It sounds like we’re at least roughly on the same page. I certainly agree that e.g. Greaves and Mogensen don’t seem tothink that “the long-term effect of our actions is hard to predict, but this is just a more pronounced version of it being harder to predict the weather in one day than in one hour, and we can’t say anything interesting about this”.
As I said:
To be fair, it’s motivated by a bit more, but arguably not much more: that bit is roughly that some philosophers think that the “hard to predict” observation at least suggests one can say something philosophically interesting about it, and in particular that it might pose some kind of challenge for standard accounts of reasoning under uncertainty such as expected value.
I would still guess that to the extent that these two (and other) philosophers advance more specific accounts of cluelessness—say, non-sharp credence functions—they don’t take their specific proposal to be part of the definition of cluelessness, or to be criterion for whether the term ‘cluelessness’ refers to anything at all. E.g. suppose philosopher A thought that cluelessness involves non-sharp credence functions, but then philosopher B convinces them that the same epistemic state is better described by having sharp credence functions with low resilience (i.e. likely to change a lot in response to new evidence). I’d guess that philosopher A would say “you’ve convinced me that cluelessness is just low credal resilience instead of having sharp credence functions” as opposed to “you’ve convinced me that I should discard the concept of cluelessness—there is no cluelessness, just low credal resilience”.
(To be clear, I think in principle either of theses uses of cluelessness would be possible. I’m also less confident that my perception of the common use is correct than I am for terms that are older and have a larger literature attached to them, such as the examples I gave in my previous comment.)
Hmm, looking again at Greaves’ paper, it seems like it really is the case that the concept of “cluelessness” itself, in the philosophical literature, is meant to be something quite absolute. From Greaves’ introduction:
The cluelessness worry. Assume determinism.1 Then, for any given (sufficiently precisely described) act A, there is a fact of the matter about which possible world would be realised – what the future course of history would be – if I performed A. Some acts would lead to better consequences (that is, better future histories) than others. Given a pair of alternative actions A1, A2, let us say that
(OB: Criterion of objective c-betterness) A1 is objectively c-better than A2 iff the consequences of A1 are better than those of A2.
It is obvious that we can never be absolutely certain, for any given pair of acts A1, A2, of whether or not A1 is objectively c-better than A2. This in itself would be neither problematic nor surprising: there is very little in life, if anything, of which we can be absolutely certain. Some have argued, however, for the following further claim:
(CWo: Cluelessness Worry regarding objective c-betterness) We can never have even the faintest idea, for any given pair of acts (A1, A2), whether or not A1 is objectively c-better than A2.
This ‘cluelessness worry’ has at least some more claim to be troubling.
So at least in her account of how other philosophers have used the term, it refers to not having “even the faintest idea” which act is better. This also fits with what “cluelessness” arguably should literally mean (having no clue at all). This seems to me (and I think to Greaves’?) quite distinct from the idea that it’s very very very* hard to predict which act is better, and thus even whether an act is net positive.
And then Greaves later calls this “simple cluelessness”, and introduces the idea of “complex cluelessness” for something even more specific and distinct from the basic idea of things being very very very hard to predict.
Having not read many other papers on cluelessness, I can’t independently verify that Greaves is explaining their usage of “cluelessness” well. But from that, it does seem to me that “cluelessness” is intended to refer to something more specific (and, in my view, less well-founded) than what I’ve seen some EAs use it to refer to (the very true and important idea that many actions are very very very hard to predict the value of).
(Though I haven’t re-read the rest of the paper for several months, so perhaps “never have even the faintest idea” doesn’t mean what I’m taking it to mean, or there’s some other complexity that counters my points.)
*I’m now stepping away from saying “extremely hard to predict”, because one might argue that that should, taken literally, mean “as hard to predict as anything could ever be”, which might be the same as “so hard to predict that we can’t have even the faintest idea”.
It sounds like we’re at least roughly on the same page. I certainly agree that e.g. Greaves and Mogensen don’t seem to think that “the long-term effect of our actions is hard to predict, but this is just a more pronounced version of it being harder to predict the weather in one day than in one hour, and we can’t say anything interesting about this”.
As I said:
I would still guess that to the extent that these two (and other) philosophers advance more specific accounts of cluelessness—say, non-sharp credence functions—they don’t take their specific proposal to be part of the definition of cluelessness, or to be criterion for whether the term ‘cluelessness’ refers to anything at all. E.g. suppose philosopher A thought that cluelessness involves non-sharp credence functions, but then philosopher B convinces them that the same epistemic state is better described by having sharp credence functions with low resilience (i.e. likely to change a lot in response to new evidence). I’d guess that philosopher A would say “you’ve convinced me that cluelessness is just low credal resilience instead of having sharp credence functions” as opposed to “you’ve convinced me that I should discard the concept of cluelessness—there is no cluelessness, just low credal resilience”.
(To be clear, I think in principle either of theses uses of cluelessness would be possible. I’m also less confident that my perception of the common use is correct than I am for terms that are older and have a larger literature attached to them, such as the examples I gave in my previous comment.)
Hmm, looking again at Greaves’ paper, it seems like it really is the case that the concept of “cluelessness” itself, in the philosophical literature, is meant to be something quite absolute. From Greaves’ introduction:
So at least in her account of how other philosophers have used the term, it refers to not having “even the faintest idea” which act is better. This also fits with what “cluelessness” arguably should literally mean (having no clue at all). This seems to me (and I think to Greaves’?) quite distinct from the idea that it’s very very very* hard to predict which act is better, and thus even whether an act is net positive.
And then Greaves later calls this “simple cluelessness”, and introduces the idea of “complex cluelessness” for something even more specific and distinct from the basic idea of things being very very very hard to predict.
Having not read many other papers on cluelessness, I can’t independently verify that Greaves is explaining their usage of “cluelessness” well. But from that, it does seem to me that “cluelessness” is intended to refer to something more specific (and, in my view, less well-founded) than what I’ve seen some EAs use it to refer to (the very true and important idea that many actions are very very very hard to predict the value of).
(Though I haven’t re-read the rest of the paper for several months, so perhaps “never have even the faintest idea” doesn’t mean what I’m taking it to mean, or there’s some other complexity that counters my points.)
*I’m now stepping away from saying “extremely hard to predict”, because one might argue that that should, taken literally, mean “as hard to predict as anything could ever be”, which might be the same as “so hard to predict that we can’t have even the faintest idea”.