I felt perhaps one point in this article could use some more nuance: I got the feeling from reading this that there is a high likelihood of escalation to a full nuclear war in case of a first strike. I just wanted to say that this and this question on Metaculus might be relevant. The first forecast says there is a ~25% chance of retaliation if a first strike happens by 2024 (most likely the chance of retaliation against Russia). The second question say that if one weapon is offensively detonated by 2050, the most likely total numer of subsequent detonations by 2050 is around 5 more weapons, so quite far away from something that could cause nuclear winter. I do not think this in any way invalidates the concerns about a nuclear winter, I just wanted to provide some forecasts that I came across in my own work.
We do not know what will happen if a nuclear weapon is again detonated offensively, other than that the world would be forever changed. This is a fear shared by pretty much everyone who deals with nuclear weaponry (including recent speeches at EAG London—such as John Gower, who we met before), and even without immediate retaliation the expected probability of a large scale future exchange would rise hugely in such a world. That’s what I meant about the “all bets are off” line.
Certainly, many countries would seek to acquire weapons under this scenario (especially if the use was against a non nuclear power, which breaks a further taboo), and even if there are no further detonations in 30 days, the chances of a full scale exchange in such a world may rise by an order of magnitude.
I’m not sure that second projection is correct, and I put the mean projected additional detonations at higher levels. However, even if it is an accurate projection, I think the core point of the article holds: An offensive detonation significantly raises the probability of large exchanges, and there is a baseline risk of such an exchange today anyway → Large exchanges with thermonuclear weaponry risk nuclear winters → this is worth considering in our calculus around the expected impacts of nuclear warfare.
Yeah, I only meant to share some data as it seemed relevant, not to take a personal stance. And I think your point on more nation states acquiring nuclear weapons after a first detonation is a really good one and one that is not captured by the Metaculus questions I referred to.
Just to be clear: I think avoiding a nuclear war is important and neglected (unfortunately I am less sure about tractability but it should still be pursued). Both the recent nuclear sabre rattling of Putin, the increase in Chinese stockpiles (along with increased US-China tensions) and the withdrawal of the MacArthur foundation from funding disarmament are terrible signs and make me worry about the future. I even applied to a job here at Stockholm-based SIPRI in part because of my worries both about great power conflict and large-scale nuclear wars.
I felt perhaps one point in this article could use some more nuance: I got the feeling from reading this that there is a high likelihood of escalation to a full nuclear war in case of a first strike. I just wanted to say that this and this question on Metaculus might be relevant. The first forecast says there is a ~25% chance of retaliation if a first strike happens by 2024 (most likely the chance of retaliation against Russia). The second question say that if one weapon is offensively detonated by 2050, the most likely total numer of subsequent detonations by 2050 is around 5 more weapons, so quite far away from something that could cause nuclear winter. I do not think this in any way invalidates the concerns about a nuclear winter, I just wanted to provide some forecasts that I came across in my own work.
Hi Ulrik, good to hear from you again!
We do not know what will happen if a nuclear weapon is again detonated offensively, other than that the world would be forever changed. This is a fear shared by pretty much everyone who deals with nuclear weaponry (including recent speeches at EAG London—such as John Gower, who we met before), and even without immediate retaliation the expected probability of a large scale future exchange would rise hugely in such a world. That’s what I meant about the “all bets are off” line.
Certainly, many countries would seek to acquire weapons under this scenario (especially if the use was against a non nuclear power, which breaks a further taboo), and even if there are no further detonations in 30 days, the chances of a full scale exchange in such a world may rise by an order of magnitude.
I’m not sure that second projection is correct, and I put the mean projected additional detonations at higher levels. However, even if it is an accurate projection, I think the core point of the article holds: An offensive detonation significantly raises the probability of large exchanges, and there is a baseline risk of such an exchange today anyway → Large exchanges with thermonuclear weaponry risk nuclear winters → this is worth considering in our calculus around the expected impacts of nuclear warfare.
Yeah, I only meant to share some data as it seemed relevant, not to take a personal stance. And I think your point on more nation states acquiring nuclear weapons after a first detonation is a really good one and one that is not captured by the Metaculus questions I referred to.
Just to be clear: I think avoiding a nuclear war is important and neglected (unfortunately I am less sure about tractability but it should still be pursued). Both the recent nuclear sabre rattling of Putin, the increase in Chinese stockpiles (along with increased US-China tensions) and the withdrawal of the MacArthur foundation from funding disarmament are terrible signs and make me worry about the future. I even applied to a job here at Stockholm-based SIPRI in part because of my worries both about great power conflict and large-scale nuclear wars.