They mean something much more narrow, which is âsomeone becoming less of an effective altruistâ. They never mention drifts from some altruistic values to other altruistic values or from some non-altruistic values to other non-altruistic values (ex.: going from a positive hedonist to a negative hedonist). And they especially never frame becoming more altruistic as a value drift, even though I have the impression a bunch of Effective Altruists approach outreach like that (but not everyone; ex.: Against moral advocacy). I feel itâs missing perspective to frame âvalueâ in such a narrow idiosyncratic way.
I think these are interesting points, with some merit. But I also think a key point to note is that these conversations/âwritings are usually about value drift among EAs. Given that context, it seems to me understandable that the focus is on shifts from more to less altruism, rather than the inverse or shifts of the non-altruistic values. (That said, it is of course true that âeven EAsâ will have non-altruistic values that could shift.)
I also think âvalue driftâ as typically used does include shifting from some altruistic values to other altruistic values. For example, I think if someone had been considering high-impact, EA-aligned careers but then switched to allocating most of their energies to things like working at a homeless shelter, this would typically be seen as value drift; the person is still altruistic, but no longer as effective. (Two caveats are required here: First, itâs conceivable that for some people the highest impact option would be working at a homeless shelter. Second, a person can of course still âcount as EAâ even if they spend some of their energies on âcommon-senseâ do-gooding.)
If they have the same value, but just became worse at fulfilling them, then itâs more something like âepistemic driftâ; although I would probably discourage using that term.
On the other end, if they started caring more about homeless people intrinsically for some reason, then it would be a value drift. But they wouldnât be âless effectiveâ, they would, presumably, be as effective, but just at a different goal.
I agree that someone can become less effective at acting on a set of values without changing what their values are. The inverse can also occur; e.g. training, practice, or reading can help one be more effective at achieving their values. (See also.)
(My comment wasnât in tension with that idea; I just didnât bring that up as I didnât see that as part of the point you were making in the paragraph I quoted.)
But I think âvalue driftâ away from EA is probably relatively rarely that someone has the exact same values (including âsurface-level valuesâ) but âforgetsâ how to act on them, or develops mistaken beliefs about how to act on them. I think itâs more often either that their âfundamentalâ values shift in a substantial way, or something like they just stop caring as much about EA cause areas or approaches. The latter doesnât require that they no longer think what EAs are doing is valuable; they might just feel less engaged or motivated by it. That still seems to me like something we can call âvalue driftâ.
We could also perhaps call it âmotivation driftâ, ârevealed preference driftâ, or something else like that. But âvalue driftâ seems adequate to me, for those cases.
On the other end, if they started caring more about homeless people intrinsically for some reason, then it would be a value drift. But they wouldnât be âless effectiveâ, they would, presumably, be as effective, but just at a different goal.
I agree that they can be described as effectively pursuing another goal (if indeed theyâre doing that effectively). But I donât think that prevents us from saying theyâre âless effectiveâ, as a shorthand for âtheyâre less effectively achieving good in the worldâ. And this in turn can be from our own perspective. As I mentioned in another comment, I think people speak in that sort of way very often (e.g., when saying âpositive impactâ), and that itâs easy enough to understand that thatâs what people mean.
I think these are interesting points, with some merit. But I also think a key point to note is that these conversations/âwritings are usually about value drift among EAs. Given that context, it seems to me understandable that the focus is on shifts from more to less altruism, rather than the inverse or shifts of the non-altruistic values. (That said, it is of course true that âeven EAsâ will have non-altruistic values that could shift.)
I also think âvalue driftâ as typically used does include shifting from some altruistic values to other altruistic values. For example, I think if someone had been considering high-impact, EA-aligned careers but then switched to allocating most of their energies to things like working at a homeless shelter, this would typically be seen as value drift; the person is still altruistic, but no longer as effective. (Two caveats are required here: First, itâs conceivable that for some people the highest impact option would be working at a homeless shelter. Second, a person can of course still âcount as EAâ even if they spend some of their energies on âcommon-senseâ do-gooding.)
If they have the same value, but just became worse at fulfilling them, then itâs more something like âepistemic driftâ; although I would probably discourage using that term.
On the other end, if they started caring more about homeless people intrinsically for some reason, then it would be a value drift. But they wouldnât be âless effectiveâ, they would, presumably, be as effective, but just at a different goal.
I agree that someone can become less effective at acting on a set of values without changing what their values are. The inverse can also occur; e.g. training, practice, or reading can help one be more effective at achieving their values. (See also.)
(My comment wasnât in tension with that idea; I just didnât bring that up as I didnât see that as part of the point you were making in the paragraph I quoted.)
But I think âvalue driftâ away from EA is probably relatively rarely that someone has the exact same values (including âsurface-level valuesâ) but âforgetsâ how to act on them, or develops mistaken beliefs about how to act on them. I think itâs more often either that their âfundamentalâ values shift in a substantial way, or something like they just stop caring as much about EA cause areas or approaches. The latter doesnât require that they no longer think what EAs are doing is valuable; they might just feel less engaged or motivated by it. That still seems to me like something we can call âvalue driftâ.
We could also perhaps call it âmotivation driftâ, ârevealed preference driftâ, or something else like that. But âvalue driftâ seems adequate to me, for those cases.
I agree that they can be described as effectively pursuing another goal (if indeed theyâre doing that effectively). But I donât think that prevents us from saying theyâre âless effectiveâ, as a shorthand for âtheyâre less effectively achieving good in the worldâ. And this in turn can be from our own perspective. As I mentioned in another comment, I think people speak in that sort of way very often (e.g., when saying âpositive impactâ), and that itâs easy enough to understand that thatâs what people mean.