Thanks as always for your many thoughtful comments.
By definition, differences in the subjective experience of time can only affect diachronic welfare (that is, welfare across time).
I agree that differences in the subjective experience of time shouldn’t affect moral status—that would amount to double-counting. An individual’s welfare shouldn’t be worth more (less) just because she has more (less) of it.
I don’t find it problematic, however, to think that differences in the subjective experience of time affect (diachronic) capacity for welfare. If two species have the same lifespan as measured in objective time, but species A has a characteristically faster rate of subjective experience than species B, then, all else equal, we should prioritize lifetime welfare improvements to species A because there is more welfare at stake.
That said, if the capacity for welfare angle is confusing or conceptually unsound, I think it’s fine to frame the issue solely in terms of differences to realized welfare.
Hey Michael.
Thanks as always for your many thoughtful comments.
By definition, differences in the subjective experience of time can only affect diachronic welfare (that is, welfare across time).
I agree that differences in the subjective experience of time shouldn’t affect moral status—that would amount to double-counting. An individual’s welfare shouldn’t be worth more (less) just because she has more (less) of it.
I don’t find it problematic, however, to think that differences in the subjective experience of time affect (diachronic) capacity for welfare. If two species have the same lifespan as measured in objective time, but species A has a characteristically faster rate of subjective experience than species B, then, all else equal, we should prioritize lifetime welfare improvements to species A because there is more welfare at stake.
That said, if the capacity for welfare angle is confusing or conceptually unsound, I think it’s fine to frame the issue solely in terms of differences to realized welfare.