What do you think is the probability of ethical hedonism being true? The definition is below. You can give your estimate here, and check the answers and respective statistics here.
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance. This importance is to be understood non-instrumentally, that is, independently of the importance of anything that pleasure or displeasure might cause or prevent.
In addition, I wonder whether having the following equalities in mind would clarify discussions about ethics:
“X is morally good/positive” = “X is intrinsically good/positive” = “X ought to be” = “X increases goodness/utility” = “X improves wellbeing (conscious experiences)”.
“X is morally bad/negative” = “X is intrinsically bad/negative” = “X ought not to be” = “X decreases goodness/utility” = “X worsens wellbeing (conscious experiences)”.
In the 1st 2 points, the 3rd and 4th italicised equal signs only apply to utilitarianism and henodism, respectively. However, even if only implicitly/subconsciously, I think people tend to mean “X improves wellbeing according to my best heuristics” when they say “X is morally good”. As Sharon Rawlette mentioned in episode 138 of The 80,000 Hours Podcast:
I actually think that if we didn’t ever experience pleasure [positive conscious experiences] or pain [negative conscious experiences], or any of these positive or negative qualitative states, that we wouldn’t actually have the concept of intrinsic goodness that we do in fact have and that we do use when we’re making moral decisions.
At a fundamental level, I guess differences between ethical theories are only related to the heuristics used to assess the value of actions. For example, the focus in deontology is on following certain rules, and in consequentialism on the consequences of the actions. However, all theories are about assessing conscious experiences, as by definition that is what can be perceived.
If this is so, at least in informal discussions, if not in the literature, it might be useful to have the above equalities in mind, and shift the focus of discussions towards assessing empirical evidence, including our conscious experiences.
However, I think this is compatible with my conception of hedonism, because personal meaning involves conscious experiences.
The thing to do in situations where you’re unsure what’s a terminal value vs. an instrumental value is to design choice situations where the two things come apart. I do this in my post (e.g., the “authenticity” experience machine thought experiment).
Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable. So, since personal meaning, knowledge, autenticity, and reunion each imply conscious experiences, all of those are terminally valuable according to hedonism. A valid counterexample would have to be terminally valuable while not involving conscious experiences.
Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable.
Seems like we’re using words differently. But it’s confusing because you seem to be going against the SEP definition that you gave above in your post:
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance. This importance is to be understood non-instrumentally, that is, independently of the importance of anything that pleasure or displeasure might cause or prevent.
This definition is about pleasure. Hedonists sometimes point out that we shouldn’t interpret “pleasure” too narrowly, i.e., that it’s not just about things like eating great food or orgasm, but also includes “positive experiences” very generally. Even so, the point behind hedonism (as I understand it, and as seems compatible with the SEP definition you gave) is something like “the better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters.” That’s clearly different from the view I’m advocating in the linked post. I’m saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can – depending on their life goals – decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning. Even if their choice (e.g.) means they’ll have a much shorter life that also includes hardships.
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance.
I understand this as meaning that all and only conscious experiences have moral importance. However, I think there is a difference between:
“Ethical value is about how it feels—and nothing else matters” (the way I interpret SEP’s definition).
“The better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters” (your suggested interpretation).
The 2nd of these seems to be about hedonic utilitarianism, not just hedonism as the 1st.
I’m saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can – depending on their life goals – decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning.
It looks like such choices would be compatible with desire and objective list theories, but I realise now that these are encompassed by my (probably unusual) interpretation of hedonism, as conscious experiences are still central to both of them.
[Question] What do you think is the probability of ethical hedonism being true?
What do you think is the probability of ethical hedonism being true? The definition is below. You can give your estimate here, and check the answers and respective statistics here.
Ethical hedonism is defined as follows in the article on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
In addition, I wonder whether having the following equalities in mind would clarify discussions about ethics:
“X is morally good/positive” = “X is intrinsically good/positive” = “X ought to be” = “X increases goodness/utility” = “X improves wellbeing (conscious experiences)”.
“X is morally bad/negative” = “X is intrinsically bad/negative” = “X ought not to be” = “X decreases goodness/utility” = “X worsens wellbeing (conscious experiences)”.
“Pleasure” = “positive utility/wellbeing” = “good/positive conscious experiences”.
“Pain” = “negative utility/wellbeing” = “bad/negative conscious experience”.
In the 1st 2 points, the 3rd and 4th italicised equal signs only apply to utilitarianism and henodism, respectively. However, even if only implicitly/subconsciously, I think people tend to mean “X improves wellbeing according to my best heuristics” when they say “X is morally good”. As Sharon Rawlette mentioned in episode 138 of The 80,000 Hours Podcast:
At a fundamental level, I guess differences between ethical theories are only related to the heuristics used to assess the value of actions. For example, the focus in deontology is on following certain rules, and in consequentialism on the consequences of the actions. However, all theories are about assessing conscious experiences, as by definition that is what can be perceived.
If this is so, at least in informal discussions, if not in the literature, it might be useful to have the above equalities in mind, and shift the focus of discussions towards assessing empirical evidence, including our conscious experiences.
For a case against hedonism, see here.
Thanks for sharing.
Could you give an example of something you value which does not involve conscious experiences? In your post, you say:
However, I think this is compatible with my conception of hedonism, because personal meaning involves conscious experiences.
The thing to do in situations where you’re unsure what’s a terminal value vs. an instrumental value is to design choice situations where the two things come apart. I do this in my post (e.g., the “authenticity” experience machine thought experiment).
Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable. So, since personal meaning, knowledge, autenticity, and reunion each imply conscious experiences, all of those are terminally valuable according to hedonism. A valid counterexample would have to be terminally valuable while not involving conscious experiences.
Seems like we’re using words differently. But it’s confusing because you seem to be going against the SEP definition that you gave above in your post:
This definition is about pleasure. Hedonists sometimes point out that we shouldn’t interpret “pleasure” too narrowly, i.e., that it’s not just about things like eating great food or orgasm, but also includes “positive experiences” very generally. Even so, the point behind hedonism (as I understand it, and as seems compatible with the SEP definition you gave) is something like “the better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters.” That’s clearly different from the view I’m advocating in the linked post. I’m saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can – depending on their life goals – decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning. Even if their choice (e.g.) means they’ll have a much shorter life that also includes hardships.
Thanks for clarifying.
I understand this as meaning that all and only conscious experiences have moral importance. However, I think there is a difference between:
“Ethical value is about how it feels—and nothing else matters” (the way I interpret SEP’s definition).
“The better it feels, the more ethical value – and nothing else matters” (your suggested interpretation).
The 2nd of these seems to be about hedonic utilitarianism, not just hedonism as the 1st.
It looks like such choices would be compatible with desire and objective list theories, but I realise now that these are encompassed by my (probably unusual) interpretation of hedonism, as conscious experiences are still central to both of them.