(In reference to Why the Subjective Experience of Time Matters)
Should welfare capacity, or at least, if used for moral weight, be understood as “instantaneous” rather than duration-based? I can’t really imagine giving more inherent moral weight to certain animals (or humans) just because they live longer or experience more subjective time, all else equal, on top of also accumulating their welfare over their lives, since that definitely seems like double counting (although using welfare capacity already might be double counting, as you’ve suggested in the previous post and comments, but I think it’s even worse with subjective time).
Rather, at a fundamental level, objective time should just be replaced with subjective time, and that’s the only thing that should be changed in the typical ethical calculus.
I think only instantaneous welfare capacity/moral weight makes sense with empty individualism, too.
Thanks as always for your many thoughtful comments.
By definition, differences in the subjective experience of time can only affect diachronic welfare (that is, welfare across time).
I agree that differences in the subjective experience of time shouldn’t affect moral status—that would amount to double-counting. An individual’s welfare shouldn’t be worth more (less) just because she has more (less) of it.
I don’t find it problematic, however, to think that differences in the subjective experience of time affect (diachronic) capacity for welfare. If two species have the same lifespan as measured in objective time, but species A has a characteristically faster rate of subjective experience than species B, then, all else equal, we should prioritize lifetime welfare improvements to species A because there is more welfare at stake.
That said, if the capacity for welfare angle is confusing or conceptually unsound, I think it’s fine to frame the issue solely in terms of differences to realized welfare.
(In reference to Why the Subjective Experience of Time Matters)
Should welfare capacity, or at least, if used for moral weight, be understood as “instantaneous” rather than duration-based? I can’t really imagine giving more inherent moral weight to certain animals (or humans) just because they live longer or experience more subjective time, all else equal, on top of also accumulating their welfare over their lives, since that definitely seems like double counting (although using welfare capacity already might be double counting, as you’ve suggested in the previous post and comments, but I think it’s even worse with subjective time).
Rather, at a fundamental level, objective time should just be replaced with subjective time, and that’s the only thing that should be changed in the typical ethical calculus.
I think only instantaneous welfare capacity/moral weight makes sense with empty individualism, too.
Hey Michael.
Thanks as always for your many thoughtful comments.
By definition, differences in the subjective experience of time can only affect diachronic welfare (that is, welfare across time).
I agree that differences in the subjective experience of time shouldn’t affect moral status—that would amount to double-counting. An individual’s welfare shouldn’t be worth more (less) just because she has more (less) of it.
I don’t find it problematic, however, to think that differences in the subjective experience of time affect (diachronic) capacity for welfare. If two species have the same lifespan as measured in objective time, but species A has a characteristically faster rate of subjective experience than species B, then, all else equal, we should prioritize lifetime welfare improvements to species A because there is more welfare at stake.
That said, if the capacity for welfare angle is confusing or conceptually unsound, I think it’s fine to frame the issue solely in terms of differences to realized welfare.