Sorry this wasnât clear â my arguments throughout this sequence donât just apply to perfect impartiality. I use âimpartialityâ loosely, in the sense in the first sentence of the intro: âgives moral weight to all consequences, no matter how distantâ. (I couldnât think of a better, non-clunky term for this.) See also footnote 4 of the first post:
âNontrivial moral weight to distant consequencesâ is deliberately vague. I mean to include not only unbounded total utilitarianism, but also various bounded-yet-scope-sensitive value functions (see Karnofsky, section âHolden vs. hardcore utilitarianismâ, and Ngo)
Iâm happy to grant that normative neartermism is immune to my arguments. When I said âour reason to work on EA causesâ, I meant âthe reason to work on such causes that my target audience actually endorses.â
I use âimpartialityâ loosely, in the sense in the first sentence of the intro: âgives moral weight to all consequences, no matter how distantâ.
Thanks for clarifying. :)
How about views that gradually discount at the normative level based on temporal distance, like 0.9999t or so? They would give weight to consequences no matter how distant, and still give non-trivial weight to fairly distant consequences (by ordinary standards), yet the weight would go to zero as the distance grows. If normative neartermism is largely immune to your arguments, might such âmedium-termistâ views largely withstand them as well?
(FWIW, I think views of that kind might actually be reasonable, or at least deserve some weight, in terms of what one practically cares about and focuses on â in part for the very reasons you raise.)
I think such a view might also be immune to the problem, depends on the details. But I donât see any non-ad hoc motivation for it. Why would sentient beingsâ interests matter less intrinsically when those beings are more distant or harder to precisely foresee?
(Iâm open to the possibility of wagering on the verdicts of this kind of view due to normative uncertainty. But different discount rates might give opposite verdicts. And seems like a subtle question when this wager becomes too Pascalian. Cf. my thoughts here.)
Why would sentient beingsâ interests matter less intrinsically when those beings are more distant or harder to precisely foresee?
I agree with that sentiment :) But I donât think one would be committed to saying that distant beingsâ interests matter less intrinsically if one âpractically cares/âfocusesâ disproportionally on beings who are in some sense closer to us (e.g. as a kind of mid-level normative principle or stance). The latter view might simply reflect the fact that we inhabit a particular place in time and space, and that we can plausibly better help beings in our vicinity (e.g. the next few thousands of years) compared to those who might exist very far away (e.g. beyond a trillion years from now), without there being any sharp cut-off between our potential to help them.
FWIW, I donât think itâs ad hoc or unmotivated. As an extreme example, one might consider a planet with sentient life that theoretically lies just inside our future light cone from time t_now, such that if we travelled out there today at the theoretical maximum speed, then we, or meaningful signals, could reach them just before cosmic expansion makes any further reach impossible. In theory, we could influence them, and in some sense merely wagging a finger right now has a theoretical influence on them. Yet it nevertheless seems to me quite defensible to practically disregard (or near-totally disregard, Ă la asymptotic discount) these effects given how remote they are (assuming a CDT framework).
Perhaps such a position can be viewed from the lens of an âapplicability domainâ: to a first approximation, the ideal of total impartiality is plausibly âpractically morally applicableâ on all of Earth and on and somewhat beyond our usual timescales. And we are right to strongly endorse it at this unusually large scale (i.e. unusual relative to prevailing values). But it also seems plausible that its applicability gradually breaks down when we approach extreme values.
Indeed, bracketing off âinfinite ethics shenanigansâ could be seen as an implicit acknowledgment of such a de-facto breakdown or boundary in the practical scope of impartiality. After all, there is a non-zero probability of an infinite future with sentient life, even if thatâs not what our current cosmological models suggest (cf. Schwitzgebelâs Washout Argument Against Longtermism). Thus, it seems that if we limit infinite outcomes from dominating everything, we have already set some kind of practical boundary (even if itâs a practical boundary of asymptotic convergence toward zero across an in-theory infinite scope). If so, it seems that the question is to clarify the nature and scope of that practical boundary, not whether itâs there or not.
