Hmm, looking again at Greavesâ paper, it seems like it really is the case that the concept of âcluelessnessâ itself, in the philosophical literature, is meant to be something quite absolute. From Greavesâ introduction:
The cluelessness worry. Assume determinism.1 Then, for any given (sufficiently precisely described) act A, there is a fact of the matter about which possible world would be realised â what the future course of history would be â if I performed A. Some acts would lead to better consequences (that is, better future histories) than others. Given a pair of alternative actions A1, A2, let us say that
(OB: Criterion of objective c-betterness) A1 is objectively c-better than A2 iff the consequences of A1 are better than those of A2.
It is obvious that we can never be absolutely certain, for any given pair of acts A1, A2, of whether or not A1 is objectively c-better than A2. This in itself would be neither problematic nor surprising: there is very little in life, if anything, of which we can be absolutely certain. Some have argued, however, for the following further claim:
(CWo: Cluelessness Worry regarding objective c-betterness) We can never have even the faintest idea, for any given pair of acts (A1, A2), whether or not A1 is objectively c-better than A2.
This âcluelessness worryâ has at least some more claim to be troubling.
So at least in her account of how other philosophers have used the term, it refers to not having âeven the faintest ideaâ which act is better. This also fits with what âcluelessnessâ arguably should literally mean (having no clue at all). This seems to me (and I think to Greavesâ?) quite distinct from the idea that itâs very very very* hard to predict which act is better, and thus even whether an act is net positive.
And then Greaves later calls this âsimple cluelessnessâ, and introduces the idea of âcomplex cluelessnessâ for something even more specific and distinct from the basic idea of things being very very very hard to predict.
Having not read many other papers on cluelessness, I canât independently verify that Greaves is explaining their usage of âcluelessnessâ well. But from that, it does seem to me that âcluelessnessâ is intended to refer to something more specific (and, in my view, less well-founded) than what Iâve seen some EAs use it to refer to (the very true and important idea that many actions are very very very hard to predict the value of).
(Though I havenât re-read the rest of the paper for several months, so perhaps ânever have even the faintest ideaâ doesnât mean what Iâm taking it to mean, or thereâs some other complexity that counters my points.)
*Iâm now stepping away from saying âextremely hard to predictâ, because one might argue that that should, taken literally, mean âas hard to predict as anything could ever beâ, which might be the same as âso hard to predict that we canât have even the faintest ideaâ.
Hmm, looking again at Greavesâ paper, it seems like it really is the case that the concept of âcluelessnessâ itself, in the philosophical literature, is meant to be something quite absolute. From Greavesâ introduction:
So at least in her account of how other philosophers have used the term, it refers to not having âeven the faintest ideaâ which act is better. This also fits with what âcluelessnessâ arguably should literally mean (having no clue at all). This seems to me (and I think to Greavesâ?) quite distinct from the idea that itâs very very very* hard to predict which act is better, and thus even whether an act is net positive.
And then Greaves later calls this âsimple cluelessnessâ, and introduces the idea of âcomplex cluelessnessâ for something even more specific and distinct from the basic idea of things being very very very hard to predict.
Having not read many other papers on cluelessness, I canât independently verify that Greaves is explaining their usage of âcluelessnessâ well. But from that, it does seem to me that âcluelessnessâ is intended to refer to something more specific (and, in my view, less well-founded) than what Iâve seen some EAs use it to refer to (the very true and important idea that many actions are very very very hard to predict the value of).
(Though I havenât re-read the rest of the paper for several months, so perhaps ânever have even the faintest ideaâ doesnât mean what Iâm taking it to mean, or thereâs some other complexity that counters my points.)
*Iâm now stepping away from saying âextremely hard to predictâ, because one might argue that that should, taken literally, mean âas hard to predict as anything could ever beâ, which might be the same as âso hard to predict that we canât have even the faintest ideaâ.