The key actors involved in FTX were extremely close to the EA community. SBF became involved after a 1:1? conversation with Will MacAskill, worked at CEA for a short while, held prime speaking slots at EAG, and set up and funded a key organization (FTX fund). Caroline held an officer position in her university EA group. It’s fair to say the people at the center of the fraud were embedded and more tightly aligned with the EA movement than most people connected with EA. It’s a classic example of high-trust / bad actors—it only takes a few of them to cause serious damage.
Is this just a black swan event? Perhaps.
Are there more bad actors in the EA community? Perhaps.
You are certainly welcome to keeping treating EA as high-trust community, but others have good reason not to.
SBF became involved after a 1:1? conversation with Will MacAskill, worked at CEA for a short while, held prime speaking slots at EAG, and set up and funded a key organization (FTX fund).
Only the last point seems concerning to me because Sam was working closely together with figures very central within EA at a time when some of the red flags should already have been visible. By contrast, I think it’s unreasonable to hold anyone responsible for another person’s negative impact if you motivate them to do something in a 1-on-1 conversation or if some “bad actor” briefly worked at [central EA organization]. We can’t be responsible for the behavior of everyone we ever interact with! It’s not always possible to vet people’s character in a single conversation or even during a brief period of working together. (And sometimes people get more corrupted over time – though I’d expect there to be early warning signs pretty much always.) I think the EA community made big mistakes with respect to FTX, but that’s precisely because many EAs have interacted with Sam over many years and worked closely together with him before the collapse.
The key actors involved in FTX were extremely close to the EA community. SBF became involved after a 1:1? conversation with Will MacAskill, worked at CEA for a short while, held prime speaking slots at EAG, and set up and funded a key organization (FTX fund). Caroline held an officer position in her university EA group. It’s fair to say the people at the center of the fraud were embedded and more tightly aligned with the EA movement than most people connected with EA. It’s a classic example of high-trust / bad actors—it only takes a few of them to cause serious damage.
Is this just a black swan event? Perhaps. Are there more bad actors in the EA community? Perhaps.
You are certainly welcome to keeping treating EA as high-trust community, but others have good reason not to.
Only the last point seems concerning to me because Sam was working closely together with figures very central within EA at a time when some of the red flags should already have been visible. By contrast, I think it’s unreasonable to hold anyone responsible for another person’s negative impact if you motivate them to do something in a 1-on-1 conversation or if some “bad actor” briefly worked at [central EA organization]. We can’t be responsible for the behavior of everyone we ever interact with! It’s not always possible to vet people’s character in a single conversation or even during a brief period of working together. (And sometimes people get more corrupted over time – though I’d expect there to be early warning signs pretty much always.) I think the EA community made big mistakes with respect to FTX, but that’s precisely because many EAs have interacted with Sam over many years and worked closely together with him before the collapse.