One might then say that infinite ethics considerations indeed count as an additional, perhaps also devastating challenge to any form of impartial altruism. But in that case, the core objection reduces to a fairly familiar objection about problems with infinities. If we make an alternative case, in which we assume that infinities can be set aside or practically limited, then it seems we have already de facto assumed some practical boundary.
In theory, we could influence them, and in some sense merely wagging a finger right now has a theoretical influence on them. Yet it nevertheless seems to me quite defensible to practically disregard (or near-totally disregard, Ă la asymptotic discount) these effects given how remote they are
Sorry, Iâm having a hard time understanding why you think this is defensible. One view you might be gesturing at is:
If a given effect is not too remote, then we can model actions A and Bâs causal connections to that effect with relatively high precision â enough to justify the claim that A is more/âless likely to result in the effect than B.
If the effect is highly remote, we canât do this. (Or, alternatively, we should treat A and B as precisely equally likely to result in the effect.)
Therefore, we can only systematically make a difference to effects of type (1). So only those effects are practically relevant.
But this reasoning doesnât seem to hold up for the same reasons Iâve given in my critiques of Option 3 and Symmetry. So Iâm not sure what your actual view is yet. Can you please clarify? (Or, if the above is your view, I can try to unpack why my critiques of Option 3 and Symmetry apply just as well here.)
(I unfortunately donât have time to engage with the rest of this comment, just want to clarify the following:)
Indeed, bracketing off âinfinite ethics shenanigansâ could be seen as an implicit acknowledgment of such a de-facto breakdown or boundary in the practical scope of impartiality.
Sorry this wasnât clear â I in fact donât think weâre justified in ignoring infinite ethics. In the footnote youâre quoting, I was simply erring on the side of being generous to the non-clueless view, to make things easier to follow. So my core objection doesnât reduce to âproblems with infinitiesâ, rather I object to ignoring considerations that dominate our impact for no particular reason other than practical expedience. :) (ETA: Which isnât to say we need to solve infinite ethics to be justified in anything.)
I was simply erring on the side of being generous to the non-clueless view
Right, I suspected that â hence the remark about infinite ethics considerations counting as an additional problem to whatâs addressed here. My point was that the non-clueless view addressed here (finite case) already implicitly entails scope limitations, so if one embraces that view, the question seems to be what the limitation (or discounting) in scope is, not whether there is one.
I meant âthe reason to work on such causes that my target audience actually endorses.â
I suspect there are many people in your target audience who donât exclusively endorse, or strictly need to rely on, the views you critique as their reason to work on EA causes (I guess Iâm among them).
Sorry this wasnât clear â my arguments throughout this sequence donât just apply to perfect impartiality. I use âimpartialityâ loosely, in the sense in the first sentence of the intro: âgives moral weight to all consequences, no matter how distantâ. (I couldnât think of a better, non-clunky term for this.) See also footnote 4 of the first post:
Iâm happy to grant that normative neartermism is immune to my arguments. When I said âour reason to work on EA causesâ, I meant âthe reason to work on such causes that my target audience actually endorses.â
Thanks for clarifying. :)
How about views that gradually discount at the normative level based on temporal distance, like 0.9999t or so? They would give weight to consequences no matter how distant, and still give non-trivial weight to fairly distant consequences (by ordinary standards), yet the weight would go to zero as the distance grows. If normative neartermism is largely immune to your arguments, might such âmedium-termistâ views largely withstand them as well?
(FWIW, I think views of that kind might actually be reasonable, or at least deserve some weight, in terms of what one practically cares about and focuses on â in part for the very reasons you raise.)
I think such a view might also be immune to the problem, depends on the details. But I donât see any non-ad hoc motivation for it. Why would sentient beingsâ interests matter less intrinsically when those beings are more distant or harder to precisely foresee?
(Iâm open to the possibility of wagering on the verdicts of this kind of view due to normative uncertainty. But different discount rates might give opposite verdicts. And seems like a subtle question when this wager becomes too Pascalian. Cf. my thoughts here.)
