I was implicitly assuming the probability of hitting the kid or the terrorist is high enough that where the bullet ends strictly matters more than Emily’s pain. If I misunderstood you and this doesn’t address your point, we could also assume that Emily only might have shoulder pain if she takes the shot. Then the difference you point to disappears, right? (And this changes nothing to the thought experiment, assuming risk neutrality and stuff.)
This also makes this second difference disappear, right? On B and C, we’re actually clueful on the out-bracket (the terrorist dwarfs Emily, so it’s better to shoot in expectation). So it’s symmetric to cluefulness on the out-bracket on A.
we could also assume that Emily only might have shoulder pain if she takes the shot
Yeah, if we’re clueless whether Emily will feel pain or not then the difference disappears. In this case I don’t have the pro-not-shooting bracketing intuition.
On B and C, we’re actually clueful on the out-bracket (the terrorist dwarfs Emily, so it’s better to shoot in expectation)
I was thinking on C we’re clueless on the out-bracket, because, conditional on shooting, we might (a) hit the child (bad for everyone except Emily), (b) nothing (neutral for everyone except Emily) or (c) the terrorist (good for everyone except Emily), and we’re clueless whether (a), (b) or (c) is the case. I might misunderstand something, tho.
if we’re clueless whether Emily will feel pain or not then the difference disappears. In this case I don’t have the pro-not-shooting bracketing intuition.
Should this difference matter if we’re not difference-making risk-averse or something? In both cases, C is better for Emily in expectation (the same way reducing potential termite suffering is better for termites, in expectation, even if it might make no difference because they might not be sentient).
Now, new thought experiment. Consider whatever intervention you find robustly overall good in the near-term (without bracketing out any near-term effect) and replace A, B, and C with the following:
A’) Bracket in the bad long-term effects (-> don’t intervene)
B’) Bracket in the good long-term effects (-> intervene)
C’) Bracket in the near-term effects (-> intervene)
Do you have the pro-C’ intuition, then? If yes, what’s different from the sniper case?
I suspect we need to involve our criteria for defining and picking bracketings here.
In practice, I think it doesn’t make sense to just bracket in the bad long-term effects or just bracket in the good ones. You might be able to carve out bracketings that include only bad (or only good) long-term effects and effects outweighed by them, but not all bad (or all good) long-term effects. But that will depend on the particulars.
I think if we only do spatiotemporal bracketing, it tells us to ignore the far future and causally inaccessible spacetime locations, because each such location is made neither determinately better off in expectation nor determinately worse off in expectation. I’m not entirely sure where the time cutoff should start in practice, but it would be related to AGI’s arrival. That could make us neartermist.
But we may also want to bracket out possibilities, not just ST locations. Maybe we can bracket out AGI by date X, for various X (or the min probability of it across choices, in case we affect its probability), and focus on non-AGI outcomes we may be more clueful about. If we bracket out the right set of possibilities, maybe some longtermist interventions will look best.
I think if we only do spatiotemporal bracketing, it tells us to ignore the far future and causally inaccessible spacetime locations, because each such location is made neither determinately better off in expectation nor determinately worse off in expectation.
Oh helpful thanks, this reasoning also works in my sniper case, actually. I am clueful about the “where Emily is right after she potentially shoots” ST location so I can’t bracket out the payoff attached to her shoulder pain. This payoff is contained within this small ST region. However, the payoffs associated with where the bullet ends aren’t neatly contained in small ST regions the same way! I want the terrorist dead because he’s gonna keep terrorizing some parts of the world otherwise. I want the kid alive to prevent the negative consequences (in various ST regions) associated with an innocent kid’s death. Because of this, I arguably can’t pin down any specific ST location other than “where Emily is right after she potentially shoots” that is made determinately better or worse off by Emily taking the shot. Hence, ST bracketing would allow C but not A or B.
To the extent that I’m still skeptical of C being warranted, it is because:
1) I find it weird that finding action-guidance depends on my inability to pin down any specific ST location other than “where Emily is right after she potentially shoots” that is made determinately better or worse off. Say I had a crystal ball randomly showing me a prison cell in Argentina that, for some reason, is empty if Emily shoots and filled with starving people if she doesn’t. ST bracketing would now tell me shooting is better… It feels wrong to decide based on isolated ST regions in which I happen to know what happens depending on whether Emily shoots. There are plenty of other ST regions that would be made better or worse off. I just can’t say where/when they are. And whether or not I can say this feels like it shouldn’t matter.[1]
2) I’m confused as to why we should bracket based on ST regions rather than on some other defensible value-bearers that may give a conflicting result.
And I guess all this also applies to A’ vs B’ vs C’ and whether to bracket out near-term effects. Thanks for helping me identify these cruxes!
I’ll take some more time to think about your point about bracketing out possibilities and AGI by date X.
