence of a predominantly-but-not-exclusively suffering creature is better than it not existing. How certain can we be of one of these viewpoints over the other?
Claude:
Your question delves into some profound and challenging philosophical territory. Let’s unpack these ideas:
1. Critique of hedonistic summation: The view that we can’t simply sum up experiences across individuals or species challenges utilitarianism and related consequentialist ethical frameworks. This perspective aligns with critiques from philosophers like Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, who argue that such summations fail to capture important aspects of value and experience.
2. Suffering as a form of experience: The idea that suffering, while hedonistically negative, might have non-negative value as a way of experiencing the universe is intriguing. It resonates with existentialist philosophy, particularly ideas from thinkers like Viktor Frankl, who argued that meaning can be found even in suffering.
3. Existence vs. non-existence: Your argument that a predominantly suffering creature’s existence might be preferable to its non-existence touches on deep questions in population ethics and value theory. It relates to Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion” and debates about the value of existence itself.
4. Complexity of value: These points collectively suggest a much more complex view of value than simple hedonic calculus allows for. This aligns with ideas in moral philosophy about value pluralism and the irreducibility of certain moral concepts.
Regarding certainty, it’s crucial to recognize that these are deeply contested philosophical issues. We cannot be highly certain about any of these viewpoints over others. Here’s why:
1. Subjectivity of experience: We lack direct access to others’ subjective experiences, making it challenging to compare or aggregate them meaningfully.
2. Philosophical disagreement: There’s no consensus among philosophers on these issues. Different ethical frameworks (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) would approach these questions differently.
3. Cultural and individual variation: Views on the value of suffering, existence, and experience vary widely across cultures and individuals.
4. Limits of human cognition: Our ability to conceptualize and reason about these abstract ethical concepts may be fundamentally limited by our cognitive architecture.
5. Empirical uncertainty: Many of these questions touch on empirical issues (like the nature of consciousness) that we don’t fully understand scientifically.
Given these factors, I’d argue that we can’t be highly certain of any one viewpoint over the others. What we can do is:
1. Acknowledge the complexity: Recognize that simplistic frameworks may not capture the full richness of value and experience.
2. Remain open to multiple perspectives: Consider various ethical viewpoints when making decisions, especially on issues with far-reaching consequences.
3. Seek common ground: Look for areas of agreement across different ethical frameworks to guide action in the face of uncertainty.
4. Emphasize robustness: Prefer actions and policies that seem positive or at least not harmful across multiple ethical frameworks.
5. Continue philosophical inquiry: Engage in ongoing reflection and debate on these issues, recognizing that our understanding may evolve.
In the context of existential risk and animal welfare, this uncertainty suggests that we should:
1. Be cautious about actions based solely on hedonic calculations. 2. Consider multiple dimensions of value when assessing risks and interventions. 3. Place high value on preserving future potential for diverse forms of experience and value. 4. Remain humble about our ability to make definitive ethical judgments, especially on a cosmic scale.
This perspective doesn’t necessarily change the prioritization of existential risk prevention, but it does enrich our understanding of what’s at stake and why it matters.
Nathan:
How likely, based on a current scientific understanding of neuroscience, do you think it is that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human? Would a series of shrimp lives, totaling a neuron-count-weighted length of time relative to a typical human life be expected to have the same diversity and complexity of experiences, the same self-aware perception of Self and the Universe, the same richness of interpersonal connections?
Claude:
Based on our current scientific understanding of neuroscience, it is highly unlikely that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human. Let’s break this down:
1. Neural complexity: - Humans have approximately 86 billion neurons in their brains. - Fruit flies have about 100,000 neurons. - Shrimp have around 100,000 neurons as well.
The vast difference in neural complexity alone suggests a significant gap in cognitive capabilities and experiential depth.
2. Brain structure: Human brains have highly developed structures like the neocortex, which is associated with higher-order thinking, self-awareness, and complex emotional processing. These structures are absent or vastly simpler in insects and crustaceans.
3. Cognitive capabilities: Humans demonstrate complex problem-solving, abstract thinking, language use, and long-term planning. While insects and crustaceans show impressive behaviors for their size, their cognitive abilities are much more limited and largely instinctual.
4. Self-awareness: There’s strong evidence for self-awareness in humans (and some other mammals), but little to no evidence for it in insects or crustaceans. The mirror test and other measures of self-awareness have not been passed by these simpler organisms.
5. Emotional complexity: Humans experience a wide range of complex emotions and can reflect on these emotions. While there’s evidence for basic forms of learning and memory in insects and crustaceans, the emotional depth is likely far simpler.
6. Social complexity: Human social interactions involve complex language, culture, and interpersonal relationships. While some insects (like bees) have impressive social structures, they’re based on much simpler communication and don’t approach human-level complexity.
