My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary is their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable
I worry youâre reifying âexpectationsâ as something objective here. The relative actual masses of the objects are clearly comparable. But if you subjectively canât compare them, then theyâre indeed incomparable âin expectationâ in the relevant sense.
I would be able to subjectively compare the mass of the 2 objects with more evidence. Some comparisons may not be feasible with currently available evidence, but the degree of imprecision should be set by what is physically possible?
If you had more evidence, you could make the comparison. But you currently have no clue which direction the comparison would go, in expectation over the evidence you might receive. So how are you supposed to compare them right now?
I would simply say the expected mass is practically (not exactly) the same given the evidence available to me, and consider gathering additional evidence depending on how much I expected this to change future decisions. Likewise for altruistic interventions among which comparisons of the expected change in welfare feel very arbitrary.
I donât know what you mean by âpractically the sameâ, can you say more?
Regardless, the problem is that âgathering evidenceâ vs âdoing something elseâ is itself a decision, whose consequences youâll be clueless about. I discuss this more here.
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence regardless of whether the mass of the 2 identical objects was exactly the same or differed by 10^-6 kg.
Do you think annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900? Child mortality decreased 37.3 pp (= 0.41 â 0.037) since then until 2023. If you agree annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900, are you confident that similar progress cannot be extented to non-humans? Would you have argued 200 years ago that we are all clueless about how to increase human welfare? I agree research can backfire. However, at least historically, doing research on the sentience of animals, and on how to increase their welfare has mostly been beneficial for the target animals?
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence
Perhaps, but thatâs consistent with incomparability. Given the independent motivations weâve discussed (/âgiven in my post) for calling the two options incomparable, Iâd say you should call them incomparable.
I worry youâre reifying âexpectationsâ as something objective here. The relative actual masses of the objects are clearly comparable. But if you subjectively canât compare them, then theyâre indeed incomparable âin expectationâ in the relevant sense.
I would be able to subjectively compare the mass of the 2 objects with more evidence. Some comparisons may not be feasible with currently available evidence, but the degree of imprecision should be set by what is physically possible?
If you had more evidence, you could make the comparison. But you currently have no clue which direction the comparison would go, in expectation over the evidence you might receive. So how are you supposed to compare them right now?
I would simply say the expected mass is practically (not exactly) the same given the evidence available to me, and consider gathering additional evidence depending on how much I expected this to change future decisions. Likewise for altruistic interventions among which comparisons of the expected change in welfare feel very arbitrary.
I donât know what you mean by âpractically the sameâ, can you say more?
Regardless, the problem is that âgathering evidenceâ vs âdoing something elseâ is itself a decision, whose consequences youâll be clueless about. I discuss this more here.
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence regardless of whether the mass of the 2 identical objects was exactly the same or differed by 10^-6 kg.
Do you think annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900? Child mortality decreased 37.3 pp (= 0.41 â 0.037) since then until 2023. If you agree annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900, are you confident that similar progress cannot be extented to non-humans? Would you have argued 200 years ago that we are all clueless about how to increase human welfare? I agree research can backfire. However, at least historically, doing research on the sentience of animals, and on how to increase their welfare has mostly been beneficial for the target animals?
Perhaps, but thatâs consistent with incomparability. Given the independent motivations weâve discussed (/âgiven in my post) for calling the two options incomparable, Iâd say you should call them incomparable.
I think I address your questions in the second paragraph in âWhy weâre especially unaware of large-scale consequencesâ (this post) and âMeta-extrapolationâ (post #4). See also my discussion with Richard here.