And that’s one way to interpret Anthony’s first objection to bracketing? I can’t actually pin down a specific ST location (or whatever value-bearer) where donating to AMF is determinately bad, but I still know for sure such locations exist! As I think you alluded to elsewhere while discussing ST bracketing and changes to agriculture/land use, what stops us from acting as if we could pin down such locations?
I was implicitly assuming the probability of hitting the kid or the terrorist is high enough that where the bullet ends strictly matters more than Emily’s pain. If I misunderstood you and this doesn’t address your point, we could also assume that Emily only might have shoulder pain if she takes the shot. Then the difference you point to disappears, right? (And this changes nothing to the thought experiment, assuming risk neutrality and stuff.)
This also makes this second difference disappear, right? On B and C, we’re actually clueful on the out-bracket (the terrorist dwarfs Emily, so it’s better to shoot in expectation). So it’s symmetric to cluefulness on the out-bracket on A.
Yeah, if we’re clueless whether Emily will feel pain or not then the difference disappears. In this case I don’t have the pro-not-shooting bracketing intuition.
I was thinking on C we’re clueless on the out-bracket, because, conditional on shooting, we might (a) hit the child (bad for everyone except Emily), (b) nothing (neutral for everyone except Emily) or (c) the terrorist (good for everyone except Emily), and we’re clueless whether (a), (b) or (c) is the case. I might misunderstand something, tho.
Should this difference matter if we’re not difference-making risk-averse or something? In both cases, C is better for Emily in expectation (the same way reducing potential termite suffering is better for termites, in expectation, even if it might make no difference because they might not be sentient).
Now, new thought experiment. Consider whatever intervention you find robustly overall good in the near-term (without bracketing out any near-term effect) and replace A, B, and C with the following:
A’) Bracket in the bad long-term effects (-> don’t intervene)
B’) Bracket in the good long-term effects (-> intervene)
C’) Bracket in the near-term effects (-> intervene)
Do you have the pro-C’ intuition, then? If yes, what’s different from the sniper case?
I suspect we need to involve our criteria for defining and picking bracketings here.
In practice, I think it doesn’t make sense to just bracket in the bad long-term effects or just bracket in the good ones. You might be able to carve out bracketings that include only bad (or only good) long-term effects and effects outweighed by them, but not all bad (or all good) long-term effects. But that will depend on the particulars.
I think if we only do spatiotemporal bracketing, it tells us to ignore the far future and causally inaccessible spacetime locations, because each such location is made neither determinately better off in expectation nor determinately worse off in expectation. I’m not entirely sure where the time cutoff should start in practice, but it would be related to AGI’s arrival. That could make us neartermist.
But we may also want to bracket out possibilities, not just ST locations. Maybe we can bracket out AGI by date X, for various X (or the min probability of it across choices, in case we affect its probability), and focus on non-AGI outcomes we may be more clueful about. If we bracket out the right set of possibilities, maybe some longtermist interventions will look best.
Oh helpful thanks, this reasoning also works in my sniper case, actually. I am clueful about the “where Emily is right after she potentially shoots” ST location so I can’t bracket out the payoff attached to her shoulder pain. This payoff is contained within this small ST region. However, the payoffs associated with where the bullet ends aren’t neatly contained in small ST regions the same way! I want the terrorist dead because he’s gonna keep terrorizing some parts of the world otherwise. I want the kid alive to prevent the negative consequences (in various ST regions) associated with an innocent kid’s death. Because of this, I arguably can’t pin down any specific ST location other than “where Emily is right after she potentially shoots” that is made determinately better or worse off by Emily taking the shot. Hence, ST bracketing would allow C but not A or B.
To the extent that I’m still skeptical of C being warranted, it is because:
1) I find it weird that finding action-guidance depends on my inability to pin down any specific ST location other than “where Emily is right after she potentially shoots” that is made determinately better or worse off. Say I had a crystal ball randomly showing me a prison cell in Argentina that, for some reason, is empty if Emily shoots and filled with starving people if she doesn’t. ST bracketing would now tell me shooting is better… It feels wrong to decide based on isolated ST regions in which I happen to know what happens depending on whether Emily shoots. There are plenty of other ST regions that would be made better or worse off. I just can’t say where/when they are. And whether or not I can say this feels like it shouldn’t matter.[1]
2) I’m confused as to why we should bracket based on ST regions rather than on some other defensible value-bearers that may give a conflicting result.
And I guess all this also applies to A’ vs B’ vs C’ and whether to bracket out near-term effects. Thanks for helping me identify these cruxes!
I’ll take some more time to think about your point about bracketing out possibilities and AGI by date X.
And that’s one way to interpret Anthony’s first objection to bracketing? I can’t actually pin down a specific ST location (or whatever value-bearer) where donating to AMF is determinately bad, but I still know for sure such locations exist! As I think you alluded to elsewhere while discussing ST bracketing and changes to agriculture/land use, what stops us from acting as if we could pin down such locations?