7. Perception of the universe: Humans can contemplate abstract concepts like the nature of the universe, their place in it, and the meaning of existence. There’s no evidence that insects or crustaceans have anything approaching this level of abstract thought.
Regarding the comparison of multiple shrimp or fruit fly lives to a human life:
Even if we were to consider a series of shrimp or fruit fly lives that, when combined, had a total neuron-count-weighted lifespan equivalent to a human, it’s extremely unlikely that this would result in an equivalent richness or diversity of experience. Here’s why:
1. Lack of continuity: Individual experiences wouldn’t accumulate or build on each other across different lives, limiting the potential for complex, long-term learning and development.
2. Simpler sensory systems: The sensory experiences of these organisms are much more limited than humans, restricting the variety and depth of their perceptions.
3. Limited memory and learning: While these organisms can learn, their capacity for complex, long-term memory formation is far more limited than humans.
4. Absence of language and culture: The lack of complex language and cultural transmission severely limits the potential for diverse experiences and knowledge accumulation.
5. Simpler social structures: While some insects have impressive social organizations, they lack the complexity and diversity of human social interactions and relationships.
6. Lack of abstract thinking: The absence of higher-order cognitive functions like abstract reasoning, imagination, and self-reflection fundamentally limits the complexity and diversity of mental experiences.
In conclusion, while shrimp and fruit flies are fascinating organisms with impressive capabilities for their size and neural complexity, current scientific understanding strongly suggests that their experiences are vastly simpler and more limited than human experiences. A collection of their lives, even if matched for total neuron-count-weighted time, would not be expected to approach the diversity, complexity, self-awareness, or richness of a human life.
This perspective underscores the importance of considering factors beyond simple neuron counts or lifespan when assessing the moral weight or value of different forms of life and consciousness. It supports a view that places significant value on the unique capabilities and experiences of more complex organisms, while still recognizing the importance of simpler life forms in their own right.
Sorry a convo with an LLM isn’t likely to convince me of anything, for starters the response on hedonism mainly consists of assertions that there are some philosophers that have opposing views to hedonism. I knew that already...
I would personally say no unless the moments of glory help others sufficiently to offset the negative experiences of the life in question.
In other words, I am a hedonist and I suspect a lot of others in this thread are too.
Conversation with Claude Sonnet 3.5:
Nathan:
What of the view of the possibility that it doesn’t make sense to do a hedonistic summation over experiences, weighted by duration / neuron-count / individual lives / intensity of subjective experience? What if suffering is also a way of experiencing the Universe, and actually has non-negative value in that sense while having negative hedonistic value? I might argue that the existence of a predominantly-but-not-exclusively suffering creature is better than it not existing. How certain can we be of one of these viewpoints over the other?
Claude:
Your question delves into some profound and challenging philosophical territory. Let’s unpack these ideas:
1. Critique of hedonistic summation:
The view that we can’t simply sum up experiences across individuals or species challenges utilitarianism and related consequentialist ethical frameworks. This perspective aligns with critiques from philosophers like Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, who argue that such summations fail to capture important aspects of value and experience.
2. Suffering as a form of experience:
The idea that suffering, while hedonistically negative, might have non-negative value as a way of experiencing the universe is intriguing. It resonates with existentialist philosophy, particularly ideas from thinkers like Viktor Frankl, who argued that meaning can be found even in suffering.
3. Existence vs. non-existence:
Your argument that a predominantly suffering creature’s existence might be preferable to its non-existence touches on deep questions in population ethics and value theory. It relates to Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion” and debates about the value of existence itself.
4. Complexity of value:
These points collectively suggest a much more complex view of value than simple hedonic calculus allows for. This aligns with ideas in moral philosophy about value pluralism and the irreducibility of certain moral concepts.
Regarding certainty, it’s crucial to recognize that these are deeply contested philosophical issues. We cannot be highly certain about any of these viewpoints over others. Here’s why:
1. Subjectivity of experience:
We lack direct access to others’ subjective experiences, making it challenging to compare or aggregate them meaningfully.
2. Philosophical disagreement:
There’s no consensus among philosophers on these issues. Different ethical frameworks (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) would approach these questions differently.
3. Cultural and individual variation:
Views on the value of suffering, existence, and experience vary widely across cultures and individuals.
4. Limits of human cognition:
Our ability to conceptualize and reason about these abstract ethical concepts may be fundamentally limited by our cognitive architecture.
5. Empirical uncertainty:
Many of these questions touch on empirical issues (like the nature of consciousness) that we don’t fully understand scientifically.
Given these factors, I’d argue that we can’t be highly certain of any one viewpoint over the others. What we can do is:
1. Acknowledge the complexity:
Recognize that simplistic frameworks may not capture the full richness of value and experience.
