My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary if their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable. Likewise, my best guess about which of 2 actions increases welfare more in expectation may be arbitrary without this implying that their expected change in welfare is incomparable.
I am not sure it matters whether one endorses precise expected values (EVs) or not. In practice, I still like to test different EVs when the underlying probability density function (PDF) is very arbitrary and uncertain, as it is the case for PDFs of welfare ranges. In such cases, I suspect decreasing uncertainty to find the best options has higher EV than the supposedly imprecise EVs of going with the current best option.
My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary is their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable
I worry you’re reifying “expectations” as something objective here. The relative actual masses of the objects are clearly comparable. But if you subjectively can’t compare them, then they’re indeed incomparable “in expectation” in the relevant sense.
I would be able to subjectively compare the mass of the 2 objects with more evidence. Some comparisons may not be feasible with currently available evidence, but the degree of imprecision should be set by what is physically possible?
If you had more evidence, you could make the comparison. But you currently have no clue which direction the comparison would go, in expectation over the evidence you might receive. So how are you supposed to compare them right now?
I would simply say the expected mass is practically (not exactly) the same given the evidence available to me, and consider gathering additional evidence depending on how much I expected this to change future decisions. Likewise for altruistic interventions among which comparisons of the expected change in welfare feel very arbitrary.
I don’t know what you mean by “practically the same”, can you say more?
Regardless, the problem is that “gathering evidence” vs “doing something else” is itself a decision, whose consequences you’ll be clueless about. I discuss this more here.
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence regardless of whether the mass of the 2 identical objects was exactly the same or differed by 10^-6 kg.
Do you think annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900? Child mortality decreased 37.3 pp (= 0.41 − 0.037) since then until 2023. If you agree annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900, are you confident that similar progress cannot be extented to non-humans? Would you have argued 200 years ago that we are all clueless about how to increase human welfare? I agree research can backfire. However, at least historically, doing research on the sentience of animals, and on how to increase their welfare has mostly been beneficial for the target animals?
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence
Perhaps, but that’s consistent with incomparability. Given the independent motivations we’ve discussed (/given in my post) for calling the two options incomparable, I’d say you should call them incomparable.
Thanks for following up, Anthony.
My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary if their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable. Likewise, my best guess about which of 2 actions increases welfare more in expectation may be arbitrary without this implying that their expected change in welfare is incomparable.
I am not sure it matters whether one endorses precise expected values (EVs) or not. In practice, I still like to test different EVs when the underlying probability density function (PDF) is very arbitrary and uncertain, as it is the case for PDFs of welfare ranges. In such cases, I suspect decreasing uncertainty to find the best options has higher EV than the supposedly imprecise EVs of going with the current best option.
I worry you’re reifying “expectations” as something objective here. The relative actual masses of the objects are clearly comparable. But if you subjectively can’t compare them, then they’re indeed incomparable “in expectation” in the relevant sense.
I would be able to subjectively compare the mass of the 2 objects with more evidence. Some comparisons may not be feasible with currently available evidence, but the degree of imprecision should be set by what is physically possible?
If you had more evidence, you could make the comparison. But you currently have no clue which direction the comparison would go, in expectation over the evidence you might receive. So how are you supposed to compare them right now?
I would simply say the expected mass is practically (not exactly) the same given the evidence available to me, and consider gathering additional evidence depending on how much I expected this to change future decisions. Likewise for altruistic interventions among which comparisons of the expected change in welfare feel very arbitrary.
I don’t know what you mean by “practically the same”, can you say more?
Regardless, the problem is that “gathering evidence” vs “doing something else” is itself a decision, whose consequences you’ll be clueless about. I discuss this more here.
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence regardless of whether the mass of the 2 identical objects was exactly the same or differed by 10^-6 kg.
Do you think annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900? Child mortality decreased 37.3 pp (= 0.41 − 0.037) since then until 2023. If you agree annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900, are you confident that similar progress cannot be extented to non-humans? Would you have argued 200 years ago that we are all clueless about how to increase human welfare? I agree research can backfire. However, at least historically, doing research on the sentience of animals, and on how to increase their welfare has mostly been beneficial for the target animals?
Perhaps, but that’s consistent with incomparability. Given the independent motivations we’ve discussed (/given in my post) for calling the two options incomparable, I’d say you should call them incomparable.
I think I address your questions in the second paragraph in “Why we’re especially unaware of large-scale consequences” (this post) and “Meta-extrapolation” (post #4). See also my discussion with Richard here.