I agree with that sentiment :) But I donât think one would be committed to saying that distant beingsâ interests matter less intrinsically if one âpractically cares/âfocusesâ disproportionally on beings who are in some sense closer to us (e.g. as a kind of mid-level normative principle or stance). The latter view might simply reflect the fact that we inhabit a particular place in time and space, and that we can plausibly better help beings in our vicinity (e.g. the next few thousands of years) compared to those who might exist very far away (e.g. beyond a trillion years from now), without there being any sharp cut-off between our potential to help them.
FWIW, I donât think itâs ad hoc or unmotivated. As an extreme example, one might consider a planet with sentient life that theoretically lies just inside our future light cone from time t_now, such that if we travelled out there today at the theoretical maximum speed, then we, or meaningful signals, could reach them just before cosmic expansion makes any further reach impossible. In theory, we could influence them, and in some sense merely wagging a finger right now has a theoretical influence on them. Yet it nevertheless seems to me quite defensible to practically disregard (or near-totally disregard, Ă la asymptotic discount) these effects given how remote they are (assuming a CDT framework).
Perhaps such a position can be viewed from the lens of an âapplicability domainâ: to a first approximation, the ideal of total impartiality is plausibly âpractically morally applicableâ on all of Earth and on and somewhat beyond our usual timescales. And we are right to strongly endorse it at this unusually large scale (i.e. unusual relative to prevailing values). But it also seems plausible that its applicability gradually breaks down when we approach extreme values.
Indeed, bracketing off âinfinite ethics shenanigansâ could be seen as an implicit acknowledgment of such a de-facto breakdown or boundary in the practical scope of impartiality. After all, there is a non-zero probability of an infinite future with sentient life, even if thatâs not what our current cosmological models suggest (cf. Schwitzgebelâs Washout Argument Against Longtermism). Thus, it seems that if we limit infinite outcomes from dominating everything, we have already set some kind of practical boundary (even if itâs a practical boundary of asymptotic convergence toward zero across an in-theory infinite scope). If so, it seems that the question is to clarify the nature and scope of that practical boundary, not whether itâs there or not.
One might then say that infinite ethics considerations indeed count as an additional, perhaps also devastating challenge to any form of impartial altruism. But in that case, the core objection reduces to a fairly familiar objection about problems with infinities. If we make an alternative case, in which we assume that infinities can be set aside or practically limited, then it seems we have already de facto assumed some practical boundary.
Sorry, Iâm having a hard time understanding why you think this is defensible. One view you might be gesturing at is:
If a given effect is not too remote, then we can model actions A and Bâs causal connections to that effect with relatively high precision â enough to justify the claim that A is more/âless likely to result in the effect than B.
If the effect is highly remote, we canât do this. (Or, alternatively, we should treat A and B as precisely equally likely to result in the effect.)
Therefore, we can only systematically make a difference to effects of type (1). So only those effects are practically relevant.
But this reasoning doesnât seem to hold up for the same reasons Iâve given in my critiques of Option 3 and Symmetry. So Iâm not sure what your actual view is yet. Can you please clarify? (Or, if the above is your view, I can try to unpack why my critiques of Option 3 and Symmetry apply just as well here.)
(I unfortunately donât have time to engage with the rest of this comment, just want to clarify the following:)
Sorry this wasnât clear â I in fact donât think weâre justified in ignoring infinite ethics. In the footnote youâre quoting, I was simply erring on the side of being generous to the non-clueless view, to make things easier to follow. So my core objection doesnât reduce to âproblems with infinitiesâ, rather I object to ignoring considerations that dominate our impact for no particular reason other than practical expedience. :) (ETA: Which isnât to say we need to solve infinite ethics to be justified in anything.)
Right, I suspected that â hence the remark about infinite ethics considerations counting as an additional problem to whatâs addressed here. My point was that the non-clueless view addressed here (finite case) already implicitly entails scope limitations, so if one embraces that view, the question seems to be what the limitation (or discounting) in scope is, not whether there is one.
I suspect there are many people in your target audience who donât exclusively endorse, or strictly need to rely on, the views you critique as their reason to work on EA causes (I guess Iâm among them).