Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable.
Seems like we’re using words differently. But it’s confusing because you seem to be going against the SEP definition that you gave above in your post:
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance. This importance is to be understood non-instrumentally, that is, independently of the importance of anything that pleasure or displeasure might cause or prevent.
This definition is about pleasure. Hedonists sometimes point out that we shouldn’t interpret “pleasure” too narrowly, i.e., that it’s not just about things like eating great food or orgasm, but also includes “positive experiences” very generally. Even so, the point behind hedonism (as I understand it, and as seems compatible with the SEP definition you gave) is something like “the better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters.” That’s clearly different from the view I’m advocating in the linked post. I’m saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can – depending on their life goals – decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning. Even if their choice (e.g.) means they’ll have a much shorter life that also includes hardships.
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance.
I understand this as meaning that all and only conscious experiences have moral importance. However, I think there is a difference between:
“Ethical value is about how it feels—and nothing else matters” (the way I interpret SEP’s definition).
“The better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters” (your suggested interpretation).
The 2nd of these seems to be about hedonic utilitarianism, not just hedonism as the 1st.
I’m saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can – depending on their life goals – decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning.
It looks like such choices would be compatible with desire and objective list theories, but I realise now that these are encompassed by my (probably unusual) interpretation of hedonism, as conscious experiences are still central to both of them.
Seems like we’re using words differently. But it’s confusing because you seem to be going against the SEP definition that you gave above in your post:
This definition is about pleasure. Hedonists sometimes point out that we shouldn’t interpret “pleasure” too narrowly, i.e., that it’s not just about things like eating great food or orgasm, but also includes “positive experiences” very generally. Even so, the point behind hedonism (as I understand it, and as seems compatible with the SEP definition you gave) is something like “the better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters.” That’s clearly different from the view I’m advocating in the linked post. I’m saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can – depending on their life goals – decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning. Even if their choice (e.g.) means they’ll have a much shorter life that also includes hardships.
Thanks for clarifying.
I understand this as meaning that all and only conscious experiences have moral importance. However, I think there is a difference between:
“Ethical value is about how it feels—and nothing else matters” (the way I interpret SEP’s definition).
“The better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters” (your suggested interpretation).
The 2nd of these seems to be about hedonic utilitarianism, not just hedonism as the 1st.
It looks like such choices would be compatible with desire and objective list theories, but I realise now that these are encompassed by my (probably unusual) interpretation of hedonism, as conscious experiences are still central to both of them.