In the last 80.000 podcast Hugh White made a compelling case that the US cares less about Taiwan than China. Given shifts in relative might, I wonder how feasible it is as a long-term strategy to hope to deter China forever.
This article seems to assume under current deterrence China sees the costs of a Taiwan invasion as higher than the long-term benefits. Still, I’m a little afraid part of their calculus is an expectation that the costs will be lower in the future as their relative might increases and Taiwan might opt for a more peaceful resolution. If this is the case any build-up in deterrence might only provoke China into an invasion, as the expectation of future costs increase and long-term Taiwanese independence is unacceptable to them.
More military power could also increase the costs in case of an invasion, so you need to be quite confident that deterrence will work and continue working indefinitely.
To me, the most tractable part of this equation seems to be the chance that the USA intervenes, but I’m profoundly uncertain if it would be better for the world if this were higher or lower. Do you have any views on that?
I’m a little nervous around geopolitics as a philanthropic cause area cause it seems so easy to harm when information and calculations are imperfect (and our information will be extremely imperfect). Decreasing the likelihood of conflict often comes from either sacrificing a lot of well-being by conceding important points (if Taiwan became part of China that would surely reduce the probability of great power conflict, at least in the short-medium term, but be awful in many other ways), increasing the cost of conflict (as I think your suggestion would do) and decreasing the cost often seems to come from increasing the likelihood/conceding important points. Do you think there are clear things we can do in this space to mitigate downside risks?
I don’t think China would need to be deterred forever. I think it would need to probably be deterred for the next ~10 years. After which…
India will probably step into global power status, and become a peer competitor with China. Unless they’ve settled their substantial border issues, this seems like a very plausible source of conflict from the PRC’s perspective. Most interstate conflicts are border skirmishes (I think).
I note this in the essay, but the PRC is in a rough neighborhood. If they act on Taiwan they need to be confident they can also ensure that a competitor like India doesn’t take the opportunity to make a move to resolve a border dispute. The same goes for any adversary who they have conflicting territorial claims with in the South China sea.
Whatever is happening with AI will probably pan out and for better or worse we’re in a world beyond our ability to easily imagine.
Demographic issues in China will start to bite which I think will relate to a broader risk aversion (a pretty weak reason).
More military power could also increase the costs in case of an invasion, so you need to be quite confident that deterrence will work and continue working indefinitely.
Yes, I agree on the first part. Not on the “indefinitely” part.
To me, the most tractable part of this equation seems to be the chance that the USA intervenes, but I’m profoundly uncertain if it would be better for the world if this were higher or lower. Do you have any views on that?
Reducing the chance the USA intervenes doesn’t strike me as very tractable. What are you imagining here?
Grassroots campaigns towards isolationism (isolationism is now associated with the right so not sure about that)
General advocacy of austerity with cuts to defense budget (that could do it but less direct and very hard to do).
Make some deal with China conditional on non-intervention in Taiwan?
I’m a little nervous around geopolitics as a philanthropic cause area cause it seems so easy to harm when information and calculations are imperfect (and our information will be extremely imperfect). [...]
Do you think there are clear things we can do in this space to mitigate downside risks?
I am also nervous and agree with the downside risks. I suspect there are some clear actions we can take, but I think we definitely need more research to know which are the best of the bunch.
I do stand by one of my main arguments that encouraging Taiwan to defend itself more smartly will make it less likely China invades. But I’m not committed to this as being the most cost-effective option. There are many other options I spent less time on like advocating that the USA minimize unhelpful and inflammatory diplomatic showmanship like the Pelosi visit.
Grassroots campaigns towards isolationism (isolationism is now associated with the right so not sure about that)
Given that the right is current dominant in US foreign policy, and will probably remain so for the next 4-8 years, something being associated with the right should probably increase your estimate of its tractability.
(I think promoting isolationism is bad for other reasons).
In the last 80.000 podcast Hugh White made a compelling case that the US cares less about Taiwan than China. Given shifts in relative might, I wonder how feasible it is as a long-term strategy to hope to deter China forever.
This article seems to assume under current deterrence China sees the costs of a Taiwan invasion as higher than the long-term benefits. Still, I’m a little afraid part of their calculus is an expectation that the costs will be lower in the future as their relative might increases and Taiwan might opt for a more peaceful resolution. If this is the case any build-up in deterrence might only provoke China into an invasion, as the expectation of future costs increase and long-term Taiwanese independence is unacceptable to them.
More military power could also increase the costs in case of an invasion, so you need to be quite confident that deterrence will work and continue working indefinitely.
You also mentioned this equation:
”37% chance of invasion × 50% USA intervenes × 5% nuclear risk = 0.9% nuclear war”
To me, the most tractable part of this equation seems to be the chance that the USA intervenes, but I’m profoundly uncertain if it would be better for the world if this were higher or lower. Do you have any views on that?
I’m a little nervous around geopolitics as a philanthropic cause area cause it seems so easy to harm when information and calculations are imperfect (and our information will be extremely imperfect). Decreasing the likelihood of conflict often comes from either sacrificing a lot of well-being by conceding important points (if Taiwan became part of China that would surely reduce the probability of great power conflict, at least in the short-medium term, but be awful in many other ways), increasing the cost of conflict (as I think your suggestion would do) and decreasing the cost often seems to come from increasing the likelihood/conceding important points. Do you think there are clear things we can do in this space to mitigate downside risks?
I don’t think China would need to be deterred forever. I think it would need to probably be deterred for the next ~10 years. After which…
India will probably step into global power status, and become a peer competitor with China. Unless they’ve settled their substantial border issues, this seems like a very plausible source of conflict from the PRC’s perspective. Most interstate conflicts are border skirmishes (I think).
I note this in the essay, but the PRC is in a rough neighborhood. If they act on Taiwan they need to be confident they can also ensure that a competitor like India doesn’t take the opportunity to make a move to resolve a border dispute. The same goes for any adversary who they have conflicting territorial claims with in the South China sea.
Whatever is happening with AI will probably pan out and for better or worse we’re in a world beyond our ability to easily imagine.
Demographic issues in China will start to bite which I think will relate to a broader risk aversion (a pretty weak reason).
Yes, I agree on the first part. Not on the “indefinitely” part.
Reducing the chance the USA intervenes doesn’t strike me as very tractable. What are you imagining here?
Grassroots campaigns towards isolationism (isolationism is now associated with the right so not sure about that)
General advocacy of austerity with cuts to defense budget (that could do it but less direct and very hard to do).
Make some deal with China conditional on non-intervention in Taiwan?
I am also nervous and agree with the downside risks. I suspect there are some clear actions we can take, but I think we definitely need more research to know which are the best of the bunch.
I do stand by one of my main arguments that encouraging Taiwan to defend itself more smartly will make it less likely China invades. But I’m not committed to this as being the most cost-effective option. There are many other options I spent less time on like advocating that the USA minimize unhelpful and inflammatory diplomatic showmanship like the Pelosi visit.
Given that the right is current dominant in US foreign policy, and will probably remain so for the next 4-8 years, something being associated with the right should probably increase your estimate of its tractability.
(I think promoting isolationism is bad for other reasons).
There we are with the ludic fallacy. We’re probably wrong about 80 % 100 % of time.