You write that Funds like ACE or the EA Animal Welfare Fund can be a solution to the coordination problem when financial cutbacks are necessary (and you donât want to apply across-the-board cuts). Thatâs true, but such funds also create exactly the dependencies on a few large donors that you criticize in the text, donât they? This dependency wouldnât exist if the money came directly from many small donors.
In general, one could say that ACE and EAAWF are better informed than individuals (also regarding the question of which organizations are particularly effective), but the same could be said about OP. I also find that plausible in principle, but I also think that a certain degree of âdemocratizationâ makes sense because it reduces the risk of wrong decisions and keeps a public discussion about effectiveness ongoing, which ultimately (hopefully) leads to better identification of more effective measures.
A lower dependency on major donors could also be good if we assume that (at least in some situations) the organizations themselves are better able than the large donors to assess which measures are most effective. With a high dependency, they might implement the measures preferred by the major donor, even though they actually believe that other measures would be more effective.
And then there are the arguments mentioned in the text. Can the arguments be summarized in such a way that the main problem of fragility is that larger fluctuations in financial resources are to be expected, and in the event of significant cutbacks, structures, experiences, and security that have been built up over years would be lost, and rebuilding them would come with additional costs?
You write that Funds like ACE or the EA Animal Welfare Fund can be a solution to the coordination problem when financial cutbacks are necessary (and you donât want to apply across-the-board cuts). Thatâs true, but such funds also create exactly the dependencies on a few large donors that you criticize in the text, donât they? This dependency wouldnât exist if the money came directly from many small donors.
In general, one could say that ACE and EAAWF are better informed than individuals (also regarding the question of which organizations are particularly effective), but the same could be said about OP. I also find that plausible in principle, but I also think that a certain degree of âdemocratizationâ makes sense because it reduces the risk of wrong decisions and keeps a public discussion about effectiveness ongoing, which ultimately (hopefully) leads to better identification of more effective measures.
A lower dependency on major donors could also be good if we assume that (at least in some situations) the organizations themselves are better able than the large donors to assess which measures are most effective. With a high dependency, they might implement the measures preferred by the major donor, even though they actually believe that other measures would be more effective.
And then there are the arguments mentioned in the text. Can the arguments be summarized in such a way that the main problem of fragility is that larger fluctuations in financial resources are to be expected, and in the event of significant cutbacks, structures, experiences, and security that have been built up over years would be lost, and rebuilding them would come with additional costs?