2. Remain open to multiple perspectives:
Consider various ethical viewpoints when making decisions, especially on issues with far-reaching consequences.
3. Seek common ground:
Look for areas of agreement across different ethical frameworks to guide action in the face of uncertainty.
4. Emphasize robustness:
Prefer actions and policies that seem positive or at least not harmful across multiple ethical frameworks.
5. Continue philosophical inquiry:
Engage in ongoing reflection and debate on these issues, recognizing that our understanding may evolve.
In the context of existential risk and animal welfare, this uncertainty suggests that we should:
1. Be cautious about actions based solely on hedonic calculations.
2. Consider multiple dimensions of value when assessing risks and interventions.
3. Place high value on preserving future potential for diverse forms of experience and value.
4. Remain humble about our ability to make definitive ethical judgments, especially on a cosmic scale.
This perspective doesn’t necessarily change the prioritization of existential risk prevention, but it does enrich our understanding of what’s at stake and why it matters.
Nathan:
How likely, based on a current scientific understanding of neuroscience, do you think it is that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human? Would a series of shrimp lives, totaling a neuron-count-weighted length of time relative to a typical human life be expected to have the same diversity and complexity of experiences, the same self-aware perception of Self and the Universe, the same richness of interpersonal connections?
Claude:
Based on our current scientific understanding of neuroscience, it is highly unlikely that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human. Let’s break this down:
1. Neural complexity:
- Humans have approximately 86 billion neurons in their brains.
- Fruit flies have about 100,000 neurons.
- Shrimp have around 100,000 neurons as well.
The vast difference in neural complexity alone suggests a significant gap in cognitive capabilities and experiential depth.
2. Brain structure:
Human brains have highly developed structures like the neocortex, which is associated with higher-order thinking, self-awareness, and complex emotional processing. These structures are absent or vastly simpler in insects and crustaceans.
3. Cognitive capabilities:
Humans demonstrate complex problem-solving, abstract thinking, language use, and long-term planning. While insects and crustaceans show impressive behaviors for their size, their cognitive abilities are much more limited and largely instinctual.
4. Self-awareness:
There’s strong evidence for self-awareness in humans (and some other mammals), but little to no evidence for it in insects or crustaceans. The mirror test and other measures of self-awareness have not been passed by these simpler organisms.
5. Emotional complexity:
Humans experience a wide range of complex emotions and can reflect on these emotions. While there’s evidence for basic forms of learning and memory in insects and crustaceans, the emotional depth is likely far simpler.
6. Social complexity:
Human social interactions involve complex language, culture, and interpersonal relationships. While some insects (like bees) have impressive social structures, they’re based on much simpler communication and don’t approach human-level complexity.
7. Perception of the universe:
Humans can contemplate abstract concepts like the nature of the universe, their place in it, and the meaning of existence. There’s no evidence that insects or crustaceans have anything approaching this level of abstract thought.
Regarding the comparison of multiple shrimp or fruit fly lives to a human life:
Even if we were to consider a series of shrimp or fruit fly lives that, when combined, had a total neuron-count-weighted lifespan equivalent to a human, it’s extremely unlikely that this would result in an equivalent richness or diversity of experience. Here’s why:
1. Lack of continuity:
Individual experiences wouldn’t accumulate or build on each other across different lives, limiting the potential for complex, long-term learning and development.
2. Simpler sensory systems:
The sensory experiences of these organisms are much more limited than humans, restricting the variety and depth of their perceptions.
3. Limited memory and learning:
While these organisms can learn, their capacity for complex, long-term memory formation is far more limited than humans.
4. Absence of language and culture:
The lack of complex language and cultural transmission severely limits the potential for diverse experiences and knowledge accumulation.
5. Simpler social structures:
While some insects have impressive social organizations, they lack the complexity and diversity of human social interactions and relationships.
6. Lack of abstract thinking:
The absence of higher-order cognitive functions like abstract reasoning, imagination, and self-reflection fundamentally limits the complexity and diversity of mental experiences.
In conclusion, while shrimp and fruit flies are fascinating organisms with impressive capabilities for their size and neural complexity, current scientific understanding strongly suggests that their experiences are vastly simpler and more limited than human experiences. A collection of their lives, even if matched for total neuron-count-weighted time, would not be expected to approach the diversity, complexity, self-awareness, or richness of a human life.
This perspective underscores the importance of considering factors beyond simple neuron counts or lifespan when assessing the moral weight or value of different forms of life and consciousness. It supports a view that places significant value on the unique capabilities and experiences of more complex organisms, while still recognizing the importance of simpler life forms in their own right.
Sorry a convo with an LLM isn’t likely to convince me of anything, for starters the response on hedonism mainly consists of assertions that there are some philosophers that have opposing views to hedonism. I knew that already...