In addition to Will MacAskill’s critique of functional decision theory (MIRI-originated and intended to be relevant for AI alignment), there’s this write-up by someone that refereed FDT’s submission to a philosophy journal:
My recommendation was to accept resubmission with major revisions, but since the article had already undergone a previous round of revisions and still had serious problems, the editors (understandably) decided to reject it. I normally don’t publish my referee reports, but this time I’ll make an exception because the authors are well-known figures from outside academia, and I want to explain why their account has a hard time gaining traction in academic philosophy.
Since then, the related paper Cheating Death in Damascus has apparently been accepted by The Journal of Philosophy, though it doesn’t seem to be published yet.
The Wolfgang Schwarz writeup is exactly the sort of thing I’m looking for; thank you!
Will’s critique is also a reasonable fit; I was hoping to avoid “EA people reviewing other EA people,” but he seems to approach the topic in his capacity as a philosopher and shows no sign of soft-pedaling his critique.
In addition to Will MacAskill’s critique of functional decision theory (MIRI-originated and intended to be relevant for AI alignment), there’s this write-up by someone that refereed FDT’s submission to a philosophy journal:
Since then, the related paper Cheating Death in Damascus has apparently been accepted by The Journal of Philosophy, though it doesn’t seem to be published yet.
The Wolfgang Schwarz writeup is exactly the sort of thing I’m looking for; thank you!
Will’s critique is also a reasonable fit; I was hoping to avoid “EA people reviewing other EA people,” but he seems to approach the topic in his capacity as a philosopher and shows no sign of soft-pedaling his critique.